Beyond Structured Settlements

SSP 2012 Annual Meeting - 2

Charles Schell, incoming President of the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP), concluded the SSP 2012 Annual Meeting by communicating his thoughts for improving the settlement planning market and expanding its core structured settlement annuity product. In his remarks, Schell addressed alternative business models and challenged participants in both models to collaborate to improve business standards and practices.

What follows is a summary of Schell's SSP comments.

Alternative business models

"Structure brokers under the traditional Claims Management model have the advantage of access to claims adjusters. However, their single-product sale is frequently dismissed by injury victims and their families for many reasons including low interest rates, lack of liquidity and the defense brokers' ties to the defendant. As a result, many injury victims and their families make uninformed decisions or resent the limited financial options presented at the time of settlement.

"In contrast, injury victims and their families generally welcome Settlement Planners into their homes as trusted advisers because they are recommended by plaintiffs' attorneys. By introducing a menu of insurance and financial products and providers, Settlement Planners promote education and information sharing. They encourage the injury victim and his/her family to actively participate in the planning process. From my personal experience, more information equals more structured settlement annuities because the product is generally right in every case at some level of participation as one asset class.

"The Claims Management model benefits the settlement planning industry and Settlement Planners should acknowledge the benefits which include product marketing and continued protection of IRC sections 104(a)(2) and 130. Concurrently, defense brokers should recognize the benefits of collaborating, rather than competing, with Settlement Planners. These benefits include access to and trust of the customer, an awareness of financial needs and family issues plus multi-product financial solutions that feature structured settlements and enhance their sale.

Business standards and practices

"To grow the structured settlement market, both Settlement Planners and traditional Claim Management structured settlement practitioners must improve their business standards and practices. To do so, we must understand, embrace and promote full disclosure, product suitability standards and written, informed consent. Our disclosure practices should include compensation and conflicts of interest. Our product suitability standards should satisfy a fiduciary and/or "best interest" test. We should insist that our customers understand, and acknowledge their understanding of, our proposed products and settlement plans by signing a written informed consent form.

"Rather than complain about secondary market business practices, primary market stakeholders should take direct actions to improve the secondary market. First, by adopting our own "best interest" or fiduciary suitability standards, the primary structured settlement market can improve settlement planning. The result will be fewer cases that are "over-structured" and subsequently require structured settlement recipients to sell payment rights to obtain needed liquidity.

"Second, we can improve the secondary market by promoting one simple, best practice from the primary market - multiple quotes. Unfortunately, single quote transfers remain a common practice within the structured settlement secondary market resulting in unnecessarily high discount rates. By educating and encouraging judges to require multiple quotes as a necessary condition for meeting the "best interest" test, the primary market can help produce an important and immediate secondary market improvement.

"To summarize: my proposed strategy to improve and grow both the structured settlement and settlement planning markets:

• "Study and improve our business standards and practices.
• "Develop "customer centric" solutions that help injury victims.
• "Build collaborative business models by focusing on shared interests."

Acknowledgement: In addition to serving as SSP's President, Charles Schell is a founding partner of Forge Consulting. Forge is also an owner of The Settlement Service Group (TSSG) for which Patrick Hindert, S2KM's blog author, serves as Managing Director.

For additional S2KM reporting about the Society of Settlement Planners, see the structured settlement wiki.

The ELNY Immunity Issue

Assuming presiding Judge John M. Galasso approves the Order of Liquidation and Approval of a Restructuring Agreement for Executive Life of New York (ELNY) as proposed by the Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (Superintendent), as ELNY's Receiver, will the Liquidation Order grant legal immunity to the Superintendent, as ELNY Receiver, and his agents, including the New York Liquidation Bureau (NYLB or Bureau), for their acts and omissions in managing ELNY's Rehabilitation since 1991?

Objection

At least some of the ELNY policyholders and shortfall payees who filed objections took issue with the following proposed paragraph in the Superintendent's proposed Order:

“Judicial immunity is extended to the Superintendent in his capacity as Receiver and his successors in office, the New York Liquidation Bureau, and their respective attorneys, agents, and employees, and such immunity is extended to them for any cause of action of any nature against them, individually or jointly, for any action or omission by any one or more of them when active in good faith, in accordance with this order, or in the performance of their duties pursuant to Insurance law Article 74; . . .”

