Beyond Structured Settlements

MSAs and Liability Cases - 3

Although no statutory or regulatory authority requires Medicare set-aside arrangements (MSAs) in third party liability settlements, confusion continues as to whether and when MSAs are necessary and/or appropriate for such cases.

S2KM has addressed this topic in two prior blog posts:

• MSAs and Liability Cases 1: summarizing recommendations for MSAs in liability cases issued by the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA) for special needs attorneys (case specific) and the American Bar Association (ABA) for the United States Congress (legislative).
• MSAs and Liability Cases 2: reviewing an article by Peter Wayne that offers advice to plaintiff attorneys about Medicare compliance generally in liability cases.

An article by Aaron D. Frishman published in the Fall 2012 issue of the NAELA Journal titled "Medicare Set-asides in Personal Injury Cases: Is There a Standard Method of Practice?" expands and updates analysis of this challenging settlement planning issue.

Frishman's article:

• Provides historical background about the Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) Act and the evolution of MSAs in workers compensation cases.
• Details the three primary arguments for and against MSAs in liability cases:
  • Statutory basis for MSAs
  • Actions taken by CMS and its regional offices
  • Risks of attorney liability.
• Reviews
  • NAELA's 2010 liability MSA Task Force Report.
  • The ABA's 2011 Resolution 108A urging Congress to enact new MSA legislation.
  • The 2011 Hinsinger v. Showboat Atlantic City case "that found MSAs in third party liability cases to be synonymous with those in workers’ compensation matters." while addressing the issue of whether a liability set aside should be reduced for procurement costs.
  • Proposed MSA rule changes CMS released June 15, 2012 in the form of an "advanced notice of proposed rule-making" (ANPRM).

Frishman's conclusions for MSA's in non-workers compensation personal injury cases:

• No clearly identifiable best practice currently exists.
• MSAs are not currently a mandatory method for satisfying Medicare's interests.
• There is currently no published history of any suit by Medicare against any party in a personal injury suit for the failure to establish an MSA.
• Whether to use an MSA is case specific and ultimately the client's choice.
• Attorneys should fully informed their clients of the issues related to future medical expenses and Medicare’s interest.
• At a minimum, attorneys should discuss the potential use of MSAs in personal injury contexts with their clients and all parties involved.
• An attorney should always consider the size of the settlement, as well as the plaintiff’s Medicare eligibility status, when evaluating whether to use MSAs in personal injury settlements.
• An attorney’s examination of the issues should include an in-depth cost-benefit analysis of the plaintiff’s circumstances.
• When an attorney is determining whether to advise his or her client to use an MSA in a personal injury settlement, it is reasonable to assume that the following CMS rules for workers compensation cases would apply:
  
  • The total settlement amount is greater than $25,000; or
  • The plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of enrolling in Medicare within 30 months from the settlement date and the anticipated total settlement amount is expected to be greater than $250,000.
• Until CMS or Congress provides firm authority regarding the application and enforcement of the MSP Act in personal injury settlements, uncertainty will continue regarding MSA use in these contexts.

For additional S2KM reporting about the relationship of structured settlements and settlement planning to Medicare, Medicaid and health care reform, see the structured settlement wiki.

ELNY Allegation Timeline

The Executive Life of New York (ELNY)  class action lawsuit , filed November 8, 2012 by attorney Edward Stone and representatives of the Christensen & Jensen law firm, on behalf of ELNY shortfall victims, against Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services of the State of New York, and his predecessor ELNY Rehabilitators (Superintendent and/or Rehabilitator), MetLife and Credit Suisse, substantially expands the historical allegations of post-1991 ELNY mismanagement and non-disclosure. 

What follows is S2KM's re-configuration of selected allegations from the class action complaint into an ELNY "allegation timeline".

For persons seeking more comprehensive understanding of alleged mismanagement of ELNY during its 21 year rehabilitation, S2KM recommends reading the ELNY class action complaint which is posted on the structured settlement wiki. The following S2KM blog posts provide additional critiques of the New York Liquidation Bureau's (NYLB) role in ELNY insolvency:

• Elephant in the ELNY Courtroom - S2KM's summary of Peter Bickford's article.
• NYLB Role in ELNY Disaster -  highlighting allegations in the National Underwriter article "The Complete ELNY Saga"

ELNY Class Action Allegation Timeline

April 16, 1991

• New York's Insurance Superintendent Salvatore Curiale states: "[ELNY] isn't insolvent and has ample cash on hand to pay life insurance death benefits and meet annuity payments."
• Curiale further states: "The company is currently neither in an insolvent or impaired condition. . . . I have not petitioned the Court to make a finding of insolvency. ELNY is a company well able to meet its current obligations."

April 23, 1991

• ELNY Rehabilitation Court enters an Order of Rehabilitation which prohibits "all" persons, including the Rehabilitator, from "doing or permitting to be done any act or thing which might waste the assets" of ELNY.
• Under ELNY's Order of Rehabilitation, no more than 30 percent of ELNY's assets can be invested in common stock at any given time. This 30 percent cap is 50 percent higher than the percentage allowed by active insurance companies.
• Consistent with normal practice, Superintendent Curiale, ELNY's Rehabilitator, delegates most of his ELNY rehabilitation duties to the New York Liquidation Bureau [NYLB], directed by a Special Deputy Superintendent who in 1991 is Kevin Foley.

May 17, 1991 - In a letter to ELNY policyholders, the Superintendent confirms the sole basis for ELNY's rehabilitation has been the risk of policy surrenders. The letter further states the Superintendent is "presently analyzing the assets and liabilities of ELNY[.]"

June 7, 1991 - NYLB files a petition, which the Rehabilitation Court approves to retain First Boston Corporation (First Boston) as ELNY's exclusive financial advisor.

• The court also approves an investment advisory and management agreement with a First Boston affiliate providing for the payment of multi-million dollar fees.
• First Boston (and its successor/purchaser Credit Suisse) subsequently invests ELNY's assets in violation of its contractual obligations, in violation of the court's order, in violation of its representations to the NYLB and the court, and in violation of its fiduciary duties to ELNY shortfall payees.
• Instead, First Boston and Credit Suisse engage in a pattern of risky investments that generate high management fees and place ELNY's assets at considerable risk.
• Note: Credit Suisse acquired First Boston Corporation in 1990 but did not phase out the First Boston name until 2006.

June 1991 - The Superintendent contacts the Life Insurance Guaranty Corporation of New York (LIGCNY) to discuss the disposition of ELNY. MetLife, the largest domiciled insurance company in New York, has a lead position in LIGCNY and receives information about ELNY that is not available to other insurers generally or to the public.

Between June and November 1991

• NYLB enters into discussions with MetLife. Deputy Superintendent Foley is the principal person representing NYLB in these discussions.
• Under an agreement ultimately approved by the Rehabilitation Court, MetLife receives more than $1.5 billion of ELNY's traditional whole life, term life and single premium deferred annuity books of business plus $1.5 billion of ELNY's highest-quality assets.
• NYLB takes several steps to prevent competitive bids from other insurers.
• The products transferred to MetLife include 52,748 single premium deferred annuities and 80,891 life insurance policies. This large book of business allows MetLife to increase its assets by more than $1 billion at essentially no risk.
• In addition to receiving cash, MetLife is allowed to pick and choose from among ELNY's bonds and to charge "substantially higher surrender charges" than allowed under the ELNY contracts.
• Part of the agreement with MetLife includes retention of MetLife to service ELNY's remaining SPIAs (including structured settlement annuities) with a monthly fee of $5.50 per payee if payments begin before the last day of any month and $2.50 per payee if payments have not begun.
• Under this arrangement, ELNY's true liabilities are ascertainable only by NYLB and MetLife, the only entities with access to the annuity contracts.

October 9, 1991 - In a letter to ELNY policyholders and annuitants, the Superintendent reiterates the original ELNY takeover was due to surrender requests and further states: "it remains our belief that ELNY policyholders, annuitants and contract holders will receive 100% of the amounts due them under any of the options chosen as part [of] the rehabilitation plan. ... Please be assured that your money is being well protected and conservatively invested by the Rehabilitator."

January 21, 1992 - In a letter to ELNY policyholders and annuitants, the Superintendent states he is proposing a transfer of assets to MetLife and that "[t]he contemplated exchange and reinsurance agreements [with MetLife] would place you in a substantially similar position as you were at the time of the entry of the Rehabilitation Order."

March 26, 1992 - To implement the agreements with First Boston and MetLife, NYLB submits a proposed ELNY Rehabilitation Plan which the court approves.

• First Boston represents to the court the only possible course of action is to transfer virtually all of ELNY's investment grade assets to MetLife in exchange for MetLife assuming ELNY's obligations to only part of its policyholders.
• First Boston and NYLB represent that with First Boston's management of ELNY's assets, it is more than 90% certain the remaining ELNY assets will be sufficient to meet 100% of ELNY's obligations.
• Superintendent Curiale represents that, following "an extensive and detailed analysis ... Petitioner, as Rehabilitator, determined that the transaction proposed in the Plan would not impose any unwarranted or unreasonable risks on ELNY's SPIA holders, creditors or shareholders."
• Deputy Superintendent Foley states that, after the transfer, "we will make continued full payment" to annuitants, that he is "fully confident that these payments can and will be made," and that it is a "100 percent guarantee."
• NYLB represents that ELNY's remaining assets and liabilities will be approximately equal after the transfer of assets to MetLife. In fact, after the highest-value assets are transferred to MetLife, ELNY's remaining assets are less that its fixed liabilities by at least $300 million.
• From 1992 until 2010, the NYLB never files any reports with or otherwise updates the ELNY Rehabilitation Court with respect to ELNY's annuities.

April 13, 1992 - In a letter to ELNY policyholders and annuitants, the Superintendent states the proposed transfer of assets to MetLife "best protects all classes of ELNY policyholders and provides security, value, fairness, timeliness and practicality."

During 1992 - The Superintendent conducts "an extensive and detailed," "careful and exhaustive," "comprehensive" "full study" of ELNY's assets and liabilities and afterward reaffirms that ELNY is solvent.

• Following the transfer to MetLife, ELNY retains 23,666 annuity contracts in force and approximately $3.3 billion of assets.
• Foley acknowledges, under the deal, MetLife received "extremely high quality assets" and ELNY was left with lower-quality assets.
• Foley predicts the ELNY rehabilitation process will take "four or five years" or possibly less.
• NYLB asks Milliman & Robertson [M&R] to render actuarial opinions regarding the sufficiency of ELNY's remaining assets based upon certain assumptions and investment strategies.
• M&R does not audit or independently verify any of the information or assumptions provided to it.
• Based upon the assumptions provided by NYLB and First Boston, NYLB represents:
  • "[T]he investment strategy adopted by [the Superintendent] does not impose any unreasonable risks on ELNY's SPIA holders, creditors or shareholders."
  • "[I]n more than 90 percent of 500 randomly generated interest rate scenarios under ... base case assumptions, ELNY's SPIA obligations are satisfied in full."
  • "Under the M&R study, the projected cash flows from the remaining assets [are] sufficient to meet 95% of the SPIA obligations under approximately 99% of the scenerios tested using ... base case default, recovery, yield and rate of return assumptions."

1996 - NYLB for the first time refuses unrestricted access by the New York State Comptroller's office (Comptroller) to its records and personnel.

• The Comptroller reports: "During our work, Department and Bureau officials prevented auditors from examining relevant records related to the liquidation of one estate and employee personnel-related records. Our audit was precluded from interviewing agency managers and operating personnel without senior management present, thereby creating an environment where those individuals could not speak freely."
• Prior to its takeover of ELNY, NYLB had generally cooperated with audits requested by the Comptroller's office.
• For example, no limitations were placed on the Comptroller in 1976, 1984, or 1990.
• In 1994, the Comptroller performed a follow up audit limited to items that had not been reviewed in 1990.

1998 - Common stock comprises 38 percent of ELNY's portfolio exceeding the 30 percent limit set by the 1991 Order of Rehabilitation. 

1999

• A NYLB representative states it could take up to 100 years before ELNY is finally liquidated.
• Former Deputy Superintendent Foley begins employment with MetLife as its Vice President of External and Internal Communications.

2000

• Common stock comprises as much as 44 percent of ELNY's investment portfolio.
• ELNY's common stock portfolio loses hundreds of millions of dollars, nearly one-third of its value.

2001

• In a meeting with a potential ELNY investor representative, the then Deputy Superintendent states: "Why would we want to sell [ELNY] when we can sit here and clip coupons all day."
• ELNY's common stock portfolio drops another 13 percent.

2002 - ELNY's common stock portfolio drops another 19 percent.

2004 - The NYLB refuses a Comptroller request to perform a comprehensive audit to include a review of ELNY's assets and liabilities.

July 23, 2004 - The Comptroller issues subpoenas related to the proposed NYLB audit.

November 17, 2004 - The Superintendent files suit to quash the subpoenas.

June 30, 2005 - A New York Supreme Court quashes the subpoenas, and the Comptroller appeals.

Late 2005 or early 2006

• Then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer campaigns for Governor on an anti-corruption platform.
• NYLB officials approach NOLHGA and the two entities begin working on a plan to liquidate ELNY without informing the Rehabilitation Court or ELNY's policyholders and annuitants of ELNY's insolvency.
• Under this plan, more than 1400 ELNY annuitants would suffer reduced payments of up to 66 percent.

August 2006 - Then-Special Deputy Superintendent Jody Hall, who has responsibility for NYLB, is fired for suspected corruption. She later pleads guilty and is convicted.

November 2006 - Governor-elect Spitzer identifies an investigation of the NYLB as an important priority for his administration.

2007

• On at least three occasions prior to 2007, groups of potential investors advise the Superintendent of an interest in purchasing ELNY's assets and liabilities. On each occasion, the Superintendent directly interposes impediments to the performance of due diligence and other investment-related activities.
• NYLB personnel begin contacting insurance companies and others, such as purchasers of structured settlement payment rights, demanding they contribute money to shore up ELNY or face punitive actions by the New York Department of Insurance.

January 2007 - Governor Spitzer appoints Mark Peters as the new Superintendent.

March 6, 2007 - The New York Appellate Division rules the Comptroller can enforce its subpoenas against NYLB.

May 2007 - Superintendent Peters announces NYLB will be subjected to a "top to bottom" audit by an independent auditor for the first time in NYLB history. The auditors discover the NYLB's financial records are in complete disarray requiring the NYLB to "reconstruct" the financial records of all 60 estates under its supervision.

October 11, 2007 - In Dinallo v. DiNapoli , the New York Court of Appeals holds that, in his capacity as rehabilitator/liquidator of insurance companies, the Superintendent is not a state officer. Therefore, acting as the Superintendent's agent, the NYLB is not a state agency and is not subject to audit by the New York State Comptroller.

December 2007

• NYLB personnel inform Governor Spitzer that a deal has been reached with insurance companies and others assuring 100 percent payment to ELNY policyholders and/or annuitants.
• Unknown to Governor Spitzer, no deal has been reached. Instead, the NYLB is still working privately with NOLHGA on the plan to liquidate ELNY.
• Governor Spitzer announces an "agreement in principle" for ELNY, subject to approval by ELNY's Rehabilitation Court. The agreement is designed to:
  • Continue paying all ELNY annuitants 100% of their benefits;
  • Provide protection for approximately 11,000 ELNY annuity recipients including structured settlement recipients.
• The announced plan, whereby various insurers and guarantee associations apparently agree to pay $650 to $750 million to help fund $2 billion of future ELNY payments, never materializes.

October 2008 - Independent auditors discover NYLB has been understating ELNY's shortfall by more than $1 billion for years. Examining ELNY's estate as of December 31, 2006, the auditor concludes ELNY's liabilities exceed its assets by $1.26 billion.

March 18, 2009 - without notification to ELNY policyholders and annuitants, Judge Daniel Martin signs an Order allowing NYLB to:

• Replace Credit Suisse as ELNY's investment advisor with Wellington Management Company and Goldman Sachs Asset Management; and
• "[F]rom time to time amend the [Investment] Guidelines set by the Rehabilitator in consultation with his new financial advisors if the Rehabilitator deems it beneficial to ELNY."

December 17, 2010 - State Supreme Court Judge Galasso orders the Superintendent to present the Court with a proposed order and plan of liquidation for ELNY on or before July 1, 2011 after the Superintendent confers with the New York Life Insurance Company Guaranty Corporation and other interested parties.

June 23, 2011 - The Superintendent files a motion to postpone the deadline for filing a proposed order and plan of liquidation for ELNY from July 1, 2011 to August 10, 2011 "in order to present a comprehensive and consensual proposed Plan of Liquidation that maximizes the potential benefits for ELNY's structured settlement and other annuitants."

August 8, 2011 - Counsel for the Superintendent advises the court the Superintendent 'is not in a position to submit a consensual proposed order and plan of liquidation on or before August 10, 2011" as previously promised. Instead, he anticipates the Superintendent doing so on or about August 26, 2011.

October 3, 2011 - Governor Andrew Cuomo creates the New York Department of Financial Services by consolidating the New York Insurance and Banking Departments. The Superintendent of Financial Services becomes the court appointed fiduciary and Receiver/Rehabilitator of ELNY as well as other impaired and insolvent insurance companies in New York.

December 2011 - NYLB:

• Files an ex parte motion stating its intent to liquidate ELNY.
• Notifies ELNY shortfall payees for the first time that their benefits will be cut.

March 2012 - Following a hearing, Judge Galasso determines ELNY is insolvent and approves the liquidation plan and restructuring agreement upon which NYLB and NOLHGA have been collaborating since 2006.

• Under the plan, ELNY shortfall payees face a potential loss of benefits exceeding $920 million.
• During the hearing, NYLB successfully prevents shortfall payees from exploring the causes of ELNY's insolvency.
• The order approving the ELNY liquidation plan and restructuring agreement is currently being appealed.

 

Calling Out Governor Cuomo

Doubling down on a recent investigative article he co-authored about Executive Life of New York (ELNY) ("The Complete ELNY Saga "), Bill Coffin, Group Editor in Chief for Summit Business Media’s LifeHealthPro.com, has published a follow-up op ed article ("Governor Cuomo, I'm Calling You Out") in which he urges New York Governor Andrew Cuomo to "make this right. Fix ELNY before its payees must endure their harsh payment cuts."

In his most recent article, Coffin repeats a charge he and his co-authors made earlier: "The New York Liquidation Bureau [NYLB] .... is the cause of all this mess." For S2KM's summary of Coffin's NYLB allegations, see "NYLB Role in ELNY Disaster".

According to its Mission Statement: NYLB "acts for the Superintendent of Financial Services as the court appointed fiduciary and Receiver of impaired and insolvent insurance companies, to maximize assets and resolve liabilities, return rehabilitated companies to the marketplace or distribute the proceeds of the company in a timely manner to creditors."

Benjamin M. Lawsky is New York's Superintendent of Financial Services. Lawsky reports directly to Governor Cuomo and is currently a defendant in an ELNY class action lawsuit  filed November 8, 2012 by attorney Edward Stone and representatives of the Christensen & Jensen law firm.

Coffin's earlier co-authored ELNY article suggested the New York state government or the insurance industry could (and should) clean up the "ELNY debacle". In his most recent article, Coffin charges Governor Cuomo with personal responsibility.

"The simple truth", according to Coffin: "[Governor] Cuomo could fix ELNY if he wanted to. If he thought fixing ELNY would help his chances for a Presidential run in 2016, ELNY would already be fixed..... The insurance industry in the state could simply be ordered to pay that amount."

So why, Coffin asks, has Governor Cuomo not taken action? "Is it because [Governor] Cuomo cannot stomach the notion of making the rest of the industry in the state pay for the actions of an irresponsible few? ... [If] that is the case, then there is always the possibility of paying for ELNY with other general fund monies..... [A]t the very least, [Governor] Cuomo could ensure that any and all fines levied by the Department of Financial Services (Ben Lawsky) go first to ELNY before going anywhere else."

Coffin concludes his appeal to Governor Cuomo by observing: "There is a difference between doing the easy thing and doing the right thing. Show your constituents that you know the difference, or be called out as being just as much a part of this long-running failure as everybody else who has had a chance to fix ELNY and come up short."

For S2KM's complete and continuing reporting about the ELNY liquidation, see the structured settlement wiki.

ELNY Appeal - Oral Arguments

Two Executive Life of New York (ELNY) legal actions are currently in process:

• ELNY Appeal - Oral arguments occurred on November 15, 2012 in Brooklyn before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department challenging the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) Order of Liquidation and Approval of the ELNY Restructuring Agreement signed by New York State Supreme Court Judge John M. Galasso on April 16, 2012.
• ELNY Class Action - Attorney Edward Stone and representatives of the Christensen & Jensen law firm filed a class action lawsuit November 8, 2012 on behalf of ELNY shortfall victims in the United States District Court Southern District of New York against defendants Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services of the State of New York, in his non-regulatory capacity as ELNY's Receiver, including predecessor ELNY Receivers (Superintendent/Rehabilitator), Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) and Credit Suisse Group, AG (Credit Suisse).

ELNY Appeal

The appeal, filed May 30, 2012 on behalf of 18 ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims as objectors:

• Alleges Judge Galasso "erroneously denied objectors' request to reject the proposed agreement of restructuring in connection with the [ELNY] liquidation";
• Further alleges  Judge Galasso's order:
  • "[I]mproperly grants and/or continues certain injunctions and immunities and discriminates against the objectors";
  • "[C]reates impermissible sub-classes of claimants"; and
  • "[R]eflects the courts erroneous denial of objectors' requests to adjourn the hearing ... due to a lack of proper notice of such hearing."
• Seeks to compel:
  • The Superintendent, as ELNY's Rehabilitator, "to provide certain discovery necessary to, among other things, allow objectors to demonstrate why the plan should not be approved and submit a viable competing restructuring plan";
  • Judge Galasso "to unseal certain documents submitted to the court by the rehabilitator"; and
• Further seeks to allow the objectors "to present evidence (in the form of live testimony by certain witnesses) rebutting the receiver's experts and otherwise showing that the proposed-liquidation plan should not have been approved."

Appellate Briefs

S2KM previously summarized:

• Objectors' appellate brief
• Arguments in the objectors' preliminary brief:
  • Due process
  • Immunity
  • Injunction
• Arguments in the Superintendent's brief and the objectors' reply brief:
  • Due process
  • Immunity
  • Injunction

Oral Arguments

S2KM did not attend the ELNY oral arguments in Brooklyn, N.Y. The following reporting notes were provided to S2KM by structured settlement shortfall payees, and their attorney Edward Stone, who did attend the oral arguments and includes their opinions and observations.

The four appellate judges who heard the oral arguments appeared to understand the complexity of the issues on appeal:

• Associate Justice Mark C. Dillon
• Associate Justice Sandra L. Sgroi
• Associate Justice Cheryl E. Chambers
• Associate Justice Robert J. Miller

Each briefing attorney summarized his/her arguments then responded to questions from the judges:

• Karra J. Porter - for the ELNY shortfall payees.
• Steven M. Bierman - for the Superintendent.
• Kevin P. Griffith - for NOLHGA.

At least a dozen attorneys supporting the ELNY liquidation plan approved by Judge Galasso attended the oral arguments, many at the expense of the ELNY victims.These attorneys included several each representing the Superintendent and NOLHGA.

Appearing on behalf of the ELNY shortfall payees, attorney Porter focused her comments on lower court proceedings that denied ELNY shortfall payees their basic due process rights including the right to verify information the Superintendent and NOLHGA relied upon in formulating their restructuring plan.

Porter also addressed the scope of immunity, if any, to be accorded the Superintendent under New York law. She asked the panel to hold the Superintendent's ELNY conduct to the same standard applicable to all private receivers: good faith and appropriate care and prudence. She argued there is no basis in either New York or common law for the immunity and injunctive relief Judge Galasso granted to the Superintendent and his agents.

Appearing on behalf of the Superintendent, attorney Bierman claimed the ELNY shortfall payees had been afforded a fair hearing and noted Judge Galasso had determined the ELNY liquidation and restructuring plan were appropriate under the circumstances. Bierman insisted the Superintendent represented all of the ELNY shortfall victims and acted in their best interest.

Bierman never referenced or attempted to refute evidence that the Superintendent and his agents mismanaged the ELNY estate. Instead, he characterized as "galling" that ELNY shortfall payees would challenge the results of the ELNY liquidation hearing and added "no good deed goes unpunished".

Understandably, the ELNY shortfall victims who attended the oral arguments strongly disagree with attorney Bierman as to what is "galling" about the ELNY rehabilitation, liquidation hearing and restructuring plan. What is "galling" to ELNY shortfall victims:

• The Superintendent's claim that he acted in their best interests.
• The Superintendent's gross mismanagement of the ELNY estate.
• Judge Galasso's denial of their basic due process rights.
• Judge Galasso's grant of immunity and injunction to:
  • Protect the Superintendent and his agents from lawsuits; and
  • Prevent meaningful verification of the Superintendent's assertions.

The judges seemed disinterested in the due process arguments presented by attorney Griffith on behalf of NOLHGA, according to the ELNY shortfall payees who attended the oral arguments. The only question asked: "Wasn't it always the obligation of NOLHGA's state guarantee association members to pay their coverage amounts to the ELNY shortfall payees?"

A decision in the ELNY appeal is expected by year end 2012.

For additional notes about the ELNY oral arguments, see attorney Edward Stone's website.

ELNY Class Action Filed

Attorney Edward Stone and representatives of the Christensen & Jensen law firm have filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of Executive Life of New York (ELNY) shortfall victims in the United States District Court Southern District of New York.

The Complaint names Jeanice Dolan, Daniel A. Malin, Keith Vincent, and other similarly situated ELNY shortfall victims, as plaintiffs, and Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services of the State of New York, in his non-regulatory capacity as ELNY's Receiver, including predecessor ELNY Receivers (Rehabilitator), Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) and Credit Suisse Group, AG (Credit Suisse) as defendants.

Causes of Action vs. Rehabilitator

• Breach of Fiduciary Duties - by:
  • "violating a court order with respect to asset allocation,
  • "employing a high risk tax inefficient investment strategy that created impermissible preferences,
  • "wasting precious assets by paying [New York Liquidation Bureau] expenses that were excessive and not related to the management of the ELNY estate - much of which was outsourced,
  • "failing to audit MetLife records and reconcile data with the social security death master file and
  • "not seeking a purchaser who could and would honor ELNY's policy obligations."
• Fraudulent Omission - by "fraudulently concealing and failing to disclose material information to plaintiffs."

Causes of Action vs. MetLife

• Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duties - by:
  • "engaging in 'bid rigging' with the Rehabilitator in order to strip ELNY's highest-quality assets and committing related misconduct,
  • "benefiting from the deal,
  • "apparently providing inducements for the deal (e.g. a lucrative future employment opportunity for the Rehabilitator's [r]epresentative),
  • "aiding in the concealment of the misrepresentations made to obtain approval of the deal,
  • "receiving "ill-gotten gains ... equaling hundreds of millions of dollars, including profits made from the receipt of ELNY's Single Premium Deferred Annuity and traditional life insurance books of business and renewals,"
  • receiving "profits made on surrender charges to former ELNY policyholders", and
  • receiving "profits made on the investment of high-quality assets received under the deal."
• Breach of Contract / Unjust Enrichment - by:
  • receiving "unearned compensation from ELNY, at the expense of ELNY’s annuitants" and
  • failing to fulfill contractual services resulting "in the inappropriate expenditure of funds, such as the payments made on behalf of deceased individuals whose benefits terminated at death."

Causes of Action vs. Credit Suisse

• Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty - by:
  • "affirmatively implementing an imprudent and unsuitable investment strategy that was incompatible with the nature of the liabilities dependent upon ELNY's assets," and
  • "actively participating in the violation of court-ordered limitations on investment activities."
• Breach of Fiduciary Duty - by failing to:
  • "consider the long-term investment needs of ELNY and the Plaintiffs;
  • "select investments suitable with such needs and to maintain an asset allocation that was consistent with that strategy;
  • "comply with court-ordered limitations or parameters regarding the investment of ELNY's assets; and
  • "act with utmost loyalty to the Plaintiffs and ELNY, and not to act in their own self-interest adversely to the Plaintiffs and ELNY."

Requested Damages and Relief

• "Damages equaling the full present value of each Class Member's annuity issued by ELNY, less any amount determined to be owing to Plaintiff under the terms of ELNY's liquidation;
• "Damages equaling the amount of each defendant's unjust enrichment and ill-gotten gains;
• "Attorney fees and litigation expenses, to the extent permitted by contract or law;
• "Pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent provided by contract or law; and
• "Such other equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate."

In addition, the Complaint demands a jury trial and seeks:

• The action to be certified as a class action;
• Plaintiffs to be appointed as representatives of the class;
• Counsel to be appointed counsel for the class; and
• An order to be issued providing for reasonable notice to be given members of the class.

Note: although filed by the same attorneys, this ELNY class action lawsuit is a separate cause of action from the ELNY appeal challenging the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) Order of Liquidation and Approval of the ELNY Restructuring Agreement signed by New York State Supreme Court Judge John M. Galasso on April 16, 2012. Oral arguments for the ELNY appeal were heard today by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department.

For S2KM's complete and continuing coverage of the ELNY liquidation, see the structured settlement wiki.

Need for Reform?

In a companion article to the National Underwriter's recent comprehensive analysis of the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) Liquidation ("The Complete ELNY Saga"), writer Warren Hersch asks: "is the structured settlement process in need of reform"?

The Hersch article highlights a "potpourri" of structured settlement issues:

• Business practices - including disclosure and suitability issues
• Structured settlement regulation - or lack thereof
• Industry lobbying
• Industry education
• Broker compensation
• Structured settlement transfers
• IRC 468B qualified settlement funds
• Declining annuity sales
• Increasing case complexity - including annuity/trust blended products
• An evolving settlement planning profession
• Responsibilities of plaintiff attorneys
• Financial strength of annuity providers

In addition to industry criticism, the article features diverse individual perspectives demonstrating a foundation for industry consensus:

• Len Blonder
  • “No other option today can match the structure’s mix of tax-free income and guaranteed security.”
  • "A casualty company should ... be allowed to vet their own representatives of choice.”
  • "Plaintiffs are free to hire any financial professional from among the tens of thousands that are available to them."
• Joseph Dehner
  • "A personal injury attorney for claimants who isn’t even considering a structured settlement in high damage cases is bordering on malpractice."
  • “Structured settlements have become both more flexible and complicated because of the advanced planning that now accompanies these transactions.”
  • "Continuing low interest rates on the fixed annuities used to satisfy settlement claims [is] the key factor" in explaining the recent declines in structured settlement annuity sales.
• Jeremy Babener
  • “The qualified settlement fund (QSF) allows for a significant increase in the amount of time that payees have to make necessary determinations.”
  • "But for the single plaintiff, use of the vehicle comes with uncertainty. That’s because it is unclear whether a single plaintiff is treated for tax purposes as receiving funds deposited into a QSF."
• Timothy Morbach: “More should be done to recognize that the field of settlement planning is highly specialized and that [claimants] should make efforts to retain separate and qualified financial and legal counsel with respect to the strategies they wish to implement.”
• Charles Schell: “If the plaintiff's attorney engages a settlement planner, then .... , more likely than not, the product or plan recommended will be suitable.”
• Peter Gallanis: "The rate of insolvencies among life and health insurers, now at an all-time low, are but a fraction of the hundreds of failures within the commercial and investment banking and thrift sectors during the financial crisis."
• Eric Vaughn: "IRC Section 5891 has effectively prevented many abuses ... that commonly occurred in prior decades."

Perhaps this National Underwriter article will help motivate the structured settlement industry to undertake its own strategic analysis about whether and how to reform the structured settlement process. Immediate existential challenges certainly exist. In addition to the ELNY liquidation, these challenges include:

• Declining primary market annuity premium
• Historically low interest rates
• Potential reforms to the tax code and the tort system
• Implementation and impact of Dodd-Frank and the Affordable Care Act
• Transitioning business skills, relationships and processes to the Internet.

Assuming Charles Darwin was correct: It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change.

The primary strategic issues for the structured settlement industry are whether, when, how and to what degree it will become "responsive to change"?

Can industry leaders:

• Be honest ? - Acknowledge the problems. Study the changes. Abandon political correctness. Question traditional assumptions, business models and business practices.
• Be inclusive ? - David Ringler, NSSTA's first president, re-stated NSSTA's original vision during NSSTA's 2011 annual conference: "I still believe having a place where everyone and anyone can sit down with each other and discuss the issues and viewpoints regardless of beliefs is the most important reason for NSSTA. ... If we can continue this tradition, there is no problem we cannot overcome."
• Be open ? - The late James Corman insisted promoters of structured settlements were "on the side of the angels". Does that statement remain true today? To regain public trust, empower stakeholders and expand the customer base, structured settlement strategic planning needs to re-emerge from behind closed doors. Important industry issues need to be articulated and discussed openly.
• Listen to customers ? - The profiles of ELNY structured settlement victims featured in "The Complete ELNY Saga" provide a valuable introduction. Prior market surveys should be re-visited, updated and expanded. The traditional "one and done" structured settlement customer model needs to be re-evaluated.
• Engage critics ? - and challenge/encourage critics to be part of an industry solution by incorporating their relevant issues and best ideas into a strategic thinking process? These critics include legal and financial professionals who view the structured settlement product and market as core components of a larger and more complex settlement planning industry.

For related S2KM reporting and analysis, see the structured settlement wiki:

• Re-thinking Structured Settlements
• Growing the Market
• Business Standards and Practices
• Settlement Planning
• Structured Settlements and Knowledge Management

NYLB Role in ELNY Disaster

The comprehensive analysis of the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) liquidation published last week by the National Underwriter Life & Health magazine on its LifeHealth Pro website describes a "slow-motion disaster of gross mismanagement" the magazine claims will result in severe collateral damage not only to hundreds of ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims but also to the life insurance industry more generally.

In its lead article, titled "The Complete ELNY Saga - 21 Years of Mismanagement, Corruption, Broken Promises and Shattered Lives", the National Underwriter report intersperses profiles of five ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims with an historical summary of the 21 year ELNY rehabilitation and liquidation process.

The historical summary concludes:

• "[T]he ELNY rehabilitation, restructuring and liquidation have been nothing short of disastrous. Not only did regulators fail to protect a company from being dis-mantled by its insolvent parent, it failed to adequately manage the company from Day One. It failed its self-appointed fiduciary duty to serve ELNY’s payees. It failed to act with integrity, and it failed to uphold the social compact between insurers and their customers that if the money needs to be there, it will be there. Always. Without fail. Without exception."
• "At every single turn with ELNY, there was failure after failure to uphold the public’s trust. The state of New York, and especially the New York Liquidation Bureau, so badly disrupted the leap of faith between insurer and insured that the ripples will be felt for years to come, as every one of ELNY’s shortfall payees tells anyone who will listen that insurance and annuities are not worth it. That the money will not be there when it is needed, that the government will not protect the public." (emphasis added)
  

The National Underwriter article challenges the conventional explanation of ELNY's downfall which S2KM reported previously in "The Fall of First Executive".  Instead, it assigns primary blame to the New York Liquidation Bureau (NYLB), the non-government entity to which the New York Insurance Superintendent delegated ELNY management responsibilities beginning in 1991.

Describing the NYLB as "a rogue agency known for its codes of secrecy and characterized by many who spoke for this story as ineffective and mismanaged at best, and a snake pit of corruption at worst", the article highlights many examples of alleged mismanagement and lack of disclosure related to the ELNY liquidation:

• Failure to prepare and/or maintain any financial reports for ELNY for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992.
• The 1991 decision to sell almost all of ELNY's non-structured settlement business along with its non-junk bond investment portfolio to MetLife.
• Predicating the rehabilitation plan on unrealistic assumptions such as 30-year U.S. government treasuries maintaining an average interest rate of nine-and-a-half percent.
• Selling ELNY's high yield bond portfolio for a steep discount in 1991 at the bottom of the "junk bond" market.
• Reinvesting the proceeds in an unsafe percentage of common stocks vs. more conservative bonds.
• Increasing ELNY gross liabilities by $500 million between 1999 and 2000 based upon questionable assumptions and without due diligence.
• Reporting discrepancies and irregularities including incorrect numbers of policyholders and thousands of purported policyholder birth dates after ELNY entered rehabilitation.
• Excessive NYLB staffing with dozens of administrators for ELNY despite contracted services for ELNY's claims (MetLife), asset management (Credit Suisse) and accounting (Milliman & Robertson).
• Alleged corruption resulting in the dismissal of NYLB superintendent Jody Hall in 2006 at a time when Hall allegedly "was making persistent efforts to examine the elusive financial records on ELNY". Note: the National Underwriter provides additional related details in a companion article titled "The Aborted New York Liquidation Bureau Investigation".
• NYLB's alleged "culture of secrecy" exemplified by:
  • Disclaimers on ELNY financial reports stating that conclusions drawn by anyone except NYLB would be “materially misleading.”
  • Conditional bonuses, paid out of estates under NYLB management, requiring NYLB retirees to sign non-disclosure agreements prohibiting comments about non-public NYLB information.
• A damning description of the NYLB in its own 2007 annual report stating that the Bureau:
  • Had "little viable management structure or professional culture at the most senior level,” and
  • Needed "to address untimely payment of claims, poor employee evaluation methods, gross financial mismanagement in the case of ELNY, and a complete lack of auditing."

In the context of NYLB's alleged "gross mismanagement", the National Underwriter article finds it especially offensive that Judge John Galasso granted the NYLB complete judicial immunity as part of his ELNY liquidation order with support from the Superintendent of New York State Department of Financial Services and NOLHGA.

Attorney Edward Stone filed a Notice of Appeal May 30, 2012 on behalf of 18 ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims as objectors with the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department, challenging Judge Galasso's order. Oral arguments for the appeal are scheduled for November 15, 2012.

The National Underwriter article concludes: "the final chapter has not closed on ELNY, and there still is time to fix the problem without causing so much collateral damage." It urges the New York state government and/or the insurance industry to dedicate funds to fully restore ELNY and its shortfall victims.

For related S2KM reporting, see the structured settlement wiki and, more specifically:

• New York Liquidation Bureau
• ELNY Liquidation Order
• Elephant in the ELNY Court Room 
• ELNY Appeal - Objectors' Brief
• The ELNY Due Process Issue
• The ELNY Immunity Issue

National Underwriter Publishes "The Complete ELNY Saga"

The National Underwriter Life & Health Magazine has published a comprehensive analysis of the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) Liquidation on its LifeHealth Pro website.

In addition to its lead article, titled "The Complete ELNY Saga - 21 Years of Mismanagement, Corruption, Broken Promises and Shattered Lives", the National Underwriter coverage includes:

• Companion Features
  
  • Interactive ELNY Timeline
  • Infographics
  • Structured Settlement Profiles
  • Annuity Calculator - How Would You Have Been Affected?
  • Links to Additional Resources
• Related Articles
  
  • "The Aborted New York Liquidation Bureau Investigation"
  • "Is the Structured Settlement Process in Need of Reform"

S2KM will summarize and analyze the National Underwriter ELNY report next week. For S2KM's complete Executive Life reporting, see the structured settlement wiki.

Garamendi v. Altus Finance S.A.

As Executive Life of New York (ELNY) stakeholders and structured settlement industry participants await the outcome of the ELNY appeal , challenging the ELNY Order of Liquidation and Approval of the ELNY Restructuring Agreement, they may be surprised to learn the ultimate fate of Executive Life of California (ELIC), ELNY's sister company, likewise continues to be litigated.

The most recent ELIC-related development occurred October 29, 2012, in Garamendi v. Altus Finance S.A., when a federal jury in Los Angeles rejected a claim by California's Insurance Commissioner that, but for a conspiracy by French investor group Artemis S.A.:

• ELIC's original conservator (then California insurance commissioner John Garamendi) would have accepted an alternative bid in 1991 by state insurance guaranty associations; and
• The alternative bid would have retained profits from ELIC's junk bond portfolio for the benefit of policyholders including ELIC structured settlement recipients.

The actual 1991 ELIC sales agreement was a two-part sales agreement with New California Life Holdings, Inc. (NCLH) and Altus Finance (Altus), an affiliate of the French Bank Credit Lyonnais. That agreement was subsequently modified and approved by a California Superior Court on August 13, 1993 as part of the ELIC rehabilitation plan.

Under the 1991 agreement, Altus paid $3.25 billion and acquired ELIC's $6.4 billion junk bond portfolio. The Altus purchase price included $300 million of capital for a newly formed company, Aurora National Life Assurance Company, Inc. (Aurora) which assumed ELIC's remaining assets and liabilities including its structured settlement obligations. Also, as part of the actual sales agreement, the Artemis S.A. joint venture acquired a controlling interest in NCLH.

 A California Court of Appeals previously summarized these complex ownership relationships as follows: "Artemis S.A. is the parent of Aurora S.A. Aurora S.A. owns a controlling interest in NCLH. NCLH owns 100 percent of Aurora."

In retrospect, many critics claimed the 1991 agreement substantially undervalued ELIC's junk bond portfolio. Although the junk bond market was depressed and thinly traded in 1991, it was among the best performing investment markets in 1992 and 1993. Even in 1991, a substantial percentage of the junk bonds owned by First Executive Corporation (FEC) and its two Executive Life subsidiaries were current on interest payments and ultimately fulfilled their investment obligations.

ELIC-related legal developments between 1993 and the October 29, 2012 jury decision in Garamendi v. Altus Finance have also been complex. Relevant historical highlights:

• Subsequent to its NCLH purchase, Artemis learned of a conspiracy by Altus/MAAF Group, an investment group which previously controlled NCLH, to evade the prohibition under California law on foreign entities controlling California insurers. Rather than disclose this conspiracy to the California Insurance Commissioner, Artemis submitted multiple filings that contained false or misleading information.
• In 1999, the California Insurance Commissioner learned from a whistleblower about the Altus S.A./MAAF Group conspiracy and filed conspiracy lawsuits against multiple defendants including French bank Credit Lyonnais.
• In 2005, some of the defendants in the conspiracy lawsuits, including Credit Lyonnais, settled for $730,500,000, most of which was distributed to former ELIC policyholders and payees.
• The conspiracy lawsuit against the two remaining defendants, Artemis S.A. and Francois Pinault (Artemis' controlling shareholder), was conducted in Federal Court in 2005. The jurors found Artemis and Pinault liable for engaging in a conspiracy and awarded $0 in compensatory damages and $700 million in punitive damages. The trial court awarded an additional $241 million in equitable restitution.
• On August 25, 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the damage awards against Artemis and Pinault and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages.

For a more detailed background case summary, see S2KM's 2011 blog post "Aurora S.A. v. Poizner".

 In an article published October 30, 2012, Bloomberg Businessweek wrote that, following the most recent Garamendi v. Altus Finance SA verdict, U.S. District Judge Gary Klausner said "he was inclined to reinstate the restitution that the judge presiding over the 2005 trial had awarded the insurance commissioner" and "[Judge] Klausner ordered both sides to file briefs on the restitution including what amounts they thought were appropriate."

 For a background summary of ELIC, see S2KM's blog post "Executive Life of California" and, for greater detail, section 3.05[12] of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J).

For S2KM's complete and continuing Executive Life reporting, see the structured settlement wiki.