Beyond Structured Settlements

ELNY Periodic Payment Obligations

More than 1400 structured settlement annuity payees are expected to suffer payment shortfalls under the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) Liquidation Plan approved by New York State Supreme Court Judge John Galasso on April 16, 2012. The average individual shortfall is estimated to exceed $600,000 present value.

Under what circumstances, if any, will defendants/liability insurers have the legal responsibility to make up the difference in ELNY structured settlement shortfall payments?

Recent Motion

This issue was highlighted in a recent Motion by liability insurers asking Judge Galasso to "clarify and/or correct" his ELNY Memorandum Decision insofar as the Memorandum Decision "caused confusion or mistake" concerning responsibilities of those liability insurers to make up shortfalls on ELNY annuities. Judge Galasso denied the Motion on July 23, 2012.

The Motion attempted to distinguish two types of structured settlement funding alternatives ("buy and hold" vs. qualified assignments). "Buy and hold" annuities, according to the Motion, "are those whereby the underlying insurer retained, or held the liability for future payments, and funded that liability through its ownership of a qualified funding asset, or annuity."

In contrast, the Motion states, "where a structured settlement includes a qualified assignment, the defendant and its liability insurer are fully released from future liability - which liability is assumed by the assignee, here, First Executive Corporation." (emphasis added). Of course, one of the problems for all ELNY stakeholders is that First Executive Corporation ceased to exist in 1991.

As S2KM has previously written, those "suggestions" and/or "assumptions" are not necessarily or universally true. Legal rights and responsibilities resulting from attempts to create qualified assignments must be determined on a case by case basis.

Three Funding Choices

As more fully explained in Section 3.02 of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J): with a structured settlement, each defendant and/or liability insurer has three choices regarding its obligation to fund future periodic payment obligations to the claimant (1) to have no obligation; (2) to assume or share the obligation; or (3) to assume and then transfer the obligation without recourse. In general:

• "No obligation" means either a claim is paid on a lump sum basis or a structured settlement occurs and all parties agree that the particular defendant or liability insurer shall have no duty to make any future periodic payments.
• “Assume the obligation” means that a particular defendant or liability insurer ("obligor") assumes a legal obligation to pay future periodic payments. This obligor may be solely, jointly, or jointly and severally liable for the payments and, by assuming the obligation, accepts certain risks. One such risk is the potential insolvency of the financing company (e.g. ELNY).
• "Transfer the obligation" means "novation" as defined in Section 280 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement): "A novation is a substituted contract that includes as a party one who was neither the obligor nor the obligee of the original duty." Comments to Section 280 further provide:
  • "Effect of novation. A novation discharges the original duty, just as any other substituted contract does, so that breach of the new duty gives no right of action on the old duty.
  • "Consideration. A novation is subject to the same requirements as any other contract, including that of consideration.... [C]onsideration to support the discharge of the original duty can usually be found in the promise to undertake a new duty….Assent of the obligee of the original duty and of the obligor of the new duty is always necessary."
  • "Substitution of obligor. ….[A] mere promise by a third party to assume the obligor’s duty, not offered in substitution for that duty, does not result in a novation, and the new duty that the third party may owe to the obligee as an intended beneficiary is in addition to and not in substitution for the obligor’s original duty."
  • Illustration: "A owes B $1000. B promises C that he will discharge the debt immediately if C will promise to pay him $1000. Intending to benefit A, C so promises. There is a novation under which B’s and C’s promises are consideration for each other, and A’s duty to pay B is discharged. A is the intended beneficiary of B’s promise …and can by disclaimer render the transaction, including the discharge, inoperative from the beginning."

Qualified Assignment

The most common method for transferring a structured settlement obligation is a "qualified assignment" as defined in IRC Section 130(c). For purposes of understanding "transfer of obligation" in the context of structured settlements, however, the Section 130 definition of "qualified assignment" presents two significant problems:

• IRC section 130 does not address whether the assignor's duty is discharged as a result of a qualified assignment.
• Section 130 incorrectly uses the term "assignment" when it should have utilized the term "delegation".

Restatement of Contracts

Comments to Section 316 of the Restatement explain both the difference and the significance of these two terms:

• "Assignment and delegation. In this Chapter rights are said to be 'assigned'; duties are said to be 'delegated' ….. 'Assignment' is the transfer of a right by the owner (the obligee or assignor) to another person (the assignee)."
• "Comparing delegation to assignment. A person subject to a duty (the obligor) does not ordinarily have such a power to substitute another in his place without the consent of the obligee; that is what is meant when it is said that duties cannot be assigned. 'Delegation' of performance may be effective to empower a substitute to perform on behalf of the obligor, but the obligor remains subject to the duty until it has been discharged by performance or otherwise."

Comments to Section 318 of the Restatement further differentiate "delegation" and "novation" as follows: "An obligor is discharged by the substitution of a new obligor only if the contract so provides or if the obligee makes a binding manifestation of assent, forming a novation….Otherwise the obligee retains his original right against the obligor, even though the obligor manifests an intention to substitute another obligor in his place and the other purports to assume the duty. The obligee may, however, have rights against the other as an intended beneficiary of the promise to assume the duty."

NSSTA Model Agreements

After ELNY entered rehabilitation in 1991, the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA) published Model Qualified Assignment Agreements (with and without a Release) which documents were updated following the enactment of IRC 5891 in 2001. Both versions of NSSTA's current Model Qualified Assignment Agreements reference IRC section 130 and utilize "assignment" to describe what the Restatement more properly characterizes as a "delegation".

