Beyond Structured Settlements

Structured Settlements in 2012 - 4

Executive Life of New York

At one time or another, each of us may have become acquainted with individuals who have overcome personal injuries and successfully transformed their disabilities and special needs into special lifetime accomplishments. Kyle Walsh, profiled in a 2012 S2KM blog post, is one such individual. The late Randy Snow, featured in a 2008 S2KM blog series, was another.

Structured settlements are supposed to provide economic security for people with serious injuries and disabilities - to help them rebuild their lives and, in many cases, to achieve special lifetime accomplishments. Instead of an all-cash personal injury settlement, structured settlement recipients accept a promise of future periodic payments.

What happens, if and when, that promise is broken? What happens when a structured settlement funding company, and the regulators and guaranty system responsible for protecting the structured settlement recipients, fail to make and/or insure full payment?

These questions are highlighted by the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) liquidation - the dominant structured settlement story of 2012 and one of the most important developments in the history of the United States structured settlement industry.

The story of ELNY, as well as its affiliate Executive Life of California (ELIC), and their parent company, First Capital Corporation (FEC), is long and complex. For background of events prior to ELNY's 1991 receivership, S2KM recommends Gary Schulte's 1992 book "The Fall of First Executive".

Significantly, neither the 1991 ELNY Rehabilitation Order nor the 1992 Order approving the ELNY Rehabilitation Plan declared ELNY to be insolvent. When then New York's Insurance Commissioner Salvatore Curiale seized control of ELNY on April 16, 1991 and placed it in receivership, he stated: "The company is currently neither in an insolvent or impaired condition. . . . I have not petitioned the Court to make a finding of insolvency. ELNY is a company well able to meet its current obligations."

Exactly twenty-one years later, on April 16, 2012, following 11 days of hearings at the Nassau County New York Supreme Court, presiding Judge John M. Galasso approved an Order of Liquidation and a Restructuring Agreement for ELNY as proposed by the Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (Superintendent), as ELNY's Receiver, and the National Organization of Life and Health Guaranty Funds (NOLHGA).

The result of the ELNY Liquidation Order and Restructuring Plan, even following contributions from state guaranty funds and voluntary life insurance company contributions, is a $900 million shortfall allocated entirely (and arguably inequitably) to more than 1400 ELNY payees out of a total of approximately 9700 current ELNY payees. The remaining ELNY payees expect to receive 100 percent of their promised future payments. The average individual shortfall is estimated to exceed $600,000 present value. Although an ELNY Hardship Fund has been created, it has not yet been funded.

An appeal was filed May 30, 2012, on behalf of 18 ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees, challenging the ELNY liquidation order and restructuring agreement on the basis of due process. The appeal also alleges that immunities and injunctions granted under the liquidation order are improper. Oral arguments occurred on November 15, 2012 in Brooklyn before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department. No decision has been announced.

Another legal challenge to the ELNY liquidation order occurred June 14, 2012 when attorneys for several liability insurers filed a Motion asking Judge John Gallasso to "clarify and/or correct" his April 16, 2012 ELNY Memorandum Decision. The motion indirectly raises the issue of whether qualified assignments extinguish the liability of defendants and/or liability insurers for shortfall payments resulting from the ELNY liquidation? Judge Galasso denied the Motion without further explanation. 

In a subsequent development, somewhat related to the liability insurers' motion, the ELNY website announced an ELNY Facilitation Plan to assist owners of ELNY structured settlement annuities (SSAs) make supplemental payments to ELNY SSA payees and to coordinate those payments with the ELNY benefit payments scheduled to be made by the Guaranty Association Benefits Company (GABC) under the ELNY Restructuring Plan approved by Judge Galasso on April 16, 2012 as part of the ELNY liquidation order.

The same attorneys who filed the ELNY appeal, Edward Stone and representatives of the Christensen & Jensen law firm, filed a class action lawsuit November 8, 2012, on behalf of ELNY shortfall victims, against Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services of the State of New York, and his predecessor ELNY Rehabilitators, as well as MetLife and Credit Suisse. The class action allegations provide a critical litany of mismanagment and non-disclosure during the 21 years ELNY's estate was being supervised by these defendants.

