Beyond Structured Settlements

"Only Half the Story"

In an August 2, 2012 blog post titled "Uniform Fiduciary Standards Only Half the Story", John Darer offers the following critique of this earlier S2KM blog post: "It's a pity that an otherwise well written blog post by Patrick Hindert about Uniform Fiduciary Standards, unexplainably omits standards for the secondary market."

S2KM's blog post addressed the following issue: "What impact will a new uniform fiduciary standard, being developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as one result of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), have upon existing structured settlement and settlement planning business models and practices?"

Without any discussion of the secondary market, S2KM's blog post also highlighted certain traditional primary market structured settlement business practices that fail to meet any fiduciary standard:

• Misrepresentations or omission of material facts; and
• Conflicts of interest - without written, informed client and/or customer consent.

John's blog post makes two valid points. First, that S2KM's blog post ignored secondary market standards. Second, despite enactment of IRC section 5891 and state structured settlement protection statutes, bad business practices continue to exist in the secondary market. John's blog post identifies several such practices.

By "setting aside the good players", however, John's blog post spotlights existing bad business practices but does not identify or address secondary structured settlement market business standards. What are those secondary market standards - and how do (or should) these standards impact the primary market?

Looking specifically at the "uniform fiduciary standard" (the subject of the S2KM blog post in question), the related secondary market standard is the "best interest" test. There are three sources that establish and/or address this secondary market standard: 1) IRC section 5891; 2) the state structured settlement protection statutes; and 3) judicial interpretations of the "best interest" standard.

IRC Section 5891

IRC section 5891 imposes a 40 percent excise tax on any person who acquires structured settlement payment rights in a factoring transaction. The excise tax, however, does not apply if the transfer is approved in advance in a "qualified order" issued under an applicable state statute by an applicable state court.

IRC section 5891(b)(2) defines a qualified order as “a final order, judgment or decree” that satisfies two requirements: a qualified order must find the transfer of the structured settlement payment rights:

• does not contravene:
  • Any Federal or State statute or
  • The order of any court or responsible administrative authority; and
• Is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents.

State Structured Settlement Protection Acts

Forty-seven states have enacted some form of structured settlement protection act. While the various state SSPAs lack uniformity, most adopt the same terminology and share the same basic legislative scheme as the Model SSPA. Echoing IRC section 5891, the state SSPAs provide that structured settlement payment rights transfers are not effective unless they receive advance court approval. Under each of the state SSPAs, key terms are defined, procedures for obtaining court approval are spelled out, and required notices, disclosures and findings are established.

Although all of the state SSPAs incorporate the "best interest" test, the California statute is the only SSPA that defines best interest. Section 10139.5 (b) of the California Insurance Code lists 15 factors that judges should consider "[w]hen determining whether the proposed transfer should be approved, including whether the transfer is fair, reasonable, and in the payee’s best interest, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents" including:

“(1) The reasonable preference and desire of the payee to complete the proposed transaction, taking into account the payee’s age, mental capacity, legal knowledge, and apparent maturity level"; and

“(15) Any other factors or facts that the payee, the transferee, or any other interested party calls to the attention of the reviewing court or that the court determines should be considered in reviewing the transfer.”

Judicial Interpretations

In the absence of a state SSPA "best interest" standard, state courts have applied differing determination standards and have been reluctant to provide their own definitions. For example, here is a statement from a 2003 New York trial court opinion (In re Petition of Settlement Capital Corp.):

"Although the [New York] statute does not define the best interests of the Payee, developing case law and the intent of the statute suggest the Court should consider: (1) the Payee’s age, mental capacity, physical capacity, maturity level, independent income, and ability to support dependents; (2) purpose of the intended use of the funds; (3) potential need for future medical treatment; (4) the financial acumen of the Payee; (5) whether the Payee is in a hardship situation to the extent that he or she is in “dire straits”; (6) the ability of the payee to appreciate financial consequences based on independent legal and financial advice; [and] (7) the timing of the application."

Conclusion

What relevance, if any, therefore, does the secondary structured settlement market "best interest" standard have as primary market stakeholders contemplate the potential impact of a uniform fiduciary standard under the Dodd-Frank legislation?

Neither IRC 5891 nor any of state SSPAs apply their "best interest" test to primary market structured settlement sales. Only four of the state SSPAs (New York, Florida, Massachusetts and Minnesota) establish any primary market sales standards, each requiring certain mandatory written disclosures.