Here is the relevant comparative language from current paragraphs 1 of the NSSTA Model Agreements:

• With Release - "Assignment and Assumption; Release of Assignor. Assignor hereby assigns to Assignee, and Assignee hereby accepts and assumes, all of Assignor’s liability to make the Periodic Payments. Each Claimant hereby accepts and consents to such assignment by Assignor and assumption by Assignee. Effective on the Effective Date, each Claimant hereby releases and discharges Assignor from all liability to make the Periodic Payments."
• Without Release - "Assignment and Assumption. Assignor hereby assigns to Assignee, and Assignee hereby accepts and assumes, all of Assignor’s liability to make the Periodic Payments."

Impact for Defendants and ELNY Victims

How does this discussion impact whether defendants/liability insurers have the legal responsibility to make up the difference in ELNY structured settlement shortfall payments?

• NSSTA's Model Qualified Assignment Agreements did not exist during the time period (1985-1990) when ELNY was selling structured settlement annuities.
• Legal rights and responsibilities resulting from attempts to create qualified assignments must be determined on a case by case basis.
• Whatever language parties used to describe and/or label their transactions (e.g. annuity financing; buy and hold; qualified assignment; novation; transfer; etc.) is not by itself determinative of the rights and responsibilities set forth in the actual language of the settlement documentation.
• Some common industry practices, at least during the 1985-1990 time period, could create problems for defendant/liability insurers.
• For example, in the paper he delivered at the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) 2012 Annual Meeting, attorney David Higgins pointed out how some defendants and liability insurers have attempted "to collapse the creation of the liability with the assignment of the liability to the assignee."
• Higgins, who drafted the text of the 1982 structured settlement law introduced in the House and the Senate, warned that "such a collapse is to be avoided if the definition [of a qualified assignment] is to be met."
• Under U.S. common law, whether a novation has occurred is a question of fact, and the burden of proving it is generally upon the party asserting it.
• The Restatement identifies potential defenses for ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims who attempt to void a novation including misrepresentation (Sections 159-162) and disclaimer (Section 306).
• All ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees, as well as defendants and/or liability insurers who purchased the related ELNY structured settlement annuities, should retain qualified legal counsel to review their settlement documentation.

For S2KM's complete reporting about the ELNY liquidation, see the structured settlement wiki.

Taxation of Emotional Distress Damages - 1

Some of the most challenging federal income tax issues for settlement planners and their clients involve damages related to emotional distress and, even more specifically, damages compensating for stress-induced physical ailments.

This blog post summarizes federal legislative and regulatory tax history related to emotional distress damages and highlights recommendations for related legislative changes. In a subsequent blog post, S2KM will review articles by Jeremy Babener and Robert Wood analyzing recent related case law and offering their advice to settlement planning stakeholders.

Before enactment of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, IRC section 104(a)(2) exempted from federal income tax payments received from settlements or judgments resulting from claims for personal injuries or sickness.

As the result of the 1996 amendment, however, Section 104(a)(2) now exempts from federal income tax “damages (other than punitive damages) received … on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.” Section 104(a) now also provides "emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness" for purposes of subsection (2). However, damages received on account of emotional distress that are attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excludable. The related legislative history provides that “emotional distress” includes “physical symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches, stomach disorders) which may result from such emotional distress.”

Since 1996, there have been many tax cases and many IRS rulings addressing damages for emotional distress. In a private letter ruling issued in 2000 (“the bruise ruling”), the IRS established “the observable bodily harms” standard in a case involving sexual assault and harassment in an employment context: “we believe that direct unwanted or uninvited physical contacts resulting in observable harms such as bruises, cuts, swelling and bleeding are personal physical injuries under section 104(a)(2).”

The United States Treasury did not issue new regulations for IRC section 104(a)(2), to address the 1996 amendments, until proposed regulations were published in 2009. A public hearing followed on February 23, 2010. On January 20, 2012, Treasury published final regulations for IRC section 104(a)(2) which were essentially the same as the 2009 proposed regulations.

Although the 2012 regulations confirm that damages for emotional distress attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from income under section 104(a)(2), they do not provide any explanation to help define “physical” or “physical sickness”.

In addition to the tax rules outlined above, recipients of damages related to emotional distress, and their advisers, should also consider the following:

• IRS Form 1099 - When defendants settle cases involving taxable damages, they are required to complete an IRS Form 1099 and send copies to the claimant and the IRS. Most section 104(a)(2) cases, according to Robert Wood in his article "Tax-Free Physical Sickness Recoveries in 2010 and Beyond", have said a Form 1099 means the defendant/payer thought the damages were taxable. Conversely, Wood states, some courts have noted that the failure to issue a Form 1099 does not make a payment tax free.
• IRC Section 6661 - IRC Section 6661 establishes a 25% penalty for “substantial understatement of income tax.” However, according to case law cited in section 2.03 of “Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments”, (S2P2J) where a taxpayer reasonably relies on the advice of professionals in claiming a tax exclusion for emotional distress damages, the taxpayer may be able to escape application of an accuracy-related penalty - even though the exclusion was not accepted,
• Medical Care Exception - IRC section 104(a) excludes from gross income “damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care … attributable to emotional distress.” In his article titled "Maximizing the Medical Care Exception to the Tax on Emotional Distress Damages", Jeremy Babener points out: "...when a client plans to receive damages on account of emotional distress, taking advantage of the medical care exception requires deliberate planning." Babener adds, however, "... while excluding damages based on past medical care expenses is relatively straightforward, excluding damages based on future medical care expenses is anything but."