Superintendent's Reply

On March 1, 2012, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General for the State of New York and Attorney for the Superintendent, filed an "Omnibus Reply Memorandum of Law in Response to the Objections to the Proposed Liquidation of ELNY and Distribution of ELNY's Assets Pursuant to the Restructuring Agreement" (Reply Memorandum). Addressing the proposed judicial grant of immunity, the Reply Memorandum argues:

• The Superintendent, as regulator of the insurance industry in the State of New York, is immune for his decision to seek liquidation and the timing of such decision.
• The Superintendent, as Receiver for ELNY, has no liability for actions performed within the scope of his authority pursuant to the Rehabilitation Order, the Rehabilitation Plan Order, and subsequent orders of this Court.
• Any claim against the Superintendent would deplete estate assets without any benefit to ELNY Contract policyholders or payees.
• If the Court does not grant immunity, the Superintendent will be forced to reserve assets in the ELNY estate to pay the costs of defending these meritless claims, which could significantly delay the liquidation of ELNY and the closing of the Restructuring Agreement.
• The injunctions contained in the 1992 ELNY Rehabilitation Order restraining all persons from commencing any action against the Superintendent, as Receiver, should be continued.
• No objector has met its burden of proof to vacate or modify the injunctions granted by the Court.

Peter Bickford Analysis

In a 2009 article consolidating a series of blog posts about "The Insurance Receivership Process in New York", attorney Peter Bickford provides an alternative perspective on the immunity issue:

"... [T]he Bureau acts as the agent for the superintendent of insurance in his separate and private role as liquidator or rehabilitator, marshalling assets, paying claims and, in the case of rehabilitation, managing the business and acting to remove the causes of insolvency to restore the company to the marketplace. The courts have held that the liquidator or rehabilitator “stands in the shoes” of management so that, in theory at least, the Bureau and its employees are subject to the same standards of care and responsibility as any manager of any insurance entity.

"Of course, given the circumstances of taking over an insolvent company, the law provides for certain protections for the estate, such as providing the courts with the authority to issue injunctions or orders 'necessary to prevent interference with the superintendent or the proceeding, or waste of the assets of the insurer, or the commencement or prosecution of any actions, the obtaining of preferences, judgments, attachments or other liens, or the making of any levy against the insurer, its assets or any part thereof.'” (Insurance Law § 7419; Bickford's emphasis)

"These powers are clearly intended for the protection of the estate and its assets, and to allow for an orderly administration of an estate. They are not intended, and have not in the past been used overtly for the personal protection of the rehabilitator or liquidator and his agents – until now."

Bickford continues:

"By adding this [immunity] paragraph to the form of court order of liquidation or rehabilitation, the Bureau seeks to obtain immunity without any basis in the law, and for which there is no precedent in any of the hundreds of liquidation and rehabilitation petitions filed in the past. This immunity, by the way, is no garden-variety immunity from mere negligence. It bestows absolute immunity – including for gross negligence or intentional acts committed while acting as liquidator or rehabilitator of an estate.

"Once again the current administration of the Liquidation Bureau has acted counter to its own pronouncements of openness and accountability. The Bureau repeatedly states that it is protecting the interests of policyholders and claimants of insolvent estates, and has publicly invoked its “fiduciary” role more than a few times. In the law, of course, fiduciaries are held to a higher standard of care than mere managers. Not only is the Bureau not prepared to assume even the most basic standard of care for its actions or inactions, the Bureau seeks to escape any and all responsibility.

"Add this unprecedented immunity to the lack of existing institutional oversight or regulation, and you have the perfect setting for unbridled and undiscoverable abuse."

Bickford concludes:

"The regulatory oversight of a licensed company should not end with the entering of an order of liquidation or rehabilitation. It makes no sense that when an insurance entity is placed in receivership the commissioner ceases to be the regulator and becomes the manager of an unregulated insurance business. Why shouldn’t the superintendent as receiver be held to the same standards that he imposes on the rest of the industry as its regulator? Why shouldn’t he apply his own rules to himself?"

The ELNY Liquidation Hearing concluded March 29, 2012 and awaits Judge Galasso's decision.

For additional Peter Bickford commentary and analysis, see "The Trouble with ELNY" , S2KM's review of a recent Bickford article. For S2KM's complete reporting about the ELNY Liquidation, see the structured settlement wiki.

Product Suitability Standards - 4

With declining annuity premium and historically low interest rates, structured settlement stakeholders should be discussing how to improve and grow their business. To help promote this discussion, S2KM's current blog series about "product suitability standards" highlights two fundamental issues rarely addressed during industry educational conferences:

• When is a structured settlement annuity appropriate for a specific physical personal injury claimant?
• What standards exist to help judges, guardians, trustees, mediators, attorneys, settlement planners, structured settlement consultants and other structured settlement stakeholders make this determination?