The secondary market "best interest" test, however, does raise important issues for the primary structured settlement markets. Most importantly, If structured settlement transfers are required to be in "the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents", why shouldn't a "best interest" test or fiduciary standard apply to the original structured settlement sale?

Thank you, John Darer, for pointing out the importance of this issue.

For additional discussion and analysis of secondary market business practices and the "best interest" test, see:

• Sections 16.02 ("History of Structured Settlement Transfers") and 16.05 ("Judicial Review of Transfer Applications") in "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J); and
• The structured settlement wiki:
  • Secondary market blog posts
  • S2KM reports about Professional Association Meetings including the National Association of Settlement Professionals (NASP).

For S2KM's 2006 analysis of "How the Primary Market Views Factoring", see this concept map. 

Uniform Fiduciary Standard

What impact will a new uniform fiduciary standard, being developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as one result of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), have upon existing structured settlement and settlement planning business models and practices?

Dodd-Frank

Among other reforms, Dodd-Frank created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau  (CRPB) and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO). CFPB's central mission is "to make markets for consumer financial products and services work for Americans ....."

In addition to creating the CFPB and the FIO, Dodd-Frank directed the SEC to study the need for a new, uniform, federal fiduciary standard of care for broker-dealers and investment advisers and to apply such a uniform standard if it deemed necessary. The SEC:

• Released its fiduciary standard study in January 2011.
• Concluded that a uniform standard of care “at least as stringent” as the fiduciary standard currently applied to investment advisors should extend to all brokers, dealers and investment advisors.
• Is expected to release its proposed regulation for a uniform fiduciary standard this year.

Historically, brokers, dealers and insurance producers have been held to a "product suitability" standard which is less stringent than a fiduciary standard. As defined at uslegal.com, "[A] fiduciary duty is an obligation to act in the best interest of another party..... A person acting in a fiduciary capacity is held to a high standard of honesty and full disclosure in regard to the client and must not obtain a personal benefit at the expense of the client." (emphasis added)

NAIC Annuity Suitability Regulation

For comparison purposes, the NAIC "Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation" (Suitability Regulation) provides: "In recommending to a consumer the purchase of an annuity or the exchange of an annuity that results in another insurance transaction or series of insurance transactions, the insurance producer, or the insurer where no producer is involved, shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the consumer on the basis of the facts disclosed by the consumer as to his or her investments or other insurance products and as to his or her financial situation and needs, including the consumer's suitability information ..." (emphasis added)

The NAIC Suitability Regulation defines "suitability information" to include: age; annual income; financial situation and needs, including financial resources used for the funding of the annuity; financial experience; financial objectives; intended use of the annuity; financial time horizon; existing assets, including investment and life insurance holdings; liquidity needs; liquid net worth; risk tolerance; and tax status.

Significantly for structured settlements, however, the NAIC Suitability Regulation exempts "settlements of or assumptions of liabilities associated with personal injury litigation or any dispute or claim resolution process". By way of explanation, the legislative history of the NAIC Suitability Regulation specifically references "structured settlements" and adds: "[a] regulator pointed out that this type of contract did not generally result from a recommendation by an insurer or producer but agreed that it did not hurt to have the exemption there."

Impact on Insurance Professionals

Although the SEC's anticipated uniform fiduciary standard has received limited publicity within the structured settlement and settlement planning industries, it has generated significant controversy and disagreement among financial planners, broker dealers and life insurance professionals.

A recent article by Brian Anderson titled "Impact of a Universal Fiduciary Standard" looks at the related issues from the perspective of "insurance producers". Part of a series of articles about threats to the independent life insurance distribution channel, Anderson's article includes the following summary of arguments for and against a universal fiduciary standard:

• "Proponents of a universal fiduciary standard — including many financial planner and consumer groups — claim consumers who rely on the financial advice of experts are confused by the different standards of care. These consumers are at an information disadvantage, they say, and vulnerable to exploitation by advisors who are not required to make recommendations in the best interest of the customer."
• "Opponents of a fiduciary standard — including many life insurance industry trade associations — say a universal fiduciary standard is unnecessary because the current suitability standard is effective. Opponents also say the imposition of a universal fiduciary standard would result in higher costs and reduced choices and service for consumers."