During and/or concurrent with the February 23, 2010 public Treasury hearing related to the section 104 (a)(2) regulations, multiple persons recommended changes to the "physical" requirement added by the 1996 amendments including:

• The National Taxpayer Advocate - The National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) addresses taxpayer considerations from inside the IRS. In a 2010 report to Congress, NTA representative Nina Olson recommended that section 104(a)(2) exempt non-physical damages, specifically emotional distress, mental anguish, and pain and suffering. To support her recommendation, Olson offered scientific data (that depression and other psychological illnesses included physical elements) and argued that existing tax law conflicts with public policy (the nondiscrimination requirement in the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008).
• John McCulloch - During the Treasury hearing, McCulloch proposed that damages received by victims of prolonged sexual abuse or false imprisonment should always be deemed “physical” for purposes of IRC section 104(a)(2) whether or not evidence is available to demonstrate physical injury.
• David Higgins - In a written submission for the Treasury public hearing, Higgins argued that the IRS’ definition of "physical" is inadequate: “direct unwanted or uninvited physical contacts resulting in observable bodily harm such as bruises, cuts, swelling, and bleeding.” Higgins recommended a broader definition, including damages for:
  • A doctor’s misdiagnosis resulting in death or serious injury from delayed or missing treatment;
  • Child neglect resulting in starvation or illness;
  • Rape committed under threat of bodily harm; and
  • Other situations where traditional physical injury torts occur without unwanted or uninvited physical contact or observable bodily harm.

For more detailed information about taxation of structured settlement payments, including emotional distress damages, see Chapter 2 of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J).

Settlement Planning Market - 1

Following three 2012 settlement planning conferences, what have we learned, and what do we still need to know, before settlement planning can be recognized and analyzed as a business and professional market?

The settlement planning conferences provided:

• Definitions for Settlement Planning - Joseph Tombs, Director of the Registered Settlement Planner (RSP) certification program, defined settlement planning as "a profession helping recipients of settlement proceeds use those proceeds to achieve post-loss goals and transition successfully to post-settlement financial life. Settlement planners represent a blend of several professionals: part tax lawyer, trial lawyer, special needs lawyer, financial planner, annuity specialist, social worker, and medical case worker."
• Descriptions of an Emergent Profession - Several conference speakers described settlement planning as a larger and more complex successor business and profession for structured settlements. For example, Jack Meligan stated: "SSP and its members have been promoting the practice of Settlement Planning as a more comprehensive solution for the financial issues facing personal injury victims and their families, and the profession of Settlement Planning as the next evolutionary step for members of the financial and legal communities that serve these injured Americans."
• Product Introductions and Descriptions - In addition to structured settlement annuities, conference speakers discussed multiple financial and insurance products in the context of settlement planning including: settlement trusts; blended structures; alternative asset management options; market linked CDs; long term care insurance; life insurance; and reinsurance.
• Government Benefit Updates - Integrating financial and insurance products with available government benefits represents one of the most important settlement planning priorities and requires effective interaction among multiple settlement planning participants. The conferences highlighted settlement planning roles for special needs attorneys as well as financial and insurance professionals. In addition, government benefit developments related to settlement planning were discussed including new requirements for liability Medicare Set-Asides (MSAs) and special needs pooled trusts as well as the Patients Protection and Affordable Care Act.
• Tax Law Updates and Improvements - In addition to integrating tort settlement proceeds with government benefits, settlement planning requires careful tax planning and specialized document drafting. The SSP conference featured Robert Wood and Jeremy Babener, who provided tax law tips and updates for settlement planners, as well as David Higgins, who proposed a potential tax law alternative to expand the use of structured settlement annuities in settlement planning.
• Business Standards and Practices Discussions - The SSP's "Standards of Professional Conduct for Settlement Planners" (SSP Standards) represents a significant accomplishment and valuable industry resource.  Professor Carl Pierce, who helped review and draft the SSP Standards, continued his analysis of related settlement planning issues as part of the Risk Settlement Planning Practicum. Karen Meyers, Director NSSTA's Certified Structured Settlement Consultant (CSSC) program, led a discussion about product suitability during the SSP Annual Meeting.

Unanswered Questions

Despite continuing educational progress, however, certain questions about the settlement planning market still need to be prioritized and addressed before settlement planning becomes a recognized business and profession. Among the most fundamental and important:

• What types of settlements comprise the settlement planning market?
• How large is the settlement planning market?
• Is the settlement planning market increasing or decreasing?
• What informational resources exist to help answer these questions?

Towers Watson Updates

Beginning with the last question, S2KM recommends the Towers Watson updates on "U.S. Tort Cost Trends" as a starting point for discussing the settlement planning market. Since 1985, Towers Watson (and its antecedent Towers Perrin) have published 15 such updates with the most recent 2011 update analyzing U.S. tort costs from 2010. Each study:

• Consists of three components: 1) losses paid to third parties; 2) defense costs; and 3) administrative expenses.
• Calculates tort costs resulting from five insured plus uninsured business lines: 1) commercial multi-peril; 2) medical malpractice; 3) product liability; 4) other liability; and 5) commercial auto;
• Excludes: 1) no-fault auto insurance; 2) property coverages; 3) workers compensation; 4) certain extraordinary (one time) costs - example: tobacco litigation.

Highlights from Towers Watson's "2011 Update on U.S. Tort Cost Trends"

• The tort costs in 2010 ($264.6 billion) were the highest in U.S. history and represent a 5.1% increase from $251.8 billion in 2009. Towers Watson estimates the 2010 U.S. tort system cost approximately $857 per person, versus $820 per person in 2009.
• Towers Watson attributes the increase to the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion and resulting oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Absent the costs from this event, Towers Watson estimates 2010 tort costs would have decreased 2.4% from 2009.
• Since 1984, tort costs as a ratio of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have ranged from a low of 1.70% to a high of 2.30% with relatively rapid increases in the ratio during the mid-1980s and early 2000s offset by intermittent and multi-year declines in the ratio.
• Since 1950, even adjusting for inflation, increases in U.S. tort costs have far exceeded U.S. population growth. However, inflation-adjusted tort costs per capita were 16% lower in 2010 than in the peak year of 2004.
• The weak U.S. economy has had a notable impact on commercial auto insurance claims. 2010 tort costs were the lowest since 2000 and 19% lower than 2004.
• Although medical malpractice costs have increased at an average annual rate of 9.7%, versus 7.5% for all other tort costs, since 1975, growth in medical malpractice costs from 2005 to 2010 averaged only 0.3% per year.
• Looking ahead, Towers Watson:
  • Anticipates employee practices litigation to be significant in the future despite the U.S. Supreme Court's 2011 ruling in favor of Wal-Mart in the sexual discrimination and civil rights class action case Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Betty Dukes et al.
  • Identifies "fracking" (a natural gas drilling process that extracts natural gas from shale by using water and chemicals which could result in contaminated drinking water) as a new area of litigation where defense costs are beginning to mount.

Up until its 2002 update of "U.S. Tort Cost Trends", Towers Watson also translated annual tort costs into the following cost categories (with 2001 percentages): 1) administrative costs - 21%; 2) defense costs - 14%; 3) plaintiff attorneys -19%; 4) economic loss - 22%; and 5) non-economic loss - 24%.

Note: Towers Watson discontinued this latter portion of its analysis in 2002, according to Russ Sutter, a Tillinghast principal and actuary who directs the Towers Watson study, "primarily because we lack reliable information from plaintiff attorneys". These percentages therefore represent Towers Watson's "best estimate" in 2002.

S2KM assumptions: lacking alternative estimates of tort cost payment categories and percentages, Towers Watson's "best estimate" in 2002 for 2001 U.S. tort costs continues to represent the most reliable annual analysis of U.S. tort dollars paid to claimants and their attorneys.

Applying Towers Watson's percentages for 2001 to the results of Towers Watson's analysis of 2010 U.S. tort costs ($264.6 billion total), produces the following assumptive results: 1) administrative costs - $55.6 billion; 2) defense costs - $37.0 billion; 3) plaintiff attorneys - $50.3 billion; 4) economic loss - $58.2 billion; and 5) non-economic loss - $63.5 billion.

Utilizing both Towers Watson's 2011 update of its "U.S. Tort Cost Trends" plus S2KM's assumptions based upon Towers Watson's additional 2002 "best estimate" for 2001 produces the following assumptive results for 2010:

• Economic loss of $58.2 billion plus non-economic loss of $63.5 billion (both amounts presumably paid to claimants) equals $121.7 billion of tort-related dollars paid to claimants.
• $121.7 billion plus $50.3 billion paid to plaintiff attorneys equals $172 billion of tort-related dollars paid to plaintiffs and their attorneys.

S2KM will reference and utilize these 2010 annual assumptive "tort cost results" in subsequent blog posts while continuing to discuss the settlement planning market. For additional S2KM reporting about settlement planning, see the structured settlement wiki.

SSP 2012 Annual Meeting - 1

The French author and poet Victor Hugo has been translated and quoted as saying: "There is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come."

Has the time come for "settlement planning" to be recognized as a powerful idea deserving professional study and status in the United States? Recent conferences, including the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) 2012 Annual Meeting, suggest that settlement planning is becoming both an important profession and an alternative business model for the structured settlement industry.

As a foundation for professional status, SSP has previously developed the Registered Settlement Planner (RSP) Program and adopted Standards of Professional Conduct. The 2012 Annual Meeting, held April 30 - May 1 in Las Vegas, featured presentations by leading settlement planning practitioners and subject matters experts. In addition, several product providers introduced insurance and financial products to complement the traditional structured settlement annuity.

What is settlement planning? Joseph Tombs, a former SSP President and co-founder of the RSP program, defines settlement planning as "... a profession helping recipients of settlement proceeds use those proceeds to achieve post-loss goals and transition successfully to post-settlement financial life."

What is a settlement planner? The SSP Standards of Professional Conduct define "settlement planner" as "... a representative who provides advice and other services to a person participating in the design, negotiation or implementation of a settlement or satisfaction of judgment for the benefit of a person claiming a legal entitlement to an award of damages or other compensation."

SSP conference Keynote Speaker Michael Ellsberg, author of "The Power of Eye Contact" and "The Education of Millionaires", discussed how to "Invest in Your Own Human Capital".

Settlement Planning Practitioners and Subject Matter Experts and Topics:

• 2011 SSP President Jack Meligan - SSP Accomplishments
• 2012 SSP President Charles Schell - SSP Goals
• Joseph DiGangi - Reinventing the Settlement Industry
• Douglas Shaw - Medicare Liens
• Robert Wood - Tax Update
• Jeremy Babener - Settlement Agreements and IRS Challenges
• Karen Meyers - Suitability Standards
• Patrick Hindert - Settlement Planning Business Models
• David Higgins - Litigation Rollover Accounts
• Jason Lazurus - Liability MSAs
• Frank Maguire - Overcoming Stalled Markets
• Mark Wahlstrom - Market Trends and Challenges
• Daniel Hindert - The ELNY Liquidation
• Richard Risk - History of Settlement Planning
• Dan Alverez - Lien Resolution
• Joseph Tombs - The RSP Program

Settlement Planning Product Providers

• Wesley Cosgriff - Secured Futures Trust
• John Woolway - Vantage Investment Partners
• Robert Noack - Aequitas Capital Management
• Christi Fried - Continental Trust Services
• Paul Hansen - Morgan Stanley Smith Barney
• Major General James W. Comstock (ret.) - Alternative Design Insurance Services
• Anthony Prieto - Synergy Settlement Services
• James Creel - First Capital Surety & Trust Co.
• Robert Burney - Integrity Financial, Inc.
• Mal Deener - Symetra Life Insurance Company (on behalf of Berkshire Hathaway Life Insurance and National Indemnity)

In subsequent blog posts, S2KM will review selected SSP conference topics. For S2KM reporting of prior SSP meetings, see the structured settlement wiki.

Treasury Publishes New IRC 104(a)(2) Regs

The United States Treasury has published new regulations for IRC section 104(a)(2) relating to the exclusion from gross income for amounts received on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.

Published January 20, 2012, the new section 104(a)(2) regulations make two primary changes to the current regulations. First, they incorporate amendments to 104(a)(2) made in Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (1996 Act). Second, they eliminate the previous regulatory requirement that damages must be based upon “tort or tort type rights” to qualify for the tax exclusion.

The 1996 Act included two legislative amendments narrowing the applicability of the 104(a)(2) exclusion. The first amendment prevents any punitive damages from qualifying for the tax exclusion in the personal injury context. The second amendment requires that injury or sickness damages must result from “physical” origins to be excluded. Although emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or physical illness, the new regulations confirm that damages for emotional distress attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from income under section 104(a)(2).

The new section 104(a)(2) regulations also eliminate the previous regulatory requirement that damages must be “based on tort or tort type rights” to qualify for exclusion. In a 1995 case (Commissioner v. Schleier), the United States Supreme Court interpreted this requirement to disallow the exclusion of damages where the relevant law (a "no-fault" statute) provided a contractual remedy even though the claimant suffered a personal physical injury or physical sickness as a result of a breach of contract. The new regulations eliminate this prior requirement and allow the tax exclusion to apply even when the physical injury or sickness does not constitute a tort under state or common law.

The new, final regulations for section 104(a)(2) are essentially the same as the proposed regulations the United States Treasury issued in 2009 and which were the subject of a public hearing on February 23, 2010. The final regulations did not adopt any of the recommendations offered by commentators at the public hearing. These recommendations included:

•  Requests by Richard Risk and Jack Meligan that the final regulations address whether a claimant has constructive receipt or the current economic benefit of a damage award that is set aside for the claimant’s benefit in a section 468B qualified settlement fund;

• Requests by John McCulloch and David Higgins that the final regulations confirm several specific types of damages are "physical" and therefore tax-exempt.

For background information about the new section 104(a)(2) regulations and their application to structured settlements, including commentary and analysis by Jeremy Babener, see these prior S2KM blog posts:

• Treasury Hearing on IRC 104(a)(2) Regs
• A Common Cause at the Treasury Regulation Hearing
• Treasury Hearing Commentary
• Voices at the Treasury Hearing
• Speaker Comments at the Treasury Hearing
• Legislation to Expand the Structured Settlement Industry
• Babener Proposes Expanded S2 Tax Subsidy

For a copy of the new section 104(a)(2) regulations, see the structured settlement wiki.

Expanding Section 104(a)(2)'s Tax Exclusion

In a 2010 article titled "How Plaintiffs Might Receive Emotional Distress Damages Tax-Free After 2010", published in the "North Carolina Lawyers Weekly", Jeremy Babener asked a pointed and strategic question: how can the structured settlement industry encourage more damages to be received tax-free? Doing so, presumably, would expand the structured settlement market.

Several proposals to accomplish these objectives have been offered during the past few months - some of which resulted from a U.S. Department of the Treasury public hearing held on February 23, 2010 to consider proposed new Treasury regulations for IRC section 104(a)(2). If adopted, these proposed new Treasury regulations would make two primary changes to current regulations: 

• Eliminate the requirement that damages be based on “tort or tort type rights” in order to qualify for the section 104(a)(2) tax exclusion, and
• Incorporate 1996 legislation requiring that personal injuries and sickness damages be “physical” in order to qualify for the section 104(a)(2) exclusion.

In the context of these proposed new Treasury regulations, the structured settlement industry would benefit from greater discussion and a better understanding of the following recent tax proposals to expand application of the section 104(a)(2) tax exclusion:

• The National Taxpayer Advocate, which considers taxpayer considerations from inside the IRS, has recommended that section 104(a)(2) exempt non-physical damages, specifically emotional distress, mental anguish, and pain and suffering.
• John McCulloch proposed, during the February 23, 2010 public Treasury hearing, that damages received by victims of prolonged sexual abuse or false imprisonment should always be deemed “physical” for purposes of IRC section 104(a)(2) whether or not evidence is available to demonstrate physical injury.
• Richard Risk and Jack Meligan each recommended, during the same public hearing, that Treasury issue regulations explicitly holding the economic benefit doctrine will not be triggered in the context of single-claimant 468B Qualified Settlement Funds.
• David Higgins has proposed two recent tax recommendations. In a written submission for the Treasury public hearing, Higgins argued that the IRS’ definition of "physical" is inadequate: “direct unwanted or uninvited physical contacts resulting in observable bodily harm such as bruises, cuts, swelling, and bleeding.” Higgins recommends a broader definition, including damages for:
  • A doctor’s misdiagnosis resulting in death or serious injury from delayed or missing treatment;
  • Child neglect resulting in starvation or illness;
  • Rape committed under threat of bodily harm; and
  • Other situations where traditional physical injury torts occur without unwanted or uninvited physical contact or observable bodily harm.
• Higgins directed his second recommendation to Senator Max Baucus (Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee), Congressman Dave Camp (Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means), and Michael Mundaca (Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy). In his communication, Higgins recommended a "rollover provision" to replace Section 130 of the Tax Code. Higgins' proposal would allow personal injury plaintiffs to accept a check from defendants and invest the money within a given period (likely limiting the investment options to annuities and Treasury bonds), without losing the tax benefit currently available to them only by agreeing to a structured settlement with a counter-party.
• Jeremy Babener has proposed a legislative conversion of the structured settlement exclusion to a refundable tax credit. The premise of Babener's proposal is that high-income taxpayers benefit more from the structured settlement subsidy than low-income taxpayers, who sometimes do not benefit at all. A refundable tax credit would provide the same incentive value to all structured settlement recipients, high-income or low-income.

Most recently, McCulloch has incorporated his earlier recommendations into a request to Treasury and the IRS that final regulations under IRC Section 104(a)(2) should clarify the scope of the exclusion for damages received on account of personal "physical" injuries or "physical" sickness. McCulloch's request seeks guidance and a determination as part of Treasury's 2011-2012 Guidance Priority List that sexual abuse cases and long-term wrongful incarceration (at least one year of restraint) are per se physical injuries under Section 104(a)(2).

In support of his proposal, McCulloch states: "There is a significant body of literature that recognizes sexual abuse as a serious medical problem with long lasting and severe physical effects, many of which can only be treated by a licensed medical practitioner or through the prescription of controlled medications. There are similar medical studies that demonstrate the persistent physical damage that results from long-term incarceration."

The purpose of the Treasury's Priority Guidance Plan is to focus United States government resources "on guidance items that are most important to taxpayers and tax administration." In reviewing recommendations and selecting projects for inclusion on the 2011-2012 Guidance Priority list, the Treasury and the IRS have stated they will consider whether the recommended guidance:

• Resolves significant issues relevant to many taxpayers;
• Promotes sound tax administration;
• Can be drafted in a manner that will enable taxpayers to easily understand and apply the guidance;
• Involves regulations that are outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome and that should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed;
• Reduces controversy and lessens the burden on taxpayers or the IRS; and
• Whether the IRS can administer the recommended guidance on a uniform basis.

McCulloch maintains his request for guidance satisfies the above criteria:

• Since Section 104(a)(2) was amended in 1996, taxpayers have needed guidance to determine the scope of the terms "physical injury" and "physical sickness" for which no definitions exist.
• The 1996 amendment did not specifically consider its application to victims of sexual abuse and wrongful incarceration and needs modification because it affects a large and growing number of taxpayers:
  • For sexual abuse victims, because of greater opportunities for victims resulting from legislation in many states which extends applicable statutes of limitations.
  • For wrongful incarceration victims, because more widely available DNA-testing absolves wrongfully convicted prisoners.
• The requested guidance would promote sound tax administration by providing an understandable tax rule thereby minimizing the likelihood of future controversies.
• It would also provide consistency in tax treatment among such victims who face uncertainties and expense when they currently attempt to address these issues individually.

In S2KM's opinion, industry support for McCulloch's proposal would provide one immediate answer to Jeremy Babener's strategic question about how the structured settlement industry can cooperate to improve and grow its market by encouraging more damages to be received tax-free under IRC section 104(a)(2).

For additional information about taxation of damages received by personal injury victims, see Chapter 2 of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J)

David Higgins' Tax Proposal

David Higgins, of Higgins Settlement Law, LLP, submitted a legislative recommendation on January 11, 2011 proposing a change to how plaintiffs enter into structured settlements. Higgins is the author of the Periodic Payments Settlement Act of 1982 and served as the first Executive Director and the first General Counsel of the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA).

Higgins submitted his recommendation to Senator Max Baucus (Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee), Congressman Dave Camp (Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means), and Michael Mundaca (Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).

S2KM asked Jeremy Babener, formerly a Tax Policy Fellow at the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy, now a Tax LL.M. at NYU School of Law, to provide S2KM readers with the following summary of Higgins' proposal.

David Higgins has recommended a "rollover provision" to replace Section 130 of the Tax Code. His proposal would allow personal injury plaintiffs to accept a check from defendants and invest the money within a given period (likely limiting the investment options to annuities and Treasury bonds), without losing the tax benefit currently available to them only by agreeing to a structured settlement with a counter-party.

Currently, when a personal injury plaintiff receives a defendant’s settlement check, successful investment of the money results in taxable income (with few exceptions). Alternatively, a plaintiff can agree to a structured settlement, in which case plaintiff only receives the settlement money (in fact, and for tax purposes) over time. Often, the defendant will transfer money and liability to an assignment company, which is thereafter responsible for plaintiff’s periodic payments.

The tax savings can be significant. But, to take advantage of the benefit, plaintiff must come to an agreement regarding the future income stream with a counter-party. Section 130 of the Tax Code allows an assignment company to exclude the portion of the transferred money used to fund the liability payments, but comes with various requirements (e.g. the liability payments required must be “fixed and determinable”).

Higgins, who played a central role in the 1982 legislation governing the taxation of structured settlements, recommends that Section 130 be repealed and replaced by a provision that allows for personal injury plaintiffs to access the same tax savings, even when plaintiffs actually receive the settlement money and subsequently invest. Higgins’ letter refers to a limited period in which plaintiffs might have to re-invest the settlement money received. Such “rollover” type provisions, though inconsistent with tax doctrines like “constructive receipt” and “economic benefit” have been allowed for certain retirement income.

“Section 130,” Higgins argues, “adds considerable complexity to a structured settlement transaction.” Though light on specifics, Higgins seems to suggest maintaining many of the limitations of Section 130 required to take advantage of the current tax benefit. For example, he writes, “The limitation to annuities and Treasury bonds seems to be working well.” He implies that the “fixed and determinable” requirement should also be kept, arguing that it has been stretched to the breaking point (based on a past IRS decision approving of qualified assignments including variable amounts based on a mutual fund portfolio). These types of limitations were put in place to protect the plaintiff from dissipating the settlement money. Higgins suggests the implementation of non-alienation requirements, though it is unclear if these would change plaintiffs’ current ability to factor.

Higgins notes potential opposition that might be voiced by the Treasury, with respect to part of the tax benefit, and the insurance industry, objecting to “expanding the exclusive distribution channels for settlement annuities that such simplification would create.” Ending with rhetorical flare, Higgins writes, “Simplification is, I suppose, not simple.” Given the considerable effort expended to establish the original legislation in the early 1980s (much of it documented in Higgins’ letter), and the similar experience in the late 1990s and early 2000s with respect to legislation on factoring, he is probably correct.

Babener's articles on the taxation of personal injury awards, structured settlements, and qualified settlement funds, are available on his web site www.taxstructuring.com. His upcoming article, "Death Then Taxes: Anticipating the Taxation of Personal Injury Proceeds at Victim's Death," will be published by Trusts & Estates Magazine in March, 2011.

For a history and analysis of the Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982, see "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" co-authored by Daniel Hindert, Joseph Dehner and Patrick Hindert.

Voices at the 104(a)(2) Treasury Hearing

By Jeremy Babener, S2KM Contributing Author

Yesterday, February 23, 2010, the Treasury conducted a hearing on proposed regulations to section 104 of the Tax Code. This article summarizes the hearing, as relevant to parties in the structured settlement industry.

As written previously, the proposed regulations would, in essence:

• Eliminate the requirement that damages be based on “tort or tort type rights” in order to qualify for the section 104(a)(2) tax exclusion, and
• Incorporate 1996 legislation requiring that personal injuries and sickness damages be “physical” in order to qualify for the section 104(a)(2) exclusion.

The Treasury received several written submissions from the structured settlement community, including letters from:

• Joseph Ricci, Executive Director, National Structured Settlements Trade Association (NSSTA)
• John Stanton, Counsel, NSSTA
• John McCulloch, Vice-President, Integrated Financial Settlements
• Dick Risk, Attorney, Risk Law Firm
• David Higgins, Attorney, Higgins Settlement Law
• Jack Meligan, President, Settlement Professionals Inc.

McCulloch, Stanton, Risk, and Meligan spoke at the Treasury hearing. As in their written submissions, the speakers focused on two questions. First, when do personal injury damages constitute “physical” injury damages, such that they may be excluded from plaintiffs’ taxable income? Second, can settlement monies be directed into qualified settlement funds (QSFs) in single-claimant cases without triggering economic benefit? If so, the structured settlement tax subsidy would be available to settlements involving single-claimant QSFs.

Of the five speakers (including one from the Consumers for Civil Justice who spoke briefly), only McCulloch focused on the “physical” issue, while the other three argued single-claimant QSFs.

John McCulloch:
McCulloch argued that the damages received by victims of prolonged sexual abuse or false imprisonment should always be deemed “physical,” whether or not evidence is available to demonstrate physical injury. This would, he argued, appropriately expand the “observable bodily harm” understanding of “physical” from private letter ruling in 2000. His arguments, which mirrored those in his written submission, were previously reviewed here.

Treasury Panel Response:
The panel queried McCulloch on both substantive and procedural grounds. McCulloch was asked whether his rule would define sexual abuse and wrongful imprisonment as “physical,” or establish an irrebuttable presumption that such damages are “physical.” Very likely, the question was asked with a 2008 private letter ruling in mind, which presumed physicality where the injury took place long ago. McCulloch suggested that neither sexual abuse nor wrongful imprisonment cases should be considered non-physical.

It is noteworthy that two of the panel members stressed the non-precedential nature of private letter rulings. While private letter rulings are certainly non-precedential, the panel seemed to imply that the “observable bodily harm” language from the 2000 private letter ruling is simply irrelevant for future interpretations of “physical.”

The panel also asked McCulloch a procedural question, one repeated in the single-claimant QSF discussion: Even if Treasury agrees, could it change the proposed regulations without being forced to conduct another notice and comment hearing?

Dick Risk and Jack Meligan:
Dick Risk and Jack Meligan both recommended that the Treasury issue regulations explicitly holding the economic benefit doctrine not to be triggered in the context of single-claimant QSFs. Each argued that such regulations are necessary as a result of the power imbalance in plaintiff-defendant negotiations.

Treasury Panel Response:
It became immediately apparent that the panel believed regulations concerning the single-claimant QSF issue could not be added to the proposed regulations without necessitating a new notice and comment period. It seemed implicit in the panel’s comments that the appropriate time to request regulations on the QSF issue would be the next time that taxpayers are asked for proposed issues. When asked why the issue had been removed after several years on the IRS Priority Guidance Plan, those on the panel declined to respond.

One member of the panel was particularly interested in the need for single-claimant QSF guidance based on the alleged power imbalance in plaintiff-defendant negotiations. Why, Risk was asked, is guidance necessary to establish a balance if single-claimant QSFs are already occurring? Moreover, how, since most plaintiffs have representation with knowledge of structured settlements, is there still an imbalance? Risk and Meligan both suggested that this imbalance is inherent in personal injury settlement negotiations, unless the defendant can be removed from the scene and replaced with a QSF.

John Stanton:
Stanton briefly repeated the procedural point of those on the panel that the current hearing was the wrong time and place for the single-claimant QSF issue to be discussed. He also urged that since current tax law of structured settlements has served all parties well, the Treasury should not make changes on the QSF front. The Treasury had no comments or questions for Stanton.

Series Note:
This article is the third in a series on the February 23, 2010 Treasury hearing on proposed regulations concerning section 104.

• Part 1: Treasury Hearing on IRC 104 Regulations
• Part 2: A Common Cause at the Treasury Regulation Hearing

S2KM Footnote:

• Jeremy Babener and S2KM Limited have agreed to feature occasional articles written by Babener on S2KM's blog. Except for articles including Jeremy Babener's byline or interviews featuring Babener, he does not contribute to or endorse S2KM opinions or writing.
• Babener's articles also appear on S2KM's structured settlement public policy wiki.
• Babener is a third year law student at NYU School of Law, and has written extensively about structured settlements (articles available at TaxStructuring.Com).

A Common Cause at the Treasury Regulation Hearing

Written by Jeremy Babener, S2KM Contributing Author

As written previously, the Treasury will be holding a hearing on its proposed regulations for section 104(a)(2) on February 23, 2010. The proposed regulations, set forth in a nutshell:

• Eliminate the requirement that damages be based on “tort or tort type rights” in order to qualify for the section 104(a)(2) tax exclusion, and
• Incorporate 1996 legislation requiring that personal injuries and sickness damages be “physical” in order to qualify for the section 104(a)(2) tax exclusion.

Ordinarily, industry spokespersons attending would be expected to comment on “what is on the table.” However, the ongoing debate of the single-claimant qualified settlement fund issue has become of central concern for many in this industry. Richard Risk, structured settlement attorney and founder of the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP), and Jack Meligan, settlement planner and founding President of SSP, posit that the Treasury should issue regulations in favor of single-claimant qualified settlement funds. Joseph Ricci, Executive Director of the National Structured Settlements Trade Association (NSSTA), and John Stanton, counsel for NSSTA at Hogan & Hartson, argue otherwise. However, this debate focuses on hypothetical regulations that the Treasury has not proposed.

While the single-claimant issue is of much importance, the structured settlement industry should not lose sight of its chance to influence the regulations actually proposed by the Treasury. Most importantly, those at NSSTA, the SSP, and the National Association of Settlement Purchasers (NASP), should consider working with those at the American Association for Justice (AAJ), and the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), who all have a common interest at the Treasury hearing: expanding the applicability of the section 104(a)(2) exclusion. Decreased taxation of damages means larger after-tax recoveries for plaintiffs, more sales for life insurance companies, and presumably, more factoring transactions. By uniting, the structured settlement industry, in tandem with AAJ and NELA, will be better able to further all interests involved (other than increasing government revenue).

John McCulloch, Vice President of Integrated Financial Settlements, and David Higgins, attorney at Higgins Settlement Law, have both written to the IRS in this vein. Both have argued for the explicit confirmation of several types of damages as “physical,” and thus tax-exempt. Most of the letters submitted to the Treasury are available at regulations.gov .

Higgins’ Proposal for the “Physical” Requirement
Higgins argues that the IRS’ definition of physical is inadequate: “direct unwanted or uninvited physical contacts resulting in observable bodily harm such as bruises, cuts, swelling, and bleeding.” He recommends a broader definition, including damages for:

1. a doctor’s misdiagnosis resulting in death or serious injury from delayed or missing treatment,
2. child neglect resulting in starvation or illness,
3. rape committed under threat of bodily harm, and
4. other situations where traditional physical injury torts occur without unwanted or uninvited physical contact or observable bodily harm.

McCulloch’s Proposal for the “Physical” Requirement
McCulloch proposes two specific examples for the IRS to include in its regulations. Examples are often found in Treasury regulations, and are used to show how the law and regulations are to be interpreted in varying situations. McCulloch's first example, if accepted, would hold that damages for emotional distress from an extended period of sexual abuse, even without proof of “observable bodily harm,” are received by plaintiff tax-free. His second example would hold that damages for wrongful imprisonment of more than one year, including a portion for resulting emotional distress, are received by plaintiff tax-free.

McCulloch's examples are based in prior IRS decisions, building on them to expand the applicability of section 104(a)(2)’s exclusion.

McCulloch's First Example (Sexual Abuse)
McCulloch notes that his first example (sexual abuse) “loosely tracks the fact pattern and conclusion reached” in a 2008 IRS Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum. There are two key differences. First, the example concerns a law suit filed “[s]ometime after” the original tort. In the 2008 memo, the law suit was not filed for a “substantial time” after the original tort. Second, McCulloch's proposal holds such damages to always constitute physical injury. The 2008 memo, noting that the substantial time lag meant that the taxpayer might have difficulty establishing the extent of his physical injuries, held that it was reasonable for the IRS to presume that the settlement compensated taxpayer for personal physical injuries. The first example thus “loosely tracks” the memo, attempting to expand its applicability, and strengthen its force.

McCulloch's Second Example (Wrongful Imprisonment)
McCulloch suggests that although there have been no observable injuries in his second example (wrongful imprisonment), “the act of physical restraint in a prison cell in this situation is inherently a type of physical injury.” He believes this to be consistent with the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provided tax-free compensation to Japanese-Americans wrongfully imprisoned during World War II. He also argues that his example is consistent with the Tax Court’s Stadnyk v. Commissioner decision, which held damages for eight hours of false imprisonment to not constitute a physical injury.

His argument makes two taxpayer-friendly moves from the World War II and Stadnyk cases. First, the World War II decisions were made prior to the 1996 legislation requiring personal injury damages to be “physical” in order for plaintiffs to receive them tax-free. Thus, they may be no more relevant than other pre-1996 cases not requiring injuries to be “physical.” Second, the Stadnyk case, which held the eight-hour wrongful imprisonment damages to be taxable, in no way limited its decision to short-term cases. In fact, the Tax Court provided seemingly timeless language: “Physical restraint and physical detention are not ‘physical injuries’ for purposes of section 104(a)(2)….Nor is the deprivation of personal freedom a physical injury for purposes of section 104(a)(2).” McCulloch’s example and comment would create new law (since the 1996 legislation), expanding the types of damages eligible for the tax exemption.

Further Work Before the Hearing
In cooperating, the relevant associations might consider additional proposals for the IRS based on last month’s decision, Domeny v. Commissioner (T.C. Memo 2010-9). There, the Tax Court held that damages were received tax-free when made by a defendant for the causing of an acute physical illness by a stressful work environment. Proposals and examples consistent with this decision may be well aimed to preserve or expand the tax-exempt status of several types of personal injury damages.

S2KM Footnote:

• Jeremy Babener and S2KM Limited have agreed to feature occasional articles written by Babener on S2KM's blog. Except for articles including Jeremy Babener's byline or interviews featuring Babener, he does not contribute to or endorse S2KM opinions or writing.
• Babener is a third year law student at NYU School of Law, and has written extensively about structured settlements (articles available at TaxStructuring.Com).