Beyond Structured Settlements

Reliance Structured Settlement Annuities

What happens, or should happen, to structured settlement payees when the owner of their structured settlement annuities becomes insolvent?

Reliance Insurance Company (Reliance), a liability insurer, is the most recent example where these issues are being adjudicated. Previous examples include Monarch Capital Corporation and First Executive Corporation, both non-insurance companies which, as "qualified assignees", owned structured settlement annuities issued by their subsidiary life insurance companies.

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania (Liquidation Court) declared Reliance insolvent and issued an Order of Liquidation which appointed the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner as Liquidator in 2001.

The Reliance Estate, however, remains open and its current assets include approximately 3,400 structured settlement annuity contracts which the Liquidator estimates have a present discounted value of $95.1 million. The Liquidator further estimates:

• Over 85 percent of the structured settlement annuity contracts owned by the Reliance Estate are “qualified assignment” contracts and the rest are “buy and hold” contracts.
• Over 95 percent of the qualified assignment contracts owned by the Reliance Estate involve annuity contracts issued by United Pacific Life Insurance Company, a former Reliance subsidiary which Reliance sold in 1993 and which is now known as Genworth Life Insurance Company.

As part of the Reliance liquidation process, current Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner Michael F. Consedine requested the Liquidation Court on September 10, 2012 to enter an Order approving transfer of ownership of these structured settlement annuity contracts to the annuity payees which, in many cases, now include factoring companies and investors who have purchased structured settlement payment rights from factoring companies.

On February 28, 2013, Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Judge Bonnie Brigance Leadbetter ordered the Liquidator’s Application for Approval to Transfer Ownership (Transfer Application) “be held in abeyance until further order of this Court.”

As justification for the proposed transfer of structured settlement ownership, the Transfer Application provides in part:

• With the exception of several structured settlement annuities issued by Executive Life of California and Executive Life of New York (ELNY), all payments related to structured settlement annuities owned by the Reliance Estate have been paid by the annuity issuers.
• The structured settlement annuity payees will have the same right to receive payments from the annuity issuers assuming transfer of ownership to the payees.
• As owner of the annuity contracts, Reliance has the right to transfer ownership upon notice to the annuity issuers.
• The Liquidator has concluded that transferring ownership of the annuity contracts to current payees under those contracts, with the simultaneous discharge of Reliance’s related structured settlement payment obligations:
  • Would be in the “best interest” of the Reliance Estate and represents “the only viable option”; and
  • Would not create any federal income tax liability for Reliance.
• Recognizing that any asset transfer requires prior court approval, the Liquidator “explored several other options” including transfer of the annuity contracts to:
  • A newly-formed entity such as a subsidiary corporation; and/or
  • A trust owned by Reliance.
• The Liquidator, however, concluded that any and all such alternative options would fail to provide the Reliance Estate with finality and expense reduction.

The Liquidator’s Transfer Application provides the following additional comments about the Reliance structured settlement payees:

• Tax consequences – The Liquidator concluded “it is impossible and imprudent” for the Liquidator to make predictions or provide tax advice for the payees because each has unique circumstances. Accordingly, “payees may want to consult a tax advisor or accountant with respect to the [proposed] transfer.”
• Priority in liquidation – If any structured settlement annuity issuer fails to meet its structured settlement obligation (which the Transfer Application questionably refers to as “the primary obligation”), the Liquidator has determined a claim against the Reliance Estate under a “qualified assignment” contract “would warrant no higher than class (e) priority" under the Pennsylvania Insurance Company Act. The Liquidator, however, anticipates no Reliance creditors below class (b) priority will receive any distribution from the Reliance Estate.
• Notice – The Liquidator does not have a complete list of current names and addresses of Reliance structured settlement payees in part because Reliance did not retain copies of either the annuity contracts or other structured settlement documents issued by United Pacific Life Insurance Company when it sold the company in 1993. The Liquidator assumes Reliance structured settlement annuity issuers have the ability to furnish individual notice. In addition, the Liquidator plans to publish notice in multiple regional and national newspapers.

Additional Resources

• For additional documents related to the Reliance Liquidation, see the Reliance Documents website.
• For additional information about the resolution of Monarch Capital Corporation structured settlements, see Section 5.04[2][b][ii] of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J).
• For additional information about the resolution of First Executive Corporation structured settlements, see the structured settlement wiki and S2P2J Sections 3.05[11-13].
• For a discussion of alternative funding options ("qualified assignments" vs. "buy and hold") in the context of the ELNY liquidation, see "ELNY Qualified Assignments".

Structured Settlements in 2012 - 2

Settlement Planning

Compared with the structured settlement primary market, which was characterized by continuing sales declines in 2012, the related settlement planning market appears to have experienced growth and vitality in 2012.

The primary evidence of this growth and vitality consisted of the increasing number of educational conferences addressing settlement planning topics during 2012. These included:

• Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) Annual Meeting
• Risk Settlement Planning Practicum
• Academy of Special Needs Planners (ASNP) Annual Meeting
• Qualified Settlement Fund Symposium
• Various National Academy of Elder Law Attorney (NAELA) Conferences - of which S2KM attended the 2012 Ohio NAELA Unprogram.

One of the challenges for measuring the growth of the settlement planning market is the lack of market metrics. For example, despite continuing market inquiries, S2KM has been unable to identify reliable national market metrics for qualified settlement funds, special needs trusts, settlement trusts, or Medicare set-aside arrangements.

Towers Watson Studies

The most valuable market research for settlement planning S2KM has identified has been the Annual Studies of United States Tort Costs published by Towers Watson (formerly Towers Perrin) since 1985. These studies:

• Calculate tort costs resulting from five insured plus uninsured business lines: 1) commercial multi-peril; 2) medical malpractice; 3) product liability; 4) other liability; and 5) commercial auto.
• Exclude: 1) no-fault auto insurance; 2) property coverages; 3) workers compensation; 4) certain extraordinary (one time) costs.
• In 2002, Towers Watson also translated overall tort costs for 2001 into the following categories and percentages: 1) administrative costs (21%); 2) defense costs (14%); plaintiff attorneys (19%); economic loss (22%) and non-economic loss (24%). Towers Perrin discontinued this portion of its analysis in 2002. It was "devilishly difficult" according to Russ Sutter, a Towers Watson principal and actuary who directs their annual tort cost studies, "primarily because we lack reliable information from plaintiff attorneys". These percentages therefore represented Tower Watson's "best estimate" in 2002.