Some life insurance representatives have expressed concern, according to Anderson's article, that the anticipated SEC fiduciary standard could potentially ban commission-based compensation for insurance product sales and thereby destroy the traditional life insurance business model.

Others disagree. Anderson quotes Jill Hoffman, NAIFA assistant vice president of federal government relations, as stating: “The language of Dodd-Frank specifically says that a fiduciary standard can be met, and a person can still receive commissions, and a person can still sell proprietary products. In other words, the language says you cannot violate a fiduciary standard just because you sell proprietary products and get paid commission.”

Structured Settlements and Settlement Planning

Will the SEC uniform fiduciary standard impact settlement planners and structured settlement professionals? Here are some reasons why leading settlement planners and structured settlement professionals should study, and anticipate the need to adopt, whatever uniform fiduciary standard the SEC ultimately adopts:

• Blended products - Structured settlement annuities increasingly are paid into trusts that also include financial products.
• Multiple licenses - In addition to structured settlement annuities, settlement planners increasingly sell securities as well as multiple life insurance and annuity products.
• Competition - To successfully compete in today's economic and legal environment, structured settlement sales persons must adjust upward to match the higher product suitability standards and best business practices of their competitors including settlement planners, financial planners and trustees.
• Clients and Stakeholders - As a matter of self-protection as well as consumer protection, many structured settlement clients (defendants; plaintiff attorneys) and stakeholders ( judges; mediators) will increasingly demand higher product and sales standards for injury victims.
• Lawsuits - In this era of accountability and compliance, all structured settlement participants are likely to be held to higher legal standards.

What issues might a uniform fiduciary standard create for structured settlement and settlement planning professionals? At their worst, as S2KM has previously observed, certain traditional structured settlement business practices fail to meet any fiduciary standard. For example:

• Misrepresentations or omission of material facts
  • Cost or Value - From a claimant's perspective, a core strategy for traditional structured settlements often appears "to make a little money look like a lot of money". The Spencer v. Hartford class action allegations outline one "sophisticated" variation of this strategy which often depends on hiding or misrepresenting annuity "cost" and/or settlement "value".
  • Guaranteed payments - Many structured settlement sales brochures continue to promise "guaranteed payments" without specifying who guarantees what if and when an annuity provider like Executive Life of New York (ELNY) becomes insolvent.
  • Managed account - Many structured settlement recipients do not understand important product details when their case is settled including how structured settlements differ from managed accounts and why they cannot access funds without court approval pursuant to state structured settlement protection acts.
  • Structured settlement myths- historically used to promote sales such as:
    • Studies show that nine out of 10 lump sum recipients squander the entire amount within five years.
    • Structured settlements enable injury victims to live free of reliance on government assistance.
• Conflicts of interest - without written, informed client and/or customer consent
  • Single product - The danger of single product structured settlement sales persons is not limited to whether his or her product is in the "best interest" of a particular claimant/customer. The danger is also that single product sales persons are inherently conflicted in recommending how much of any settlement should be allocated to their product.
  • Multiple roles - A structured settlement sales person introduced into a case by a defendant or liability insurer frequently plays four separate roles each of which potentially conflicts with the other roles: agent for the annuity provider; broker for the defendant; broker for the plaintiff; and agent for the defendant in helping to negotiate and settle the case.
  • Compensation sharing - Unless all parties to a settlement are informed about whether and how structured settlement annuity commissions are shared, a structured settlement creates a variety of potential conflicts of interest.
  • Funding alternatives - Based upon traditional structured settlement business and compensation models, the potential availability and applicability of 468B qualified settlement funds for "appropriate cases" creates inherent conflicts of interest between defendants and their structured settlement brokers.

For additional S2KM reporting about structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki.

SSP 2012 Annual Meeting - 2

Charles Schell, incoming President of the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP), concluded the SSP 2012 Annual Meeting by communicating his thoughts for improving the settlement planning market and expanding its core structured settlement annuity product. In his remarks, Schell addressed alternative business models and challenged participants in both models to collaborate to improve business standards and practices.

What follows is a summary of Schell's SSP comments.

Alternative business models

"Structure brokers under the traditional Claims Management model have the advantage of access to claims adjusters. However, their single-product sale is frequently dismissed by injury victims and their families for many reasons including low interest rates, lack of liquidity and the defense brokers' ties to the defendant. As a result, many injury victims and their families make uninformed decisions or resent the limited financial options presented at the time of settlement.