Potential sources for structured settlement product suitability standards discussed in prior S2KM blog posts:

• Part 1 - NSSTA's Code of Ethics; SSP's Standards of Professional Conduct; and the NAIC's Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation.
• Part 2 - State minors' statutes and state structured settlement protection statutes.
• Part 3 - The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)

Fiduciary Standard

Among other findings, S2KM's prior review points out a general legislative trend to protect investors and consumers with a more uniform fiduciary, and/or "best interest", standard of care. In general, a fiduciary standard is viewed as the highest legal standard of customer care requiring both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. A fiduciary is required to act in the best interest of the investor and/or customer and to fully disclose all material facts plus any conflicts of interest. Trustees and investment advisers currently are held to a fiduciary standard which may soon also apply to financial planners and broker dealers. Many state minors' statutes and all state structured settlement protection statutes incorporate "best interest" standards.

Model Annuity Regulations

For some but not all annuity products, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has created a "Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation". Significantly, the NAIC Model Suitability Regulation exempts structured settlements and provides less consumer protection than the fiduciary, and/or "best interest" standard. The NAIC has also promulgated an "Annuity Disclosure Model Regulation" "to provide standards for the disclosure of certain minimum information about annuity contracts to protect consumers and foster consumer education." It also exempts structured settlements. The legislative history of the NAIC Model Disclosure Regulation indicates that "[i]nterested parties spoke in favor of an exemption for sophisticated transactions such as ..... structured settlements."

A Hall Pass?

Do these NAIC exemptions mean that structured settlements have been given a "hall pass" for purposes of product suitability requirements? No. If structured structured stakeholders want to improve and grow their business, there are many reasons why they should: 1) understand the meaning and requirements of all three standards (fiduciary duty, best interest, and suitability); and 2) adopt better business practices that address and incorporate one or more of these product standards. Reasons include:

• Blended products - Structured settlement annuities increasingly are paid into trusts (UPIA standard) that also include financial products (Dodd-Frank standard).
• Multiple licenses - In addition to structured settlement annuities, settlement planners increasingly sell securities as well as multiple life insurance and annuity products.
• Competition - To successfully compete in today's economic and legal environment, structured settlement sales persons must adjust upward to match the higher product suitability standards and best business practices of their competitors.
• Clients and Stakeholders - As a matter of self-protection as well as consumer protection, many structured settlement clients (defendants; plaintiff attorneys) and stakeholders ( judges; mediators) will increasingly demand higher product and sales standards for injury victims.
• Lawsuits - In this era of accountability and compliance, all structured settlement participants are likely to be held to higher legal standards.

Three-Card Monte

Why do product suitability standards create issues for the structured settlement industry? At their worst, especially from the perspective of an unrepresented injury victim, some traditional structured settlement business practices not only fall far short of the fiduciary standard - they can resemble a game of "Three-card Monte" .

Misrepresentations or omission of material facts

• Cost or Value - From a claimant's perspective, a core strategy for traditional structured settlements often appears "to make a little money look like a lot of money". The Spencer v. Hartford class action allegations outline one "sophisticated" variation of this strategy which often depends on hiding or misrepresenting annuity "cost" and/or settlement "value".
• Guaranteed payments - Many structured settlement sales brochures continue to promise "guaranteed payments" without specifying who guarantees what if and when an annuity provider like Executive Life of New York (ELNY) becomes insolvent.
• Managed account - Many structured settlement recipients do not understand important product details when their case is settled including how structured settlements differ from managed accounts and why they cannot access funds without court approval pursuant to state structured settlement protection acts.
• Structured settlement myths- historically used to promote sales such as:
  • Studies show that nine out of 10 lump sum recipients squander the entire amount within five years.
  • Structured settlements enable injury victims to live free of reliance on government assistance.

Conflicts of interest - without written, informed client and/or customer consent

• Single product - The danger of single product structured settlement sales persons is not limited to whether his or her product is "suitable" or in the "best interest" of a particular claimant/customer. The danger is also that single product sales persons are inherently conflicted in recommending how much of any settlement should be allocated to their product.
• Multiple roles - A structured settlement sales person introduced into a case by a defendant or liability insurer frequently plays four separate roles each of which potentially conflicts with the other roles: agent for the annuity provider; broker for the defendant; broker for the plaintiff; and agent for the defendant in helping to negotiate and settle the case.
• Compensation sharing - Unless all parties to a settlement are informed about whether and how structured settlement annuity commissions are shared, a structured settlement creates a variety of potential conflicts of interest.
• Funding alternatives - Based upon traditional structured settlement business and compensation models, the potential availability and applicability of 468B qualified settlement funds for "appropriate cases" creates inherent conflicts of interest between defendants and their structured settlement brokers.

Recommendations

• Education - Both the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA) and the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) should devote more educational resources to understanding product suitability standards applicable directly and indirectly to structured settlements including standards applicable to their clients and competitors.
• Business standards - SSP's "Standards of Professional Conduct for Settlement Planners" represents an important industry document that has received less attention among structured settlement stakeholders than it deserves. As a result of Dodd-Frank, SSP should review and re-consider the product suitability standards proposed in its current Standards of Conduct.
• Business model - Without violating anti-trust laws, both NSSTA and SSP should encourage their members to continue studying and discussing how transitional settlement planning business models impact traditional structured settlement broker roles, compensation models and business standards.
• Documentation - In the context of transitional business models and standards, structured settlement stakeholders should review and improve core case documents including client requests for proposals, sales materials, settlement agreements, broker of record letters, and commission sharing agreements.

For additional S2KM reporting and commentary about structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki.

Product Suitability Standards - 3

When is a structured settlement annuity appropriate for a specific physical personal injury claimant? And what standards exist to help judges, guardians, trustees, mediators, attorneys, settlement planners, structured settlement consultants and other structured settlement stakeholders make this determination?

In two prior blog posts, S2KM has addressed these issues in the context of:

• Part 1 - NSSTA's Code of Ethics; SSP's Standards of Professional Conduct; and the NAIC's Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation.
• Part 2 - Minors' statutes and state structured settlement protection statutes.

This blog post discusses product suitability standards created by the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) and highlights a general trend to create a more uniform fiduciary, and/or "best interest", standard of care to protect investors.

UPIA

When investing and managing assets (including settlement proceeds and structured settlement annuity payments), trustees historically have been held to a fiduciary standard. According to uslegal.com, "[A] fiduciary duty is an obligation to act in the best interest of another party..... A person acting in a fiduciary capacity is held to a high standard of honesty and full disclosure in regard to the client and must not obtain a personal benefit at the expense of the client." (emphasis added)

More recently and comprehensively, a trustee's investment responsibilities have been re-defined legislatively by the UPIA which was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1994 and approved by the American Bar Association in 1995. The UPIA now serves as the most important reference, external to the trust document itself, for trustees to determine what fiduciary duties their position requires. With some state-specific modifications, 41 states, U.S. Virgin Island, and the District of Columbia have adopted the UPIA.

Prior to the UPIA, courts applied the "prudent man rule" when evaluating trustee investment performance. The prudent man rule required trustees “to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.”

The UPIA, by contrast, adopts "modern portfolio theory" as a different and more appropriate standard for trustees. Compared with the prudent man rule, modern portfolio theory promotes a holistic view of trust assets by focusing on the total return generated by a trust as opposed to viewing a trust's income and principal separately. By viewing all investments comprehensively, modern portfolio theory and the UPIA hold that a trustee (or other investor) can achieve a positive overall investment return despite the poor performance of specific investments. This new standard allows for greater investment diversification so long as the risk/reward ratio matches the purposes and terms of the trust instrument.

Section 2(c) of the UPIA identifies eight factors a trustee should consider when making any investment:

• General economic conditions;
• The possible effect of inflation or deflation;
• The expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies;
• The role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall trust portfolio;
• The expected total return from income and appreciation of capital;
• Other resources of the beneficiaries;
• Needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation or appreciation of capital; and
• An asset’s relationship of special value, if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries.

Significant for structured settlement annuities, the UPIA's list of investment considerations fails to mention mental or physical disabilities of a trust beneficiary. From a settlement planning and/or special needs perspective, injuries or diseases that reduce an individual's normal life expectancy arguably should receive important consideration when a trustee makes investment decisions.

Dodd-Frank

President Obama signed Dodd-Frank into law on July 21, 2010. Among other reforms, this sweeping legislation created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO). CFPB's central mission is "to make markets for consumer financial products and services work for Americans ....." Among its core functions are addressing consumer complaints and restricting unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices under the Federal consumer financial laws. Dodd-Frank provides the CFPB with significant authority that goes beyond existing consumer protection statutes. CFPB has broad authority to ask questions and demand information including consumer complaints. The FIO is part of the U.S. Department of Treasury and has authority to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry.

In addition to creating the CFPB and the FIO, Dodd-Frank directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to study the need for a new, uniform, federal fiduciary standard of care for broker-dealers and investment advisers and to apply such a uniform standard if it deemed necessary. The SEC's assignment also required determining the existence of any gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in legal or regulatory standards for the protection of retail customers.

Historically, investment advisers and broker-dealers have been subject to differing standards of care. Investment advisers are defined under Federal law as persons who “engage in the business of advising others. . .as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities. . .” [15 U.S.C. § 80b-2] They are regulated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and owe a fiduciary duty to their clients.

Broker-dealers are defined under Federal law as persons who engage in “the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities. . .” [15 U.S.C. § 78b(12)] and may provide a variety of related services. Broker-dealers generally are not subject to any fiduciary duty under the federal securities laws. They do, however, have a duty of fair dealing which includes a “suitability” standard - i.e. broker-dealers must make recommendations that are consistent with the interests of their customers.

Adding further uncertainty for investors, the existing legislative and regulatory system, according to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), also "leaves states free to develop their own often conflicting definitions of fiduciary standards. This can confuse investors and lead to inconsistent definitions and interpretations under existing state law." SIFMA has recommended adoption of a uniform definition of "fiduciary duty" applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers that includes both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. These duties, according to SIFMA, should require both broker-dealers and investment advisers "to act in the best interest of the customer, and to provide full and fair disclosure of material facts and conflicts of interest."

In January 2011, the SEC submitted its "fiduciary standard" study to Congress recommending the adoption of a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisers and broker-dealers when providing investment advice to retail customers. The SEC's proposed standard would be “no less stringent” than the standard currently applicable to investment advisers, and would include the duty to act in the "best interest" of the customer.

Structured Settlement Annuities

Why are the UPIA and Dodd-Frank relevant and important for structured settlement stakeholders?

• Structured settlement annuities increasingly are paid into trusts (UPIA) that also include financial securities (Dodd-Frank).
• Settlement planners, as opposed to traditional structured settlement sales persons, are increasingly licensed to sell financial securities as well as insurance products.
• The UPIA (settlement trustees) and Dodd-Frank (financial planners; investment advisers; broker-dealers) directly impact structured settlement competitors.
• To be successful in the changing financial and insurance environment, anyone selling structured settlement annuities must understand and compete against the highest product suitability standards and best business practices.

Given the diversity, uncertainty and transition of various product suitability standards, how should structured settlement stakeholders address the issue of whether a structured settlement is appropriate for individual physical personal injury claimants? S2KM will offer practical case-specific advice and strategic industry advice in its next blog post.

For additional information about structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki and Section 6.02 of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J).

Product Suitability Standards - 1

To what professional "product suitability standards", if any, should structured settlement "consultants" be held responsible when they recommend structured settlement annuities for claimants in the context of personal injury settlements? And where should they look for guidance?

Should it matter:

• Whether the structured settlement consultant is working on behalf of the defendant or the plaintiff?
• Whether the structured settlement consultant is also a:
  • Registered Settlement Planner (RSP); or a,
  • Certified Structured Settlement Consultant (CSSC); or a,
  • Registered Representative (RR); or a,
  • Certified Financial Planner (CFP); or a,
  • Registered Investment Adviser (RIA)?
• Whether the proposed structured settlement annuity will be paid into a trust set up for the claimant as opposed to the claimant directly?

The National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA) is the largest national structured settlement professional association in the United States.  NSSTA has adopted a "Statement of Ethics and Professional Responsibility" (Code of Ethics) to provide "guiding principles" to its members and member organizations.  The Preamble to NSSTA's Code of Ethics provides:

"Implicit in the acceptance of this Statement is an obligation to act in a professionally responsible and ethical manner when providing structured settlement services."

Although Principle VI directs NSSTA members to:

"…comply with all material federal and state laws and regulations applicable to the structured settlement services that are provided",

NSSTA's Code of Ethics does not directly address product suitability standards. Nor does NSSTA's Code of Ethics include any penalties or enforcement procedures for member violations.

By comparison, the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP), whose members also sell structured settlement annuities, has adopted the "Standards of Professional Conduct For Settlement Planners" (Standards of Conduct).  Related to product suitability, Rule 5 (Conflict of Interest and Loyalty) of SSP's Standards of Conduct states in part:

"A settlement planner shall make and implement only recommendations that are appropriate for the client and consistent with the client’s objectives" (emphasis added).

In the event of a conflict between SSP's Standards of Conduct and any:

"laws, court rules, licensure requirements or other standards imposed on any regulated profession such as law, accounting, financial planning, securities trading or insurance", the SSP's members "should abide by the laws or professional standards imposed on the members discipline (emphasis added) ..."

Rule 5 also requires SSP members to obtain their client's "informed consent" which their Standards of Conduct define as:

"…agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the settlement planner has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct."

The Preamble to SSP's Standards of Conduct addresses enforcement, stating in part:

"Compliance with these Rules depends upon voluntary adherence and, secondarily, upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion.....Although it is not intended that a violation of these Rules will, in itself, subject a settlement planner to civil liability to a person injured by such a violation, it is expected that these rules may be used as evidence of the conduct expected of reasonable settlement planners."

What does "appropriate" mean under the SSP Standards of Conduct? And what "laws or professional standards" could impact whether a structured settlement is appropriate for a particular injury victim?

One potential source for answers is the "Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation" (Suitability Regulation) promulgated and most recently revised in 2010 by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and subsequently enacted by several states.  The purpose of the NAIC Suitability Regulation is:

“…to require insurers to establish a system to supervise recommendations and to set forth standards and procedures for recommendations to consumers that result in transactions involving annuity products so that the insurance needs and financial objectives of consumers at the time of the transaction are appropriately addressed."  However, the NAIC Suitability Regulation adds:  "Nothing herein shall be construed to create or imply a private cause of action for a violation of this regulation."

Section 6A of the NAIC Suitability Regulation provides in part:

"In recommending to a consumer the purchase of an annuity or the exchange of an annuity that results in another insurance transaction or series of insurance transactions, the insurance producer, or the insurer where no producer is involved, shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the consumer on the basis of the facts disclosed by the consumer as to his or her investments or other insurance products and as to his or her financial situation and needs, including the consumer's suitability information ..."

The NAIC Suitability Regulation defines "suitability information" to include: age; annual income; financial situation and needs, including financial resources used for the funding of the annuity; financial experience; financial objectives; intended use of the annuity; financial time horizon; existing assets, including investment and life insurance holdings; liquidity needs; liquid net worth; risk tolerance; and tax status; prescribes duties and penalties for insurers and insurance producers.

The NAIC Suitability Regulation applies "to any recommendation to purchase, exchange or replace an annuity made to a consumer by an insurance producer, or an insurer where no producer is involved, that results in the purchase, exchange or replacement recommended."

Significantly for structured settlements, however, Section 4 of the NAIC Suitability Regulation exempts "settlements of or assumptions of liabilities associated with personal injury litigation or any dispute or claim resolution process".

Does this exemption encompass structured settlements?

By way of explanation, the legislative history of the NAIC Suitability Regulation specifically references "structured settlements" and adds:

"A regulator pointed out that this type of contract did not generally result from a recommendation by an insurer or producer but agreed that it did not hurt to have the exemption there."

If the NAIC Suitability Regulation exempts structured settlements, why is it relevant to structured settlement consultants and/or settlement planners?

• First, some structured settlement consultants and most settlement planners also sell annuity products (example SPIAs) that are covered by the NAIC Suitability Regulation.
• Second, some states now require all licensed insurance agents to complete a one-time annuity suitability training program as a condition for selling any annuity products. NSSTA already offers qualifying training programs for its members.

• Third, some structured settlement consultants may also be licensed to sell financial securities in addition to annuity products and may therefore be held to a higher product suitability standard by their broker-dealer.

• Fourth, some structured settlement consultants and/or annuity providers may proactively decide to adopt product suitability standards regardless of legal requirements. See, for example, the SSP "appropriate" standard highlighted above. Also note: under Section 8 of the NAIC Suitability Regulation, insurers are responsible for compliance and subject to penalties for non-compliance.
• Fifth, many structured settlement competitors (examples: financial planners and settlement trustees) are held to higher, more specific product suitability standards. To improve their sales success, structured settlement consultants should understand their competitors' product suitability standards including "fiduciary" and "best interest" standards in addition to, and in contrast with, the NAIC annuity suitability standard.

In subsequent blog posts, S2KM will identify and discuss product suitability legislation and regulations, in addition to the NAIC Suitability Regulation, that could impact structured settlement consultants and settlement planners.

For additional S2KM blog posts concerning structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki and Section 6.02 of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J).