In response, attorneys representing Benjamin M. Lawsky, in his capacity as ELNY's Receiver, filed a Notice of a Motion with the Nassau County New York State Supreme Court requesting oral argument on January 4, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the parties may be heard:

• to enjoin three ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees and their legal counsel from proceeding with a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court Southern District of New York;
• to hold in contempt of court the shortfall payees' legal counsel; and
• to require their payment of the related costs and attorney's fees incurred by the Superintendent.

Although the ELNY liquidation has so far received limited coverage in the mainstream media, specialty insurance experts and analysts have not been silent. Examples:

• Peter Bickford - In his article titled "The Elephant in the Court Room" (summarized here by S2KM), Bickford argues New York’s receivership system has failed ELNY, its policyholders and beneficiaries, as well as the insurance industry and its customers due to a lack of basic accountability standards. Although the ELNY restructuring plan may solve the immediate ELNY problem (at the expense of the remaining ELNY shortfall victims), Bickford maintains it does not address the broader, underlying systemic defects inherent in the New York life insurance receivership system. Without an act of the New York legislature, according to Bickford, "there will be no life insurance guaranty fund coverage in New York" following ELNY. Bickford's article also provides succinct summaries of objections raised by ELNY shortfall victims and ELNY legal issues which he states "could linger in the courts for years"
• LifeHealthPro - In an article titled "The Complete ELNY Saga: 21 Years of Mismanagement, Corruption, Broken Promises and Shattered Lives", (summarized here by S2KM), the authors assign primary blame for ELNY insolvency to the NYLB which they describe as "a rogue agency known for its codes of secrecy and characterized by many who spoke for this story as ineffective and mismanaged at best, and a snake pit of corruption at worst". In a companion article (reviewed here by S2KM), writer Warren Hersch asks: "is the structured settlement process in need of reform"?  In a follow-up oped article titled "Governor Cuomo I'm Calling You Out", (summarized here by S2KM), Bill Coffin, LifeHealthPro's Group Editor, charges New York Governor Andrew Cuomo with personal responsibility to clean up the "ELNY debacle".

The final results of the ELNY liquidation will depend upon the outcome of the continuing litigation highlighted in this article. It also remains to be seen what reforms, if any, will result from the failed ELNY receivership process.

In conclusion, it should also be noted that ELIC-related litigation continued in 2012 (Garamendi v. Altus Finance S.A.) when a federal jury in Los Angeles rejected a claim by California's Insurance Commissioner that, but for a conspiracy by French investor group Artemis S.A.:

• ELIC's original conservator (then California insurance commissioner John Garamendi) would have accepted an alternative bid in 1991 by state insurance guaranty associations; and
• The alternative bid would have retained profits from ELIC's junk bond portfolio for the benefit of policyholders including ELIC structured settlement recipients.

For S2KM's complete and continuing reporting about the ELNY liquidation, see the structured settlement wiki.

This blog post completes S2KM's series "Structured Settlements in 2012":

• Part 1 - Primary market
• Part 2 - Settlement planning
• Part 3 - Secondary market
• Part 4 - Executive Life of New York

"Only Half the Story"

In an August 2, 2012 blog post titled "Uniform Fiduciary Standards Only Half the Story", John Darer offers the following critique of this earlier S2KM blog post: "It's a pity that an otherwise well written blog post by Patrick Hindert about Uniform Fiduciary Standards, unexplainably omits standards for the secondary market."

S2KM's blog post addressed the following issue: "What impact will a new uniform fiduciary standard, being developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as one result of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), have upon existing structured settlement and settlement planning business models and practices?"

Without any discussion of the secondary market, S2KM's blog post also highlighted certain traditional primary market structured settlement business practices that fail to meet any fiduciary standard:

• Misrepresentations or omission of material facts; and
• Conflicts of interest - without written, informed client and/or customer consent.

John's blog post makes two valid points. First, that S2KM's blog post ignored secondary market standards. Second, despite enactment of IRC section 5891 and state structured settlement protection statutes, bad business practices continue to exist in the secondary market. John's blog post identifies several such practices.

By "setting aside the good players", however, John's blog post spotlights existing bad business practices but does not identify or address secondary structured settlement market business standards. What are those secondary market standards - and how do (or should) these standards impact the primary market?

Looking specifically at the "uniform fiduciary standard" (the subject of the S2KM blog post in question), the related secondary market standard is the "best interest" test. There are three sources that establish and/or address this secondary market standard: 1) IRC section 5891; 2) the state structured settlement protection statutes; and 3) judicial interpretations of the "best interest" standard.

IRC Section 5891

IRC section 5891 imposes a 40 percent excise tax on any person who acquires structured settlement payment rights in a factoring transaction. The excise tax, however, does not apply if the transfer is approved in advance in a "qualified order" issued under an applicable state statute by an applicable state court.

IRC section 5891(b)(2) defines a qualified order as “a final order, judgment or decree” that satisfies two requirements: a qualified order must find the transfer of the structured settlement payment rights:

• does not contravene:
  • Any Federal or State statute or
  • The order of any court or responsible administrative authority; and
• Is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents.

State Structured Settlement Protection Acts

Forty-seven states have enacted some form of structured settlement protection act. While the various state SSPAs lack uniformity, most adopt the same terminology and share the same basic legislative scheme as the Model SSPA. Echoing IRC section 5891, the state SSPAs provide that structured settlement payment rights transfers are not effective unless they receive advance court approval. Under each of the state SSPAs, key terms are defined, procedures for obtaining court approval are spelled out, and required notices, disclosures and findings are established.

Although all of the state SSPAs incorporate the "best interest" test, the California statute is the only SSPA that defines best interest. Section 10139.5 (b) of the California Insurance Code lists 15 factors that judges should consider "[w]hen determining whether the proposed transfer should be approved, including whether the transfer is fair, reasonable, and in the payee’s best interest, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents" including:

“(1) The reasonable preference and desire of the payee to complete the proposed transaction, taking into account the payee’s age, mental capacity, legal knowledge, and apparent maturity level"; and

“(15) Any other factors or facts that the payee, the transferee, or any other interested party calls to the attention of the reviewing court or that the court determines should be considered in reviewing the transfer.”

Judicial Interpretations

In the absence of a state SSPA "best interest" standard, state courts have applied differing determination standards and have been reluctant to provide their own definitions. For example, here is a statement from a 2003 New York trial court opinion (In re Petition of Settlement Capital Corp.):

"Although the [New York] statute does not define the best interests of the Payee, developing case law and the intent of the statute suggest the Court should consider: (1) the Payee’s age, mental capacity, physical capacity, maturity level, independent income, and ability to support dependents; (2) purpose of the intended use of the funds; (3) potential need for future medical treatment; (4) the financial acumen of the Payee; (5) whether the Payee is in a hardship situation to the extent that he or she is in “dire straits”; (6) the ability of the payee to appreciate financial consequences based on independent legal and financial advice; [and] (7) the timing of the application."

Conclusion

What relevance, if any, therefore, does the secondary structured settlement market "best interest" standard have as primary market stakeholders contemplate the potential impact of a uniform fiduciary standard under the Dodd-Frank legislation?

Neither IRC 5891 nor any of state SSPAs apply their "best interest" test to primary market structured settlement sales. Only four of the state SSPAs (New York, Florida, Massachusetts and Minnesota) establish any primary market sales standards, each requiring certain mandatory written disclosures.

The secondary market "best interest" test, however, does raise important issues for the primary structured settlement markets. Most importantly, If structured settlement transfers are required to be in "the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents", why shouldn't a "best interest" test or fiduciary standard apply to the original structured settlement sale?

Thank you, John Darer, for pointing out the importance of this issue.

For additional discussion and analysis of secondary market business practices and the "best interest" test, see:

• Sections 16.02 ("History of Structured Settlement Transfers") and 16.05 ("Judicial Review of Transfer Applications") in "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J); and
• The structured settlement wiki:
  • Secondary market blog posts
  • S2KM reports about Professional Association Meetings including the National Association of Settlement Professionals (NASP).

For S2KM's 2006 analysis of "How the Primary Market Views Factoring", see this concept map. 

Uniform Fiduciary Standard

What impact will a new uniform fiduciary standard, being developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as one result of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), have upon existing structured settlement and settlement planning business models and practices?

Dodd-Frank

Among other reforms, Dodd-Frank created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau  (CRPB) and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO). CFPB's central mission is "to make markets for consumer financial products and services work for Americans ....."

In addition to creating the CFPB and the FIO, Dodd-Frank directed the SEC to study the need for a new, uniform, federal fiduciary standard of care for broker-dealers and investment advisers and to apply such a uniform standard if it deemed necessary. The SEC:

• Released its fiduciary standard study in January 2011.
• Concluded that a uniform standard of care “at least as stringent” as the fiduciary standard currently applied to investment advisors should extend to all brokers, dealers and investment advisors.
• Is expected to release its proposed regulation for a uniform fiduciary standard this year.

Historically, brokers, dealers and insurance producers have been held to a "product suitability" standard which is less stringent than a fiduciary standard. As defined at uslegal.com, "[A] fiduciary duty is an obligation to act in the best interest of another party..... A person acting in a fiduciary capacity is held to a high standard of honesty and full disclosure in regard to the client and must not obtain a personal benefit at the expense of the client." (emphasis added)

NAIC Annuity Suitability Regulation

For comparison purposes, the NAIC "Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation" (Suitability Regulation) provides: "In recommending to a consumer the purchase of an annuity or the exchange of an annuity that results in another insurance transaction or series of insurance transactions, the insurance producer, or the insurer where no producer is involved, shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the consumer on the basis of the facts disclosed by the consumer as to his or her investments or other insurance products and as to his or her financial situation and needs, including the consumer's suitability information ..." (emphasis added)

The NAIC Suitability Regulation defines "suitability information" to include: age; annual income; financial situation and needs, including financial resources used for the funding of the annuity; financial experience; financial objectives; intended use of the annuity; financial time horizon; existing assets, including investment and life insurance holdings; liquidity needs; liquid net worth; risk tolerance; and tax status.

Significantly for structured settlements, however, the NAIC Suitability Regulation exempts "settlements of or assumptions of liabilities associated with personal injury litigation or any dispute or claim resolution process". By way of explanation, the legislative history of the NAIC Suitability Regulation specifically references "structured settlements" and adds: "[a] regulator pointed out that this type of contract did not generally result from a recommendation by an insurer or producer but agreed that it did not hurt to have the exemption there."

Impact on Insurance Professionals

Although the SEC's anticipated uniform fiduciary standard has received limited publicity within the structured settlement and settlement planning industries, it has generated significant controversy and disagreement among financial planners, broker dealers and life insurance professionals.

A recent article by Brian Anderson titled "Impact of a Universal Fiduciary Standard" looks at the related issues from the perspective of "insurance producers". Part of a series of articles about threats to the independent life insurance distribution channel, Anderson's article includes the following summary of arguments for and against a universal fiduciary standard:

• "Proponents of a universal fiduciary standard — including many financial planner and consumer groups — claim consumers who rely on the financial advice of experts are confused by the different standards of care. These consumers are at an information disadvantage, they say, and vulnerable to exploitation by advisors who are not required to make recommendations in the best interest of the customer."
• "Opponents of a fiduciary standard — including many life insurance industry trade associations — say a universal fiduciary standard is unnecessary because the current suitability standard is effective. Opponents also say the imposition of a universal fiduciary standard would result in higher costs and reduced choices and service for consumers."

Some life insurance representatives have expressed concern, according to Anderson's article, that the anticipated SEC fiduciary standard could potentially ban commission-based compensation for insurance product sales and thereby destroy the traditional life insurance business model.

Others disagree. Anderson quotes Jill Hoffman, NAIFA assistant vice president of federal government relations, as stating: “The language of Dodd-Frank specifically says that a fiduciary standard can be met, and a person can still receive commissions, and a person can still sell proprietary products. In other words, the language says you cannot violate a fiduciary standard just because you sell proprietary products and get paid commission.”

Structured Settlements and Settlement Planning

Will the SEC uniform fiduciary standard impact settlement planners and structured settlement professionals? Here are some reasons why leading settlement planners and structured settlement professionals should study, and anticipate the need to adopt, whatever uniform fiduciary standard the SEC ultimately adopts:

• Blended products - Structured settlement annuities increasingly are paid into trusts that also include financial products.
• Multiple licenses - In addition to structured settlement annuities, settlement planners increasingly sell securities as well as multiple life insurance and annuity products.
• Competition - To successfully compete in today's economic and legal environment, structured settlement sales persons must adjust upward to match the higher product suitability standards and best business practices of their competitors including settlement planners, financial planners and trustees.
• Clients and Stakeholders - As a matter of self-protection as well as consumer protection, many structured settlement clients (defendants; plaintiff attorneys) and stakeholders ( judges; mediators) will increasingly demand higher product and sales standards for injury victims.
• Lawsuits - In this era of accountability and compliance, all structured settlement participants are likely to be held to higher legal standards.

What issues might a uniform fiduciary standard create for structured settlement and settlement planning professionals? At their worst, as S2KM has previously observed, certain traditional structured settlement business practices fail to meet any fiduciary standard. For example:

• Misrepresentations or omission of material facts
  • Cost or Value - From a claimant's perspective, a core strategy for traditional structured settlements often appears "to make a little money look like a lot of money". The Spencer v. Hartford class action allegations outline one "sophisticated" variation of this strategy which often depends on hiding or misrepresenting annuity "cost" and/or settlement "value".
  • Guaranteed payments - Many structured settlement sales brochures continue to promise "guaranteed payments" without specifying who guarantees what if and when an annuity provider like Executive Life of New York (ELNY) becomes insolvent.
  • Managed account - Many structured settlement recipients do not understand important product details when their case is settled including how structured settlements differ from managed accounts and why they cannot access funds without court approval pursuant to state structured settlement protection acts.
  • Structured settlement myths- historically used to promote sales such as:
    • Studies show that nine out of 10 lump sum recipients squander the entire amount within five years.
    • Structured settlements enable injury victims to live free of reliance on government assistance.
• Conflicts of interest - without written, informed client and/or customer consent
  • Single product - The danger of single product structured settlement sales persons is not limited to whether his or her product is in the "best interest" of a particular claimant/customer. The danger is also that single product sales persons are inherently conflicted in recommending how much of any settlement should be allocated to their product.
  • Multiple roles - A structured settlement sales person introduced into a case by a defendant or liability insurer frequently plays four separate roles each of which potentially conflicts with the other roles: agent for the annuity provider; broker for the defendant; broker for the plaintiff; and agent for the defendant in helping to negotiate and settle the case.
  • Compensation sharing - Unless all parties to a settlement are informed about whether and how structured settlement annuity commissions are shared, a structured settlement creates a variety of potential conflicts of interest.
  • Funding alternatives - Based upon traditional structured settlement business and compensation models, the potential availability and applicability of 468B qualified settlement funds for "appropriate cases" creates inherent conflicts of interest between defendants and their structured settlement brokers.

For additional S2KM reporting about structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki.

ELNY Periodic Payment Obligations

More than 1400 structured settlement annuity payees are expected to suffer payment shortfalls under the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) Liquidation Plan approved by New York State Supreme Court Judge John Galasso on April 16, 2012. The average individual shortfall is estimated to exceed $600,000 present value.

Under what circumstances, if any, will defendants/liability insurers have the legal responsibility to make up the difference in ELNY structured settlement shortfall payments?

Recent Motion

This issue was highlighted in a recent Motion by liability insurers asking Judge Galasso to "clarify and/or correct" his ELNY Memorandum Decision insofar as the Memorandum Decision "caused confusion or mistake" concerning responsibilities of those liability insurers to make up shortfalls on ELNY annuities. Judge Galasso denied the Motion on July 23, 2012.

The Motion attempted to distinguish two types of structured settlement funding alternatives ("buy and hold" vs. qualified assignments). "Buy and hold" annuities, according to the Motion, "are those whereby the underlying insurer retained, or held the liability for future payments, and funded that liability through its ownership of a qualified funding asset, or annuity."

In contrast, the Motion states, "where a structured settlement includes a qualified assignment, the defendant and its liability insurer are fully released from future liability - which liability is assumed by the assignee, here, First Executive Corporation." (emphasis added). Of course, one of the problems for all ELNY stakeholders is that First Executive Corporation ceased to exist in 1991.

As S2KM has previously written, those "suggestions" and/or "assumptions" are not necessarily or universally true. Legal rights and responsibilities resulting from attempts to create qualified assignments must be determined on a case by case basis.

Three Funding Choices

As more fully explained in Section 3.02 of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J): with a structured settlement, each defendant and/or liability insurer has three choices regarding its obligation to fund future periodic payment obligations to the claimant (1) to have no obligation; (2) to assume or share the obligation; or (3) to assume and then transfer the obligation without recourse. In general:

• "No obligation" means either a claim is paid on a lump sum basis or a structured settlement occurs and all parties agree that the particular defendant or liability insurer shall have no duty to make any future periodic payments.
• “Assume the obligation” means that a particular defendant or liability insurer ("obligor") assumes a legal obligation to pay future periodic payments. This obligor may be solely, jointly, or jointly and severally liable for the payments and, by assuming the obligation, accepts certain risks. One such risk is the potential insolvency of the financing company (e.g. ELNY).
• "Transfer the obligation" means "novation" as defined in Section 280 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement): "A novation is a substituted contract that includes as a party one who was neither the obligor nor the obligee of the original duty." Comments to Section 280 further provide:
  • "Effect of novation. A novation discharges the original duty, just as any other substituted contract does, so that breach of the new duty gives no right of action on the old duty.
  • "Consideration. A novation is subject to the same requirements as any other contract, including that of consideration.... [C]onsideration to support the discharge of the original duty can usually be found in the promise to undertake a new duty….Assent of the obligee of the original duty and of the obligor of the new duty is always necessary."
  • "Substitution of obligor. ….[A] mere promise by a third party to assume the obligor’s duty, not offered in substitution for that duty, does not result in a novation, and the new duty that the third party may owe to the obligee as an intended beneficiary is in addition to and not in substitution for the obligor’s original duty."
  • Illustration: "A owes B $1000. B promises C that he will discharge the debt immediately if C will promise to pay him $1000. Intending to benefit A, C so promises. There is a novation under which B’s and C’s promises are consideration for each other, and A’s duty to pay B is discharged. A is the intended beneficiary of B’s promise …and can by disclaimer render the transaction, including the discharge, inoperative from the beginning."

Qualified Assignment

The most common method for transferring a structured settlement obligation is a "qualified assignment" as defined in IRC Section 130(c). For purposes of understanding "transfer of obligation" in the context of structured settlements, however, the Section 130 definition of "qualified assignment" presents two significant problems:

• IRC section 130 does not address whether the assignor's duty is discharged as a result of a qualified assignment.
• Section 130 incorrectly uses the term "assignment" when it should have utilized the term "delegation".

Restatement of Contracts

Comments to Section 316 of the Restatement explain both the difference and the significance of these two terms:

• "Assignment and delegation. In this Chapter rights are said to be 'assigned'; duties are said to be 'delegated' ….. 'Assignment' is the transfer of a right by the owner (the obligee or assignor) to another person (the assignee)."
• "Comparing delegation to assignment. A person subject to a duty (the obligor) does not ordinarily have such a power to substitute another in his place without the consent of the obligee; that is what is meant when it is said that duties cannot be assigned. 'Delegation' of performance may be effective to empower a substitute to perform on behalf of the obligor, but the obligor remains subject to the duty until it has been discharged by performance or otherwise."

Comments to Section 318 of the Restatement further differentiate "delegation" and "novation" as follows: "An obligor is discharged by the substitution of a new obligor only if the contract so provides or if the obligee makes a binding manifestation of assent, forming a novation….Otherwise the obligee retains his original right against the obligor, even though the obligor manifests an intention to substitute another obligor in his place and the other purports to assume the duty. The obligee may, however, have rights against the other as an intended beneficiary of the promise to assume the duty."

NSSTA Model Agreements

After ELNY entered rehabilitation in 1991, the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA) published Model Qualified Assignment Agreements (with and without a Release) which documents were updated following the enactment of IRC 5891 in 2001. Both versions of NSSTA's current Model Qualified Assignment Agreements reference IRC section 130 and utilize "assignment" to describe what the Restatement more properly characterizes as a "delegation".

Here is the relevant comparative language from current paragraphs 1 of the NSSTA Model Agreements:

• With Release - "Assignment and Assumption; Release of Assignor. Assignor hereby assigns to Assignee, and Assignee hereby accepts and assumes, all of Assignor’s liability to make the Periodic Payments. Each Claimant hereby accepts and consents to such assignment by Assignor and assumption by Assignee. Effective on the Effective Date, each Claimant hereby releases and discharges Assignor from all liability to make the Periodic Payments."
• Without Release - "Assignment and Assumption. Assignor hereby assigns to Assignee, and Assignee hereby accepts and assumes, all of Assignor’s liability to make the Periodic Payments."

Impact for Defendants and ELNY Victims

How does this discussion impact whether defendants/liability insurers have the legal responsibility to make up the difference in ELNY structured settlement shortfall payments?

• NSSTA's Model Qualified Assignment Agreements did not exist during the time period (1985-1990) when ELNY was selling structured settlement annuities.
• Legal rights and responsibilities resulting from attempts to create qualified assignments must be determined on a case by case basis.
• Whatever language parties used to describe and/or label their transactions (e.g. annuity financing; buy and hold; qualified assignment; novation; transfer; etc.) is not by itself determinative of the rights and responsibilities set forth in the actual language of the settlement documentation.
• Some common industry practices, at least during the 1985-1990 time period, could create problems for defendant/liability insurers.
• For example, in the paper he delivered at the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) 2012 Annual Meeting, attorney David Higgins pointed out how some defendants and liability insurers have attempted "to collapse the creation of the liability with the assignment of the liability to the assignee."
• Higgins, who drafted the text of the 1982 structured settlement law introduced in the House and the Senate, warned that "such a collapse is to be avoided if the definition [of a qualified assignment] is to be met."
• Under U.S. common law, whether a novation has occurred is a question of fact, and the burden of proving it is generally upon the party asserting it.
• The Restatement identifies potential defenses for ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims who attempt to void a novation including misrepresentation (Sections 159-162) and disclaimer (Section 306).
• All ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees, as well as defendants and/or liability insurers who purchased the related ELNY structured settlement annuities, should retain qualified legal counsel to review their settlement documentation.

For S2KM's complete reporting about the ELNY liquidation, see the structured settlement wiki.

Liability Insurers' ELNY Motion Denied

Without further explanation, Judge John Galasso has denied a Motion by liability insurers, including Travelers, Fireman's Fund and Hartford, asking the Judge to "clarify and/or correct" his August 16, 2012 Executive Life of New York (ELNY) Memorandum Decision insofar as the Memorandum Decision "caused confusion or mistake" concerning responsibilities of those liability insurers to make up shortfalls on ELNY annuities. (see Addendum below)

The ELNY Memorandum Decision states in relevant part: "certain insurance companies such as Travelers, the Fireman's Fund Companies and Hartford have assured the Court that they will make up the difference to those identified shortfall payees for any settlement obligation where they purchased an ELNY annuity on behalf of an injured party."

In their June 14, 2012 Motion, attorneys representing those liability insurers, as well as Jefferson Insurance Company, Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company dba Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty North America, John Hancock Property and Casualty Insurance Company and John Hancock Indemnity Company, asked the Court to "amend its decision to omit what the Court likely intended as an aside, or background, which is not material to the Court's approval" of the ELNY Liquidation Plan.

Their Motion had attempted to distinguish two types of structured settlement funding alternatives: "buy and hold" vs. qualified assignments. The Motion maintained that "at no time" did the liability insurers "undertake liability following qualified assignments - liability was extinguished pursuant to the qualified assignment arrangements."

The Motion further attempted to clarify statements made during the ELNY Liquidation hearings by attorneys representing liability insurers including Fireman's Fund attorney Peter Vodola and Traveler's attorney Craig Ulman. (see Addendum below)

According to the Motion, Vodola's promise on behalf of Fireman's Fund that structured settlement shortfall payees "will receive a hundred percent of their benefits regardless of what happens here" was specifically limited to ELNY annuitants "who are entitled to payments under annuities owned by Fireman's Fund."

Similarly, the Motion sought to clarify Ulman's testimony which provided in part: "l can't speak for any but Travelers but they will in fact be covering the shortfalls under their structured settlements. So that the payees will receive the same number of dollars that they are -- were scheduled to receive eventually." Ulman further stated: "The fact is, their obligations are what they are and they will not be affected by the status of the plan." (see Addendum below)

As S2KM has previously written, the legal rights and responsibilities of ELNY qualified assignments represents a critical issue that may subsequently be litigated by the ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims. The Motion suggested that all qualified assignments release all defendants and liability insurers from future liability for promised periodic payments and that annuity ownership determines liability.

Those "suggestions" and/or "assumptions", however, are not necessarily or universally true. For example:

• IRC section 130, which defines a "qualified assignment", does not address whether the assignor's duty is discharged as a result of a qualified assignment.
• IRC section 130 does include requirements which must be met to successfully create a qualified assignment.
• The Monarch Capital case demonstrates some judges apply "creative" legal analysis to protect structured settlement payees following the bankruptcy of a qualified structured settlement assignee.

In subsequent blog posts, S2KM will review IRC section 130 history and requirements and summarize, in the context of ELNY structured settlement shortfall payments, relevant sections of the Restatement (Second) of Law of Contracts addressing:

• Assignment of Rights
• Delegation of Duties
• Delegation vs. Novation
• Disclaimer by a Beneficiary
• Misrepresentation and Voidable Contracts

For S2KM's complete coverage of the ELNY liquidation, see the structured settlement wiki.

ADDENDUM (July 29, 2012) - Please note two corrections to the above report:

1. Although Judge Galasso's Memorandum Decision specifically mentions Travelers, Travelers had nothing to do with the Motion "to clarify and/or correct" the Memorandum Decision. Travelers was "not a party to [the Motion] and learned about it only after it was filed" according to Craig Ulman, Travelers' attorney.
   
2. Although Ulman's testimony, as quoted above, appears in the ELNY liquidation hearing transcript, the Motion "to clarify and/or correct" does not mention Ulman's testimony at the hearing.  Instead, Ulman's hearing testimony, as quoted by S2KM above, appears in the "Affirmation of Edward S. Stone in Opposition to Motions to Clarify and/or Correct the Court's Memorandum Decision."

The following related ELNY documents are accessible on the structured settlement wiki:

• Memorandum Decision
• Motion to Clarify and/or Correct
• Affirmation in Opposition
• Reply in Support
• Decision denying the Motion
• Craig Ulman Testimony from the ELNY Liquidation Hearing Transcript