"In contrast, injury victims and their families generally welcome Settlement Planners into their homes as trusted advisers because they are recommended by plaintiffs' attorneys. By introducing a menu of insurance and financial products and providers, Settlement Planners promote education and information sharing. They encourage the injury victim and his/her family to actively participate in the planning process. From my personal experience, more information equals more structured settlement annuities because the product is generally right in every case at some level of participation as one asset class.

"The Claims Management model benefits the settlement planning industry and Settlement Planners should acknowledge the benefits which include product marketing and continued protection of IRC sections 104(a)(2) and 130. Concurrently, defense brokers should recognize the benefits of collaborating, rather than competing, with Settlement Planners. These benefits include access to and trust of the customer, an awareness of financial needs and family issues plus multi-product financial solutions that feature structured settlements and enhance their sale.

Business standards and practices

"To grow the structured settlement market, both Settlement Planners and traditional Claim Management structured settlement practitioners must improve their business standards and practices. To do so, we must understand, embrace and promote full disclosure, product suitability standards and written, informed consent. Our disclosure practices should include compensation and conflicts of interest. Our product suitability standards should satisfy a fiduciary and/or "best interest" test. We should insist that our customers understand, and acknowledge their understanding of, our proposed products and settlement plans by signing a written informed consent form.

"Rather than complain about secondary market business practices, primary market stakeholders should take direct actions to improve the secondary market. First, by adopting our own "best interest" or fiduciary suitability standards, the primary structured settlement market can improve settlement planning. The result will be fewer cases that are "over-structured" and subsequently require structured settlement recipients to sell payment rights to obtain needed liquidity.

"Second, we can improve the secondary market by promoting one simple, best practice from the primary market - multiple quotes. Unfortunately, single quote transfers remain a common practice within the structured settlement secondary market resulting in unnecessarily high discount rates. By educating and encouraging judges to require multiple quotes as a necessary condition for meeting the "best interest" test, the primary market can help produce an important and immediate secondary market improvement.

"To summarize: my proposed strategy to improve and grow both the structured settlement and settlement planning markets:

• "Study and improve our business standards and practices.
• "Develop "customer centric" solutions that help injury victims.
• "Build collaborative business models by focusing on shared interests."

Acknowledgement: In addition to serving as SSP's President, Charles Schell is a founding partner of Forge Consulting. Forge is also an owner of The Settlement Service Group (TSSG) for which Patrick Hindert, S2KM's blog author, serves as Managing Director.

For additional S2KM reporting about the Society of Settlement Planners, see the structured settlement wiki.

Product Suitability Standards - 4

With declining annuity premium and historically low interest rates, structured settlement stakeholders should be discussing how to improve and grow their business. To help promote this discussion, S2KM's current blog series about "product suitability standards" highlights two fundamental issues rarely addressed during industry educational conferences:

• When is a structured settlement annuity appropriate for a specific physical personal injury claimant?
• What standards exist to help judges, guardians, trustees, mediators, attorneys, settlement planners, structured settlement consultants and other structured settlement stakeholders make this determination?

Potential sources for structured settlement product suitability standards discussed in prior S2KM blog posts:

• Part 1 - NSSTA's Code of Ethics; SSP's Standards of Professional Conduct; and the NAIC's Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation.
• Part 2 - State minors' statutes and state structured settlement protection statutes.
• Part 3 - The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)

Fiduciary Standard

Among other findings, S2KM's prior review points out a general legislative trend to protect investors and consumers with a more uniform fiduciary, and/or "best interest", standard of care. In general, a fiduciary standard is viewed as the highest legal standard of customer care requiring both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. A fiduciary is required to act in the best interest of the investor and/or customer and to fully disclose all material facts plus any conflicts of interest. Trustees and investment advisers currently are held to a fiduciary standard which may soon also apply to financial planners and broker dealers. Many state minors' statutes and all state structured settlement protection statutes incorporate "best interest" standards.

Model Annuity Regulations

For some but not all annuity products, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has created a "Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation". Significantly, the NAIC Model Suitability Regulation exempts structured settlements and provides less consumer protection than the fiduciary, and/or "best interest" standard. The NAIC has also promulgated an "Annuity Disclosure Model Regulation" "to provide standards for the disclosure of certain minimum information about annuity contracts to protect consumers and foster consumer education." It also exempts structured settlements. The legislative history of the NAIC Model Disclosure Regulation indicates that "[i]nterested parties spoke in favor of an exemption for sophisticated transactions such as ..... structured settlements."