Based upon Towers Watson's most recent 2011 Annual Study and utilizing Tower Watson's 2002 "best estimate" of payout percentages, S2KM estimates, that at least since 2006, more than $160 billion of United States tort costs annually have represented payments to injury victims and their attorneys.

Settlement Planning Issues

Among many settlement planning issues, S2KM viewed the following as the most strategically important during 2012:

• The evolutionary relationship between structured settlements and settlement planning;
• Comparing these two business models;
• Improving settlement planning by expanding structured settlements;
• What we have learned about the settlement planning market;
• Settlement planning tax challenges - including stress-induced physical ailments;
• How the Affordable Care Act (ACA) impacts settlement planning;
• How states are reforming Medicaid programs to address budgetary shortfalls and the ACA;
• Whether a standard of practice exists for using Medicare set-aside arrangements in liability cases;
• The application of product suitability standards to settlement plans funded with structured settlements;
• The impact of Dodd-Frank's uniform fiduciary standard on settlement planning.

Additional post in S2KM's blog series: "Structured Settlements in 2012":

• Part 1 - Primary market

• Part 2 - Settlement planning

• Part 3 - Secondary market

• Part 4 - Executive Life of New York

NASP 2012 Annual Conference - 2

Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the enactment of IRC 5891, the National Association of Settlement Purchasers (NASP) hosted its 2012 Annual Conference last week in New Orleans.

The conference featured an ambitious and successful educational program highlighting prior NASP accomplishments and focusing on emerging issues that impact both the primary and secondary structured settlement markets. For the first time in NASP's history, conference attendance was open to primary market participants.

S2KM previously published an introductory blog post identifying NASP 2012 conference speakers and topics and providing links to S2KM reports from previous NASP conferences. Subsequent S2KM blog posts will recap speaker presentations.

This blog post offers S2KM's general observations and impressions of some of the broader structured settlement industry issues based upon NASP's 2012 conference.

Why Has Factoring Flourished?

Compared with the primary structured settlement market, both NASP and the secondary market appear to be flourishing. What explains this paradoxical success?

The groundwork for secondary structured settlement market success began in 1997 when NASP launched a strategic lobbying initiative resulting in the enactment of IRC 5891 and NCOIL's Model State Structured Settlement Protection Act (Model Act).

Although neither legislative development would have been possible without support from the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA), the lobbying agendas of the two associations were markedly different. Ultimately NASP prevailed on several critical issues including:

• "Best interest" standard vs. NSSTA's preferred "financial hardship" standard.
• Denying annuity owners and providers the right to veto proposed transfers.
• Eliminating maximum discount rates.

In addition to NASP's lobbying success, NASP's members have achieved considerable, and controversial, marketing success utilizing aggressive television advertizing and sophisticated Internet techniques. As one measure of this marketing success, the primary market now claims the secondary market has "stolen the structured settlement brand".

Both the primary and the secondary structured settlement markets were devastated by the 2008 financial crisis which:

• Temporarily shut down asset-backed securities markets including securities backed by structured settlement payment rights.
• Created an industry liquidity crisis which resulted in:
  • J.G. Wentworth, the largest secondary market company, entering bankruptcy in 2009.
  • AIG, the largest primary market company, receiving a financial bailout from the U.S. government in 2008 and 2009.
  • Both Wentworth and AIG have subsequently recovered and regained their respective market leadership roles.
• Reduced interest rates to historic low levels causing a substantial reduction in primary market sales beginning in 2009.

As of the 2012 second calendar quarter, the secondary structured settlement market appears to have fully recovered from the 2008 financial crisis. The primary market has not yet recovered. Part of the reason is that interest rates, whether high or low, affect the primary and secondary structured settlement markets differently.

Other reasons, however, also help explain the growing success of the secondary structured settlement market.

• Structured settlement transfers improve the structured settlement product by addressing a critical need for many structured settlement recipients - a liquidity need that was not properly addressed in the original settlement plan or, alternatively, resulted from unanticipated developments.
• Continuing strong demand exists among some institutional and individual investors for recycled structured settlement payment rights.

Linked Markets - Same Customers

Having failed politically to end structured settlement factoring, NSSTA, and many annuity providers, have adopted alternative strategies which appear to be misguided attempts to create obstacles and impede the growth of the secondary structured settlement market.

NSSTA's 2006 bylaw amendments represent one such example. As NSSTA explained to its members: "because [the secondary market] activities [prohibited by the amendments] are inconsistent with the membership qualifications, engaging in those activities can lead to suspension or expulsion from membership and to denial of new membership applications." (emphasis added).

The increasing "administrative fees" annuity providers charge factoring companies, either as a condition to avoid "opposed transfers" or to allow transfers of life contingent payment rights, represents another example. Ultimately, the structured settlement recipients who transfer payment rights pay for those administrative fees which, for some annuity providers, now represent a new profit center.

How do these types of actions help the structured settlement customer or improve the structured settlement industry?

Both NSSTA and NASP, and their members, share a common existential interest in IRC 104(a)(2) and 130. Both NSSTA and NASP recognize the anticipated re-writing of the U.S. tax code expected to begin following the 2012 Presidential election represents a threat to those tax sections.

Arguably, the existence of IRC 5891, which not only links to IRC 104(a)(2) and 130, but also to the 48 state structured settlement protection statutes, has both expanded and strengthened the U.S. structured settlement legislative framework.

Having collaborated to help enact IRC 5891 and the NCOIL Model Act, shouldn't NSSTA and NASP also collaborate to defend and maintain IRC 104(a)(2) and 130 - and to identify additional shared interests for structured settlement industry improvement and growth?

Improving Industry Education

In his opening comments at the NASP 2012 conference, outgoing NASP President Matthew Bracy challenged attendees to make the structured settlement transfer business better: "better in the marketplace, better in the courts, and above all better for the customers who so need the service this industry provides."

One way NASP "walks the walk" of secondary market improvement is by inviting its critics to speak at NASP conferences. NASP challenges these critics not only to address secondary market problems but also to recommend improvements.

Critics who have spoken at past NASP conferences include: Jack Meligan, Stephen Harris, Peter Vodola, John Darer, and Richard Risk. Other critics, including NSSTA leaders, have been invited but have declined to participate.

Jan Schlichtmann, keynote speaker for the 2012 NASP conference, began by stating: "I don't like your advertizing". He then praised NASP for inviting and encouraging criticism to better itself and the secondary structured settlement market.

NSSTA also has permitted criticism as part of its educational programs. Examples include: Joseph DiGangi (see: "Settlement Consulting") and Dan Clark (see: "SSP and NSSTA 2010 Annual Meetings"). Whenever NSSTA has addressed strategically important and/or controversial issues (egs. IRC 468B and IRC 5891), however, NSSTA members generally hear only "politically correct" speakers and perspectives.

Because of the importance of issues such as qualified settlement funds (QSFs) and the secondary market for the future of structured settlements, NSSTA members increasingly must rely upon non-NSSTA educational programs and educational resources to interact with the people and ideas challenging and changing the structured settlement industry.

During 2012, these educational programs have included: the SSP conference, the ASNP conference, the Risk settlement planning practicum and the QSF symposium.

Fortunately for NSSTA members, as well as members of the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP), NASP has now opened an entirely new educational forum to challenge and expand their understanding of structured settlements.

S2P2J Release 52

Publisher Law Journal Press anticipates a late October 2012 distribution date for hardcopy supplements for Release 52 of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J). Online S2P2J will also be updated late October 2012 to include Release 52 materials. First published in 1986, S2P2J is co-authored and updated semi-annually by Daniel W. Hindert, Joseph J. Dehner and Patrick J. Hindert. Both the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA) and the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) utilize S2P2J as an educational resource for their certification programs.

Release 52 Highlights

Documenting a structured settlement is generally more complicated than the paper work involved with a lump sum settlement. Structured settlement documentation can be further complicated depending upon the number of claimants and annuities, whether plaintiff attorneys defer their fees, the need to allocate damages, the degree of government benefit planning and the growing integration of annuities and trusts into blended products.

Increasingly, therefore, the parties to a structured settlement agreement must endeavor to implement complex settlement plans, using multiple funding devices, designed to address both the intent of the parties and compliance and accountability requirements from the public sector.

To assist structured settlement participants in achieving these objectives, S2P2J Release 52 features new sample structured settlement forms with suggested alternate clauses for use as circumstances change. The new sample forms include a model Structured Settlement Agreement, with a Supplemental Schedule to more conveniently address funding details, plus an optional Advisory Disclosure document specifying the involvement, services and commission sharing (if any) of structured settlement consultants used by the claimant, defendant and liability insurer(s).

The Supplemental Schedule provides a useful, alternative format for specifying the funding details of the settlement, including:

• The amount of up-front payments and their recipients.
• The cost to purchase funding for the periodic payments.
• A provision if the claimant’s attorney will receive periodic payments.
• Allocations by the parties between tax-free and taxable payments.
• Amount of monthly payments and whether they will extend for the claimant’s lifetime or for the greater of claimant’s lifetime or a set period of time.
• Any deferred lump sums to be paid.
• Contingent payee provisions in case payments remain due after claimant’s death.
• Provisions needed for minor’s or protected person’s settlements.
• Specific payee designations, including post office addresses or account information for electronic deposits.
• Designation of attorneys to be paid and at what address or to what account number.
• Language used to permit or disallow later transfers of periodic payment rights.

To help explain these new structured settlement forms, the authors have added extensive related commentary discussing how to create enforceable structured settlement agreements that minimize the risk of post-closing issues.

Release 52 also features a comprehensive update of the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) liquidation plus new and/or expanded analyses for the following structured settlement industry issues and case developments:

• International use of structured settlements.
• Whether defendants save money, historically and currently, using structured settlements.
• New Treasury regulations for IRC section 104(a)(2).
• Allocating settlement proceeds between taxable and tax-exempt elements.
• How special needs trusts can prevent private health care organizations from obtaining subrogation reimbursements from SNT beneficiaries.
• New case law addressing structured settlements for minors issues.
• Bankruptcy court decisions analyzing whether and when a bankruptcy trustee can access structured settlement benefits.
• New cases addressing differences between state periodic payment of judgment statutes that do and do not include termination provisions.
• The State of Washington's new Claims Resolution Structured Settlement Agreement for workers compensation cases.
• The new CMS Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery Portal offering authorized users access and the ability to update pending case information.
• Secondary market case update including:
  • Approval and denial of transfers based upon the "best interest" and "fair and reasonable"  tests.
  • Whether a structured attorney fee is subject to the state structured settlement protection statutes.

For highlights of prior "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" updates, see the structured settlement wiki.

"Only Half the Story"

In an August 2, 2012 blog post titled "Uniform Fiduciary Standards Only Half the Story", John Darer offers the following critique of this earlier S2KM blog post: "It's a pity that an otherwise well written blog post by Patrick Hindert about Uniform Fiduciary Standards, unexplainably omits standards for the secondary market."

S2KM's blog post addressed the following issue: "What impact will a new uniform fiduciary standard, being developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as one result of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), have upon existing structured settlement and settlement planning business models and practices?"

Without any discussion of the secondary market, S2KM's blog post also highlighted certain traditional primary market structured settlement business practices that fail to meet any fiduciary standard:

• Misrepresentations or omission of material facts; and
• Conflicts of interest - without written, informed client and/or customer consent.

John's blog post makes two valid points. First, that S2KM's blog post ignored secondary market standards. Second, despite enactment of IRC section 5891 and state structured settlement protection statutes, bad business practices continue to exist in the secondary market. John's blog post identifies several such practices.

By "setting aside the good players", however, John's blog post spotlights existing bad business practices but does not identify or address secondary structured settlement market business standards. What are those secondary market standards - and how do (or should) these standards impact the primary market?

Looking specifically at the "uniform fiduciary standard" (the subject of the S2KM blog post in question), the related secondary market standard is the "best interest" test. There are three sources that establish and/or address this secondary market standard: 1) IRC section 5891; 2) the state structured settlement protection statutes; and 3) judicial interpretations of the "best interest" standard.

IRC Section 5891

IRC section 5891 imposes a 40 percent excise tax on any person who acquires structured settlement payment rights in a factoring transaction. The excise tax, however, does not apply if the transfer is approved in advance in a "qualified order" issued under an applicable state statute by an applicable state court.

IRC section 5891(b)(2) defines a qualified order as “a final order, judgment or decree” that satisfies two requirements: a qualified order must find the transfer of the structured settlement payment rights:

• does not contravene:
  • Any Federal or State statute or
  • The order of any court or responsible administrative authority; and
• Is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents.

State Structured Settlement Protection Acts

Forty-seven states have enacted some form of structured settlement protection act. While the various state SSPAs lack uniformity, most adopt the same terminology and share the same basic legislative scheme as the Model SSPA. Echoing IRC section 5891, the state SSPAs provide that structured settlement payment rights transfers are not effective unless they receive advance court approval. Under each of the state SSPAs, key terms are defined, procedures for obtaining court approval are spelled out, and required notices, disclosures and findings are established.

Although all of the state SSPAs incorporate the "best interest" test, the California statute is the only SSPA that defines best interest. Section 10139.5 (b) of the California Insurance Code lists 15 factors that judges should consider "[w]hen determining whether the proposed transfer should be approved, including whether the transfer is fair, reasonable, and in the payee’s best interest, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents" including:

“(1) The reasonable preference and desire of the payee to complete the proposed transaction, taking into account the payee’s age, mental capacity, legal knowledge, and apparent maturity level"; and

“(15) Any other factors or facts that the payee, the transferee, or any other interested party calls to the attention of the reviewing court or that the court determines should be considered in reviewing the transfer.”

Judicial Interpretations

In the absence of a state SSPA "best interest" standard, state courts have applied differing determination standards and have been reluctant to provide their own definitions. For example, here is a statement from a 2003 New York trial court opinion (In re Petition of Settlement Capital Corp.):

"Although the [New York] statute does not define the best interests of the Payee, developing case law and the intent of the statute suggest the Court should consider: (1) the Payee’s age, mental capacity, physical capacity, maturity level, independent income, and ability to support dependents; (2) purpose of the intended use of the funds; (3) potential need for future medical treatment; (4) the financial acumen of the Payee; (5) whether the Payee is in a hardship situation to the extent that he or she is in “dire straits”; (6) the ability of the payee to appreciate financial consequences based on independent legal and financial advice; [and] (7) the timing of the application."

Conclusion

What relevance, if any, therefore, does the secondary structured settlement market "best interest" standard have as primary market stakeholders contemplate the potential impact of a uniform fiduciary standard under the Dodd-Frank legislation?

Neither IRC 5891 nor any of state SSPAs apply their "best interest" test to primary market structured settlement sales. Only four of the state SSPAs (New York, Florida, Massachusetts and Minnesota) establish any primary market sales standards, each requiring certain mandatory written disclosures.

The secondary market "best interest" test, however, does raise important issues for the primary structured settlement markets. Most importantly, If structured settlement transfers are required to be in "the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents", why shouldn't a "best interest" test or fiduciary standard apply to the original structured settlement sale?

Thank you, John Darer, for pointing out the importance of this issue.

For additional discussion and analysis of secondary market business practices and the "best interest" test, see:

• Sections 16.02 ("History of Structured Settlement Transfers") and 16.05 ("Judicial Review of Transfer Applications") in "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J); and
• The structured settlement wiki:
  • Secondary market blog posts
  • S2KM reports about Professional Association Meetings including the National Association of Settlement Professionals (NASP).

For S2KM's 2006 analysis of "How the Primary Market Views Factoring", see this concept map. 

Uniform Fiduciary Standard

What impact will a new uniform fiduciary standard, being developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as one result of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), have upon existing structured settlement and settlement planning business models and practices?

Dodd-Frank

Among other reforms, Dodd-Frank created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau  (CRPB) and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO). CFPB's central mission is "to make markets for consumer financial products and services work for Americans ....."

In addition to creating the CFPB and the FIO, Dodd-Frank directed the SEC to study the need for a new, uniform, federal fiduciary standard of care for broker-dealers and investment advisers and to apply such a uniform standard if it deemed necessary. The SEC:

• Released its fiduciary standard study in January 2011.
• Concluded that a uniform standard of care “at least as stringent” as the fiduciary standard currently applied to investment advisors should extend to all brokers, dealers and investment advisors.
• Is expected to release its proposed regulation for a uniform fiduciary standard this year.

Historically, brokers, dealers and insurance producers have been held to a "product suitability" standard which is less stringent than a fiduciary standard. As defined at uslegal.com, "[A] fiduciary duty is an obligation to act in the best interest of another party..... A person acting in a fiduciary capacity is held to a high standard of honesty and full disclosure in regard to the client and must not obtain a personal benefit at the expense of the client." (emphasis added)

NAIC Annuity Suitability Regulation

For comparison purposes, the NAIC "Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation" (Suitability Regulation) provides: "In recommending to a consumer the purchase of an annuity or the exchange of an annuity that results in another insurance transaction or series of insurance transactions, the insurance producer, or the insurer where no producer is involved, shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the consumer on the basis of the facts disclosed by the consumer as to his or her investments or other insurance products and as to his or her financial situation and needs, including the consumer's suitability information ..." (emphasis added)

The NAIC Suitability Regulation defines "suitability information" to include: age; annual income; financial situation and needs, including financial resources used for the funding of the annuity; financial experience; financial objectives; intended use of the annuity; financial time horizon; existing assets, including investment and life insurance holdings; liquidity needs; liquid net worth; risk tolerance; and tax status.

Significantly for structured settlements, however, the NAIC Suitability Regulation exempts "settlements of or assumptions of liabilities associated with personal injury litigation or any dispute or claim resolution process". By way of explanation, the legislative history of the NAIC Suitability Regulation specifically references "structured settlements" and adds: "[a] regulator pointed out that this type of contract did not generally result from a recommendation by an insurer or producer but agreed that it did not hurt to have the exemption there."

Impact on Insurance Professionals

Although the SEC's anticipated uniform fiduciary standard has received limited publicity within the structured settlement and settlement planning industries, it has generated significant controversy and disagreement among financial planners, broker dealers and life insurance professionals.

A recent article by Brian Anderson titled "Impact of a Universal Fiduciary Standard" looks at the related issues from the perspective of "insurance producers". Part of a series of articles about threats to the independent life insurance distribution channel, Anderson's article includes the following summary of arguments for and against a universal fiduciary standard:

• "Proponents of a universal fiduciary standard — including many financial planner and consumer groups — claim consumers who rely on the financial advice of experts are confused by the different standards of care. These consumers are at an information disadvantage, they say, and vulnerable to exploitation by advisors who are not required to make recommendations in the best interest of the customer."
• "Opponents of a fiduciary standard — including many life insurance industry trade associations — say a universal fiduciary standard is unnecessary because the current suitability standard is effective. Opponents also say the imposition of a universal fiduciary standard would result in higher costs and reduced choices and service for consumers."

Some life insurance representatives have expressed concern, according to Anderson's article, that the anticipated SEC fiduciary standard could potentially ban commission-based compensation for insurance product sales and thereby destroy the traditional life insurance business model.

Others disagree. Anderson quotes Jill Hoffman, NAIFA assistant vice president of federal government relations, as stating: “The language of Dodd-Frank specifically says that a fiduciary standard can be met, and a person can still receive commissions, and a person can still sell proprietary products. In other words, the language says you cannot violate a fiduciary standard just because you sell proprietary products and get paid commission.”

Structured Settlements and Settlement Planning

Will the SEC uniform fiduciary standard impact settlement planners and structured settlement professionals? Here are some reasons why leading settlement planners and structured settlement professionals should study, and anticipate the need to adopt, whatever uniform fiduciary standard the SEC ultimately adopts:

• Blended products - Structured settlement annuities increasingly are paid into trusts that also include financial products.
• Multiple licenses - In addition to structured settlement annuities, settlement planners increasingly sell securities as well as multiple life insurance and annuity products.
• Competition - To successfully compete in today's economic and legal environment, structured settlement sales persons must adjust upward to match the higher product suitability standards and best business practices of their competitors including settlement planners, financial planners and trustees.
• Clients and Stakeholders - As a matter of self-protection as well as consumer protection, many structured settlement clients (defendants; plaintiff attorneys) and stakeholders ( judges; mediators) will increasingly demand higher product and sales standards for injury victims.
• Lawsuits - In this era of accountability and compliance, all structured settlement participants are likely to be held to higher legal standards.

What issues might a uniform fiduciary standard create for structured settlement and settlement planning professionals? At their worst, as S2KM has previously observed, certain traditional structured settlement business practices fail to meet any fiduciary standard. For example:

• Misrepresentations or omission of material facts
  • Cost or Value - From a claimant's perspective, a core strategy for traditional structured settlements often appears "to make a little money look like a lot of money". The Spencer v. Hartford class action allegations outline one "sophisticated" variation of this strategy which often depends on hiding or misrepresenting annuity "cost" and/or settlement "value".
  • Guaranteed payments - Many structured settlement sales brochures continue to promise "guaranteed payments" without specifying who guarantees what if and when an annuity provider like Executive Life of New York (ELNY) becomes insolvent.
  • Managed account - Many structured settlement recipients do not understand important product details when their case is settled including how structured settlements differ from managed accounts and why they cannot access funds without court approval pursuant to state structured settlement protection acts.
  • Structured settlement myths- historically used to promote sales such as:
    • Studies show that nine out of 10 lump sum recipients squander the entire amount within five years.
    • Structured settlements enable injury victims to live free of reliance on government assistance.
• Conflicts of interest - without written, informed client and/or customer consent
  • Single product - The danger of single product structured settlement sales persons is not limited to whether his or her product is in the "best interest" of a particular claimant/customer. The danger is also that single product sales persons are inherently conflicted in recommending how much of any settlement should be allocated to their product.
  • Multiple roles - A structured settlement sales person introduced into a case by a defendant or liability insurer frequently plays four separate roles each of which potentially conflicts with the other roles: agent for the annuity provider; broker for the defendant; broker for the plaintiff; and agent for the defendant in helping to negotiate and settle the case.
  • Compensation sharing - Unless all parties to a settlement are informed about whether and how structured settlement annuity commissions are shared, a structured settlement creates a variety of potential conflicts of interest.
  • Funding alternatives - Based upon traditional structured settlement business and compensation models, the potential availability and applicability of 468B qualified settlement funds for "appropriate cases" creates inherent conflicts of interest between defendants and their structured settlement brokers.

For additional S2KM reporting about structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki.

SSP 2012 Annual Meeting - 2

Charles Schell, incoming President of the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP), concluded the SSP 2012 Annual Meeting by communicating his thoughts for improving the settlement planning market and expanding its core structured settlement annuity product. In his remarks, Schell addressed alternative business models and challenged participants in both models to collaborate to improve business standards and practices.

What follows is a summary of Schell's SSP comments.

Alternative business models

"Structure brokers under the traditional Claims Management model have the advantage of access to claims adjusters. However, their single-product sale is frequently dismissed by injury victims and their families for many reasons including low interest rates, lack of liquidity and the defense brokers' ties to the defendant. As a result, many injury victims and their families make uninformed decisions or resent the limited financial options presented at the time of settlement.

"In contrast, injury victims and their families generally welcome Settlement Planners into their homes as trusted advisers because they are recommended by plaintiffs' attorneys. By introducing a menu of insurance and financial products and providers, Settlement Planners promote education and information sharing. They encourage the injury victim and his/her family to actively participate in the planning process. From my personal experience, more information equals more structured settlement annuities because the product is generally right in every case at some level of participation as one asset class.

"The Claims Management model benefits the settlement planning industry and Settlement Planners should acknowledge the benefits which include product marketing and continued protection of IRC sections 104(a)(2) and 130. Concurrently, defense brokers should recognize the benefits of collaborating, rather than competing, with Settlement Planners. These benefits include access to and trust of the customer, an awareness of financial needs and family issues plus multi-product financial solutions that feature structured settlements and enhance their sale.

Business standards and practices

"To grow the structured settlement market, both Settlement Planners and traditional Claim Management structured settlement practitioners must improve their business standards and practices. To do so, we must understand, embrace and promote full disclosure, product suitability standards and written, informed consent. Our disclosure practices should include compensation and conflicts of interest. Our product suitability standards should satisfy a fiduciary and/or "best interest" test. We should insist that our customers understand, and acknowledge their understanding of, our proposed products and settlement plans by signing a written informed consent form.

"Rather than complain about secondary market business practices, primary market stakeholders should take direct actions to improve the secondary market. First, by adopting our own "best interest" or fiduciary suitability standards, the primary structured settlement market can improve settlement planning. The result will be fewer cases that are "over-structured" and subsequently require structured settlement recipients to sell payment rights to obtain needed liquidity.

"Second, we can improve the secondary market by promoting one simple, best practice from the primary market - multiple quotes. Unfortunately, single quote transfers remain a common practice within the structured settlement secondary market resulting in unnecessarily high discount rates. By educating and encouraging judges to require multiple quotes as a necessary condition for meeting the "best interest" test, the primary market can help produce an important and immediate secondary market improvement.

"To summarize: my proposed strategy to improve and grow both the structured settlement and settlement planning markets:

• "Study and improve our business standards and practices.
• "Develop "customer centric" solutions that help injury victims.
• "Build collaborative business models by focusing on shared interests."

Acknowledgement: In addition to serving as SSP's President, Charles Schell is a founding partner of Forge Consulting. Forge is also an owner of The Settlement Service Group (TSSG) for which Patrick Hindert, S2KM's blog author, serves as Managing Director.

For additional S2KM reporting about the Society of Settlement Planners, see the structured settlement wiki.

Product Suitability Standards - 4

With declining annuity premium and historically low interest rates, structured settlement stakeholders should be discussing how to improve and grow their business. To help promote this discussion, S2KM's current blog series about "product suitability standards" highlights two fundamental issues rarely addressed during industry educational conferences:

• When is a structured settlement annuity appropriate for a specific physical personal injury claimant?
• What standards exist to help judges, guardians, trustees, mediators, attorneys, settlement planners, structured settlement consultants and other structured settlement stakeholders make this determination?

Potential sources for structured settlement product suitability standards discussed in prior S2KM blog posts:

• Part 1 - NSSTA's Code of Ethics; SSP's Standards of Professional Conduct; and the NAIC's Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation.
• Part 2 - State minors' statutes and state structured settlement protection statutes.
• Part 3 - The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)

Fiduciary Standard

Among other findings, S2KM's prior review points out a general legislative trend to protect investors and consumers with a more uniform fiduciary, and/or "best interest", standard of care. In general, a fiduciary standard is viewed as the highest legal standard of customer care requiring both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. A fiduciary is required to act in the best interest of the investor and/or customer and to fully disclose all material facts plus any conflicts of interest. Trustees and investment advisers currently are held to a fiduciary standard which may soon also apply to financial planners and broker dealers. Many state minors' statutes and all state structured settlement protection statutes incorporate "best interest" standards.

Model Annuity Regulations

For some but not all annuity products, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has created a "Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation". Significantly, the NAIC Model Suitability Regulation exempts structured settlements and provides less consumer protection than the fiduciary, and/or "best interest" standard. The NAIC has also promulgated an "Annuity Disclosure Model Regulation" "to provide standards for the disclosure of certain minimum information about annuity contracts to protect consumers and foster consumer education." It also exempts structured settlements. The legislative history of the NAIC Model Disclosure Regulation indicates that "[i]nterested parties spoke in favor of an exemption for sophisticated transactions such as ..... structured settlements."

A Hall Pass?

Do these NAIC exemptions mean that structured settlements have been given a "hall pass" for purposes of product suitability requirements? No. If structured structured stakeholders want to improve and grow their business, there are many reasons why they should: 1) understand the meaning and requirements of all three standards (fiduciary duty, best interest, and suitability); and 2) adopt better business practices that address and incorporate one or more of these product standards. Reasons include:

• Blended products - Structured settlement annuities increasingly are paid into trusts (UPIA standard) that also include financial products (Dodd-Frank standard).
• Multiple licenses - In addition to structured settlement annuities, settlement planners increasingly sell securities as well as multiple life insurance and annuity products.
• Competition - To successfully compete in today's economic and legal environment, structured settlement sales persons must adjust upward to match the higher product suitability standards and best business practices of their competitors.
• Clients and Stakeholders - As a matter of self-protection as well as consumer protection, many structured settlement clients (defendants; plaintiff attorneys) and stakeholders ( judges; mediators) will increasingly demand higher product and sales standards for injury victims.
• Lawsuits - In this era of accountability and compliance, all structured settlement participants are likely to be held to higher legal standards.

Three-Card Monte

Why do product suitability standards create issues for the structured settlement industry? At their worst, especially from the perspective of an unrepresented injury victim, some traditional structured settlement business practices not only fall far short of the fiduciary standard - they can resemble a game of "Three-card Monte" .

Misrepresentations or omission of material facts

• Cost or Value - From a claimant's perspective, a core strategy for traditional structured settlements often appears "to make a little money look like a lot of money". The Spencer v. Hartford class action allegations outline one "sophisticated" variation of this strategy which often depends on hiding or misrepresenting annuity "cost" and/or settlement "value".
• Guaranteed payments - Many structured settlement sales brochures continue to promise "guaranteed payments" without specifying who guarantees what if and when an annuity provider like Executive Life of New York (ELNY) becomes insolvent.
• Managed account - Many structured settlement recipients do not understand important product details when their case is settled including how structured settlements differ from managed accounts and why they cannot access funds without court approval pursuant to state structured settlement protection acts.
• Structured settlement myths- historically used to promote sales such as:
  • Studies show that nine out of 10 lump sum recipients squander the entire amount within five years.
  • Structured settlements enable injury victims to live free of reliance on government assistance.

Conflicts of interest - without written, informed client and/or customer consent

• Single product - The danger of single product structured settlement sales persons is not limited to whether his or her product is "suitable" or in the "best interest" of a particular claimant/customer. The danger is also that single product sales persons are inherently conflicted in recommending how much of any settlement should be allocated to their product.
• Multiple roles - A structured settlement sales person introduced into a case by a defendant or liability insurer frequently plays four separate roles each of which potentially conflicts with the other roles: agent for the annuity provider; broker for the defendant; broker for the plaintiff; and agent for the defendant in helping to negotiate and settle the case.
• Compensation sharing - Unless all parties to a settlement are informed about whether and how structured settlement annuity commissions are shared, a structured settlement creates a variety of potential conflicts of interest.
• Funding alternatives - Based upon traditional structured settlement business and compensation models, the potential availability and applicability of 468B qualified settlement funds for "appropriate cases" creates inherent conflicts of interest between defendants and their structured settlement brokers.

Recommendations

• Education - Both the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA) and the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) should devote more educational resources to understanding product suitability standards applicable directly and indirectly to structured settlements including standards applicable to their clients and competitors.
• Business standards - SSP's "Standards of Professional Conduct for Settlement Planners" represents an important industry document that has received less attention among structured settlement stakeholders than it deserves. As a result of Dodd-Frank, SSP should review and re-consider the product suitability standards proposed in its current Standards of Conduct.
• Business model - Without violating anti-trust laws, both NSSTA and SSP should encourage their members to continue studying and discussing how transitional settlement planning business models impact traditional structured settlement broker roles, compensation models and business standards.
• Documentation - In the context of transitional business models and standards, structured settlement stakeholders should review and improve core case documents including client requests for proposals, sales materials, settlement agreements, broker of record letters, and commission sharing agreements.

For additional S2KM reporting and commentary about structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki.

Product Suitability Standards - 3

When is a structured settlement annuity appropriate for a specific physical personal injury claimant? And what standards exist to help judges, guardians, trustees, mediators, attorneys, settlement planners, structured settlement consultants and other structured settlement stakeholders make this determination?

In two prior blog posts, S2KM has addressed these issues in the context of:

• Part 1 - NSSTA's Code of Ethics; SSP's Standards of Professional Conduct; and the NAIC's Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation.
• Part 2 - Minors' statutes and state structured settlement protection statutes.

This blog post discusses product suitability standards created by the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) and highlights a general trend to create a more uniform fiduciary, and/or "best interest", standard of care to protect investors.

UPIA

When investing and managing assets (including settlement proceeds and structured settlement annuity payments), trustees historically have been held to a fiduciary standard. According to uslegal.com, "[A] fiduciary duty is an obligation to act in the best interest of another party..... A person acting in a fiduciary capacity is held to a high standard of honesty and full disclosure in regard to the client and must not obtain a personal benefit at the expense of the client." (emphasis added)

More recently and comprehensively, a trustee's investment responsibilities have been re-defined legislatively by the UPIA which was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1994 and approved by the American Bar Association in 1995. The UPIA now serves as the most important reference, external to the trust document itself, for trustees to determine what fiduciary duties their position requires. With some state-specific modifications, 41 states, U.S. Virgin Island, and the District of Columbia have adopted the UPIA.

Prior to the UPIA, courts applied the "prudent man rule" when evaluating trustee investment performance. The prudent man rule required trustees “to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.”

The UPIA, by contrast, adopts "modern portfolio theory" as a different and more appropriate standard for trustees. Compared with the prudent man rule, modern portfolio theory promotes a holistic view of trust assets by focusing on the total return generated by a trust as opposed to viewing a trust's income and principal separately. By viewing all investments comprehensively, modern portfolio theory and the UPIA hold that a trustee (or other investor) can achieve a positive overall investment return despite the poor performance of specific investments. This new standard allows for greater investment diversification so long as the risk/reward ratio matches the purposes and terms of the trust instrument.

Section 2(c) of the UPIA identifies eight factors a trustee should consider when making any investment:

• General economic conditions;
• The possible effect of inflation or deflation;
• The expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies;
• The role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall trust portfolio;
• The expected total return from income and appreciation of capital;
• Other resources of the beneficiaries;
• Needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation or appreciation of capital; and
• An asset’s relationship of special value, if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries.

Significant for structured settlement annuities, the UPIA's list of investment considerations fails to mention mental or physical disabilities of a trust beneficiary. From a settlement planning and/or special needs perspective, injuries or diseases that reduce an individual's normal life expectancy arguably should receive important consideration when a trustee makes investment decisions.

Dodd-Frank

President Obama signed Dodd-Frank into law on July 21, 2010. Among other reforms, this sweeping legislation created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO). CFPB's central mission is "to make markets for consumer financial products and services work for Americans ....." Among its core functions are addressing consumer complaints and restricting unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices under the Federal consumer financial laws. Dodd-Frank provides the CFPB with significant authority that goes beyond existing consumer protection statutes. CFPB has broad authority to ask questions and demand information including consumer complaints. The FIO is part of the U.S. Department of Treasury and has authority to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry.

In addition to creating the CFPB and the FIO, Dodd-Frank directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to study the need for a new, uniform, federal fiduciary standard of care for broker-dealers and investment advisers and to apply such a uniform standard if it deemed necessary. The SEC's assignment also required determining the existence of any gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in legal or regulatory standards for the protection of retail customers.

Historically, investment advisers and broker-dealers have been subject to differing standards of care. Investment advisers are defined under Federal law as persons who “engage in the business of advising others. . .as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities. . .” [15 U.S.C. § 80b-2] They are regulated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and owe a fiduciary duty to their clients.

Broker-dealers are defined under Federal law as persons who engage in “the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities. . .” [15 U.S.C. § 78b(12)] and may provide a variety of related services. Broker-dealers generally are not subject to any fiduciary duty under the federal securities laws. They do, however, have a duty of fair dealing which includes a “suitability” standard - i.e. broker-dealers must make recommendations that are consistent with the interests of their customers.

Adding further uncertainty for investors, the existing legislative and regulatory system, according to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), also "leaves states free to develop their own often conflicting definitions of fiduciary standards. This can confuse investors and lead to inconsistent definitions and interpretations under existing state law." SIFMA has recommended adoption of a uniform definition of "fiduciary duty" applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers that includes both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. These duties, according to SIFMA, should require both broker-dealers and investment advisers "to act in the best interest of the customer, and to provide full and fair disclosure of material facts and conflicts of interest."

In January 2011, the SEC submitted its "fiduciary standard" study to Congress recommending the adoption of a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisers and broker-dealers when providing investment advice to retail customers. The SEC's proposed standard would be “no less stringent” than the standard currently applicable to investment advisers, and would include the duty to act in the "best interest" of the customer.

Structured Settlement Annuities

Why are the UPIA and Dodd-Frank relevant and important for structured settlement stakeholders?

• Structured settlement annuities increasingly are paid into trusts (UPIA) that also include financial securities (Dodd-Frank).
• Settlement planners, as opposed to traditional structured settlement sales persons, are increasingly licensed to sell financial securities as well as insurance products.
• The UPIA (settlement trustees) and Dodd-Frank (financial planners; investment advisers; broker-dealers) directly impact structured settlement competitors.
• To be successful in the changing financial and insurance environment, anyone selling structured settlement annuities must understand and compete against the highest product suitability standards and best business practices.

Given the diversity, uncertainty and transition of various product suitability standards, how should structured settlement stakeholders address the issue of whether a structured settlement is appropriate for individual physical personal injury claimants? S2KM will offer practical case-specific advice and strategic industry advice in its next blog post.

For additional information about structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki and Section 6.02 of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J).

Product Suitability Standards - 2

Should structured settlement "consultants" be held to some "product suitability standard" when they recommend structured settlement annuities to resolve personal injury lawsuits? If the answer is "yes", to what standard should they be held accountable and by whom?

A prior S2KM blog post discussed these issues in the context of the Code of Ethics of the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA), the Standards of Professional Conduct of the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) and the Suitability in Annuity Transaction Model Regulation promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).

NSSTA's Code of Ethics does not directly address product suitability standards. It does, however, direct NSSTA members to: "…comply with all material federal and state laws and regulations applicable to the structured settlement services that are provided."

SSP's Standards of Professional Conduct utilizes the words "appropriate" and "informed consent". In the event of a conflict between SSP's Standards of Professional Conduct and any "laws, court rules, licensure requirements or other standards imposed on any regulated profession", SSP's members are directed to "abide by the laws or professional standards imposed on the members discipline."

Although the NAIC Suitability Regulation applies "to any recommendation to purchase, exchange or replace an annuity made to a consumer by an insurance producer, or an insurer ...", the Model Regulation exempts "settlements of or assumptions of liabilities associated with personal injury litigation or any dispute or claim resolution process" which presumably encompass structured settlement annuities.

What other legislation or regulations could impact whether a structured settlement annuity is suitable for a specific personal physical injury claimant - and why should it matter?

Several additional laws and regulations could be relevant to these questions including:

• Minors' Statutes
• State Structured Settlement Protection Statutes
• The Uniform Prudent Investors Act
• Dodd Frank Legislation

This blog post considers minor statutes and state protection statutes. A subsequent S2KM blog post will discuss the Prudent Investors Act and Dodd Frank.

Texas attorney Phillip McCrury addressed the topic "What Judges Look for When Approving a Minor's Settlement" during the SSP 2009 Annual Meeting. McCrury surveyed existing state legislation and concluded that most state minors' statutes require court approval but few, if any, specifically address structured settlements. Various states have adopted two alternative standards for judicial approval of minors' settlements: the "best interest" standard and the "fair and reasonable" standard. McCrury, however, did not identify a single state minors' statute that defined either "best interest" or "fair and reasonable".

Both McCrury's SSP presentation and the 2011 Hancock v. Share case highlight the potential for conflicting judicial interpretations when structured settlement annuities are part of a proposed minor's settlement. Assuming a structured settlement "binds the assets" of a minor beyond the age of majority:

• Under what circumstances is a structured settlement in a minor's best interest - or fair and reasonable under some state minors' statutes?
• Should it matter whether or not a minor has a debilitating injury?
• What justification should be required from a guardian who recommends a structured settlement for a minor?
• When a judge evaluates whether a proposed structured settlement transfer meets the "best interest" test, what importance should be given to the fact that a proposed transferor was a minor when he/she received the structured settlement and therefore never personally approved or consented to the structured settlement?

In addition to minors' statutes, the state structured settlement protection statutes provide an application of the "best interest" and "fair and reasonable" standards with which structured settlement consultants and settlement planners should be familiar. Both IRC section 5891 and the Model State Structured Settlement Protection Act (Model Protection Act) require a transfer to be in "the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents" as a condition for judicial approval.

Some state protection statutes require that structured settlement transfers also meet an additional "fair and reasonable" test. For example, under New York's structured settlement protection act, a judge must "determine whether the transaction, including the discount rate used to determine the gross advance amount and the fees and expenses used to determine the net advance amount, are fair and reasonable" (emphasis added) in addition to meeting the "best interest" test.

Neither IRC 5891 nor the Model Protection Act, however, define "best interest". California's revised structured settlement protection act, however, includes the following list of factors that California judges "shall consider" when deciding whether to approve a proposed transfer:

• The payee's age, mental capacity, legal knowledge, and apparent maturity level;
• The stated purpose for the proposed transfer;
• The payee's financial and economic situation;
• The terms of the proposed transfer, including the discount rate and transaction fees;
• Whether the payments are intended to pay for future medical care related to the payee's original injuries;
• Whether the payments are intended to pay for necessary living expenses;
• Whether the payee is likely to require future medical care for the payee's original injuries, and, if yes, whether the payee has other resources, including insurance, to pay for those expenses;
• Whether the payee has other income to meet his/her obligations to support dependents;
• Whether the payee has any court-ordered child support obligations;
• Whether the payee has attempted or completed prior transfers;
• Whether the payee or his/her family is facing any financial hardship;
• Whether the payee has received or should receive independent professional advice about the transfer; plus
• "Any other factors or facts that the payee, the transferee, or any other interested party calls to the attention of the reviewing court or that the court determines should be considered in reviewing the transfer."

Various courts have also identified factors to be considered when determining whether a proposed structured settlement transfer meets the "best interest" test. For example, a New York Supreme Court considered the following factors before denying a proposed 2003 transfer: the payee’s age; mental and physical capacity; maturity level; ability to show sufficient income that is independent of the payments sought for transfer; capacity to provide for the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents; the need for medical treatment; the stated purpose for the transfer; and the demonstrated ability of the payee to appreciate the financial terms and consequences of the proposed transfer based upon truly independent legal and financial advice. (In re Settlement Capital Corp.)

What relevance, if any, do state structured settlement protection statutes have for primary structured settlement product suitability standards?

Neither IRC 5891 nor any of state structured settlement protection statutes apply their "best interest" test to primary market structured settlement sales. Only four of the state statutes (New York, Florida, Massachusetts and Minnesota) establish any primary market sales standards, each requiring certain mandatory written disclosures.

The secondary market "best interest" test, however, does raise important issues for the primary structured settlement markets. Most importantly, If structured settlement transfers are required to be in "the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents", why shouldn't a "best interest" test apply to the original structured settlement sale? And, what impact would a "best interest" test have on primary market business standards and practices?

In a subsequent blog post, S2KM will consider whether, when and how the Uniform Prudent Investors Act and Dodd Frank require primary structured settlement sales to meet a "best interest" test and/or otherwise impact structured settlement business standards and practices.

For additional commentary and analysis of structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki and Section 6.02 of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J).