A Hall Pass?

Do these NAIC exemptions mean that structured settlements have been given a "hall pass" for purposes of product suitability requirements? No. If structured structured stakeholders want to improve and grow their business, there are many reasons why they should: 1) understand the meaning and requirements of all three standards (fiduciary duty, best interest, and suitability); and 2) adopt better business practices that address and incorporate one or more of these product standards. Reasons include:

• Blended products - Structured settlement annuities increasingly are paid into trusts (UPIA standard) that also include financial products (Dodd-Frank standard).
• Multiple licenses - In addition to structured settlement annuities, settlement planners increasingly sell securities as well as multiple life insurance and annuity products.
• Competition - To successfully compete in today's economic and legal environment, structured settlement sales persons must adjust upward to match the higher product suitability standards and best business practices of their competitors.
• Clients and Stakeholders - As a matter of self-protection as well as consumer protection, many structured settlement clients (defendants; plaintiff attorneys) and stakeholders ( judges; mediators) will increasingly demand higher product and sales standards for injury victims.
• Lawsuits - In this era of accountability and compliance, all structured settlement participants are likely to be held to higher legal standards.

Three-Card Monte

Why do product suitability standards create issues for the structured settlement industry? At their worst, especially from the perspective of an unrepresented injury victim, some traditional structured settlement business practices not only fall far short of the fiduciary standard - they can resemble a game of "Three-card Monte" .

Misrepresentations or omission of material facts

• Cost or Value - From a claimant's perspective, a core strategy for traditional structured settlements often appears "to make a little money look like a lot of money". The Spencer v. Hartford class action allegations outline one "sophisticated" variation of this strategy which often depends on hiding or misrepresenting annuity "cost" and/or settlement "value".
• Guaranteed payments - Many structured settlement sales brochures continue to promise "guaranteed payments" without specifying who guarantees what if and when an annuity provider like Executive Life of New York (ELNY) becomes insolvent.
• Managed account - Many structured settlement recipients do not understand important product details when their case is settled including how structured settlements differ from managed accounts and why they cannot access funds without court approval pursuant to state structured settlement protection acts.
• Structured settlement myths- historically used to promote sales such as:
  • Studies show that nine out of 10 lump sum recipients squander the entire amount within five years.
  • Structured settlements enable injury victims to live free of reliance on government assistance.

Conflicts of interest - without written, informed client and/or customer consent

• Single product - The danger of single product structured settlement sales persons is not limited to whether his or her product is "suitable" or in the "best interest" of a particular claimant/customer. The danger is also that single product sales persons are inherently conflicted in recommending how much of any settlement should be allocated to their product.
• Multiple roles - A structured settlement sales person introduced into a case by a defendant or liability insurer frequently plays four separate roles each of which potentially conflicts with the other roles: agent for the annuity provider; broker for the defendant; broker for the plaintiff; and agent for the defendant in helping to negotiate and settle the case.
• Compensation sharing - Unless all parties to a settlement are informed about whether and how structured settlement annuity commissions are shared, a structured settlement creates a variety of potential conflicts of interest.
• Funding alternatives - Based upon traditional structured settlement business and compensation models, the potential availability and applicability of 468B qualified settlement funds for "appropriate cases" creates inherent conflicts of interest between defendants and their structured settlement brokers.

Recommendations

• Education - Both the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA) and the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) should devote more educational resources to understanding product suitability standards applicable directly and indirectly to structured settlements including standards applicable to their clients and competitors.
• Business standards - SSP's "Standards of Professional Conduct for Settlement Planners" represents an important industry document that has received less attention among structured settlement stakeholders than it deserves. As a result of Dodd-Frank, SSP should review and re-consider the product suitability standards proposed in its current Standards of Conduct.
• Business model - Without violating anti-trust laws, both NSSTA and SSP should encourage their members to continue studying and discussing how transitional settlement planning business models impact traditional structured settlement broker roles, compensation models and business standards.
• Documentation - In the context of transitional business models and standards, structured settlement stakeholders should review and improve core case documents including client requests for proposals, sales materials, settlement agreements, broker of record letters, and commission sharing agreements.

For additional S2KM reporting and commentary about structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki.