Beyond Structured Settlements

PFAC 2016 Annual Conference

Fiduciary standards, as they relate to product suitability specifically, and to business practices generally, can be expected to become more significant factors in product sales for the traditional structured settlement market as it continues to expand into, and interact with, the larger, more complex personal injury settlement planning market.

Multiple developments support this prediction. They include the expanding role of fiduciaries as settlement planning stakeholders and decision makers. In that context, fiduciaries most often serve as trustees, but also as guardians, conservators and/or executors.

Any person acting in a fiduciary capacity has an obligation to act in the "best interest" of another party. A fiduciary duty requires a high standard of honesty and full disclosure including any potential conflicts of interests. A fiduciary must not obtain a personal benefit at the expense of his or her client.

Regardless of who sells/provides a financial or insurance product to a settlement trust, and what independent duties that product provider might have to a trust beneficiary (i.e. injury victim), the settlement trustee's own fiduciary duties arguably should require the settlement trustee to evaluate specific trust products, trust product providers and their related business conduct utilizing that same fiduciary standard which requires honesty, full disclosure, and best interest.

In personal injury settlement planning, several types of trusts are utilized - any of which may be funded with, or utilized to fund, structured settlements: qualified government bond trusts; reversionary grantor trusts; settlement preservation trusts; special needs trusts including pooled trusts; Medicare set-aside trusts; and IRC 468B Settlement Funds.

As one related result of the expanding use of settlement trusts, a unique settlement trust market is evolving in the United States characterized by:

• Specialized knowledge about government benefits required to serve "special needs" beneficiaries and their families.
• Willingness to consider structured settlements as trust assets and knowledge related thereto.
• Willingness to accept corpus amounts less than minimum requirements of traditional corporate trustees.
• Professional individual trustees as well as corporate trustees.

To S2KM's knowledge there does not yet exist any national association of settlement trustees. Instead, settlement trustees participate as members, speakers, sponsors and/or exhibitors at various structured settlement, settlement planning and special needs national conferences such as: NSSTA, SSP, NAMSAP, NAELA, ASNP, SN Alliance, Stetson SNT, University of Texas SNT among others.

PFAC Conference

There exist, however, state fiduciary associations the largest of which is the Professional Fiduciary Association of California (PFAC). To learn more about fiduciaries and fiduciary standards, from a structured settlement perspective, S2KM attended the 21st Annual PFAC Conference, which occurred June 1-4, 2016 in Indian Wells, California and featured 74 exhibitors, more than 600 attendees plus four days of speakers and breakout sessions covering a multitude of topics.

PFAC is an affiliate of the National Guardianship Association (NGA). California Court Rules define education and qualification requirements to serve as guardian, conservator or trustee in California. Attorneys and CPAs with current, active licenses to practice in California automatically qualify. To retain their license, professional fiduciaries must also meet continuing education requirements. Approximately 680 professional fiduciaries are currently licensed in California.

Not all professional fiduciaries, of course, work in personal injury settlement planning. In fact, relatively few of the PFAC Conference presentations and/or exhibits were even relevant to structured settlement and/or settlement planning professionals.

Uniform Prudent Investor Act

Perhaps the most important and relevant lessons S2KM learned during the PFAC conference concerned the duties of care and the investment considerations imposed upon trustees by the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA). Understanding these UPIA trustee duties and investment considerations will almost certainly help structured settlement and settlement planning professionals improve their sales success when personal injury cases include settlement trusts.

The UPIA , which was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1994, has been enacted, with some state-specific modifications, by 44 states and the District of Columbia. In those states, the UPIA, external to the trust document itself, serves as the most important reference defining a trustee's investment responsibilities.

Prior to the UPIA, courts applied the "prudent man rule" when evaluating trustee investment performance. The UPIA, by contrast, adopts "modern portfolio theory" as a different and more appropriate standard for trustees. Compared with the prudent man rule, modern portfolio theory promotes a holistic view of trust assets by focusing on the total return generated by a trust as opposed to viewing a trust's income and principal separately. This newer standard allows for greater investment diversification so long as the risk/reward ratio matches the purposes and terms of the trust instrument.

In his PFAC conference presentation titled "A Trustee's Duty of Care Under the UPIA", Josh Yager addressed how a trustee can demonstrate prudence and good faith, and thereby avoid a lawsuit, by fulfilling six trustee duties required under the UPIA:

• Duty to have a plan.
• Duty to monitor risk/return.
• Duty to diversify.
• Duty to pay only fair fees.
• Duty to prudently delegate.
• Duty to monitor agent's activities.

Yager never mentioned structured settlements or personal injury settlement planning during his discussion. Within the context of his presentation, however, here are some follow-up questions worth considering at future educational conferences:

• How should life contingent structured settlements be compared with other investment alternatives when trustees calculate rates of return needed to accomplish trust objectives?
• How can structured settlement and settlement planning professionals better anticipate and address trustee risk objections that many structured settlements include too much concentration, as well as a lack of liquidity?
• What are "asset classes" - and should structured settlements be promoted/evaluated as a distinct and necessary "asset class" within settlement trusts?
• Assuming trustees have a duty to evaluate compensation arrangements related to trust assets, should structured settlement professionals be required to disclose their case-specific compensation, including compensation sharing agreements? To whom? When?
• How do "industry standard" four (4%) percent structured settlement commissions compare with commissions and fees charged by other financial product providers? Are these commissions "fair" or "excessive"?
• Why was a given structured settlement design and/or settlement professional selected in a specific case? Does he/she possess appropriate licenses and credentials? Is he/she subject to any undisclosed conflicts of interest? Has he/she been the subject of any prior lawsuits or client complaints? Does he/she understand the trustee's duties under the UPIA? Has he/she accomplished what they promised?
• What legal options does a trustee have when confronted with a structured settlement or structured settlement consultant that the trustee believes violates a fiduciary standard or duty for a specific settlement trust under the UPIA?

Although not specifically discussed in any of the PFAC presentations S2KM attended, Section 2(c) of the UPIA identifies eight additional factors a trustee should consider when making any investment:

• General economic conditions.
• The possible effect of inflation or deflation.
• The expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies.
• The role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall trust portfolio.
• The expected total return from income and appreciation of capital.
• Other resources of the beneficiaries.
• Needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation or appreciation of capital; and
• An asset’s relationship of special value, if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries.

When settlement trusts play a role in a personal injury settlement, structured settlement and settlement planning professionals should be prepared to address these factors as part of their sales strategy. Significant for structured settlements, the UPIA's list of investment considerations fails to mention mental or physical disabilities of a trust beneficiary. From a settlement planning perspective, injuries or diseases that create special needs or reduce an individual's normal life expectancy arguably should receive important consideration when a trustee makes investment decisions.

Comparative Business Standards

How do current business standards of structured settlement and settlement planning professionals measure up to the "best interest" standards required of trustees and other fiduciaries? Although various members of both the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA) and the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) are appointed as independent agents representing many of the same structured settlement annuity providers, the two associations address the issue of product suitability differently.

NSSTA, whose members include defense and plaintiff brokers, has adopted a "Statement of Ethics and Professional Responsibility" (Code of Ethics) with "guiding principles" for its members and member organizations. The Preamble provides: "Implicit in the acceptance of this Statement is an obligation to act in a professionally responsible and ethical manner when providing structured settlement services." Although Principle VI directs NSSTA members to:"…comply with all material federal and state laws and regulations applicable to the structured settlement services that are provided", NSSTA's Code of Ethics does not specifically address either fiduciary or product suitability standards.

By comparison with NSSTA, SSP's Mission Statement provides, in relevant part, that "[m]embership is open to all individuals with a genuine interest in the profession of settlement planning." However, "[c]andidates for membership must attest to their .......striving to ensure plans are consummated to a fiduciary standard." (emphasis added). Unlike NSSTA, almost all of SSP's members represent injury victims and their families and attorneys as opposed to defendants and liability insurers. Many SSP members also sell financial products as well as structured settlement annuities.

Plaintiff structured settlement brokers generally, and SSP members more specifically, regularly face direct competition from non-structured settlement financial advisors. Currently some financial advisors (Certified Financial Planners and Investment Advisors) are held to a fiduciary ("best interest") standard while other financial advisors (broker-dealers) provide services under a “suitability standard” which requires only a reasonable belief that any recommended product is suitable for a client.

Consumer protection concerns appear to be favoring broader application of the fiduciary standard. Acting under authority of Dodd-Frank, the SEC submitted a "fiduciary standard" study to Congress in 2011 recommending the adoption of a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisers and broker-dealers when providing investment advice to retail customers. Congress has not yet adopted this uniform standard. More recently the U.S. Department of Labor has proposed a rule requiring fiduciary accountability for all investment advice related to retirement assets.

CONCLUSION

For most of its history, the primary structured settlement market has developed its business standards and practices based upon a "claim management" model which limits the scope of its representatives' duties of care toward injury victims - the ultimate customers for its products. Within the larger "settlement planning" market, which encompasses structured settlements, fiduciaries and other participating professionals are superimposing a more demanding "best interest" duty of care. To successfully compete in the settlement planning market place, therefore, structured settlement professionals need to acquire a better understanding of fiduciary and UPIA duties and requirements - and learn to re-shape their product sales accordingly.

Former Executives Sue J.G. Wentworth

Former J.G. Wentworth (JGW) executives and Directors, Michael Goodman and Gary Veloric, (Plaintiffs) have filed a Complaint in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware against current CEO David Miller, three current JGW Directors and multiple JGW affiliate companies seeking to enforce a Tax Receivables Agreement (TRA) under which they claim they are owed approximately $35 million.

In addition to Miller, other Defendants include: Paul S. Levy, Francisco J. Rodriguez and Alexander R. Castaldi (Defendant Directors); J.G. Wentworth, Inc. (Wentworth Inc.); J.G. Wentworth LLC (JGW LLC); JGW Holdco LLC (Holdco); JLL JGW Distribution LLC (JLL Distribution); JLL Partner Fund V L.P. (Fund V, and together with JLL Distribution, JLL Entities); and JGWPT Holdings LLC (JGW Peachtree).

The Complaint alleges:

• Plaintiffs and other principals sold the J.G. Wentworth family of companies in 2005 to JLL Distribution, an affiliate of private equity firm JLL Partners, Inc.
• Although Plaintiffs continued as senior officers thereafter, JLL Entities henceforth controlled all J.G. Wentworth affiliate companies.
• Anticipating an eventual public stock offering, JLL Entities in 2007:
  • Formed 1) Holdco to own all the J.G. Wentworth subsidiaries; and 2) Wentworth, Inc. as a vehicle for the public offering. Wentworth Inc.also served as Managing Member of Holdco and never had any assets of its own except for its interest in Holdco.
  • Determined they could maximize the value of their JGW investment by separating the value of equity from the value of various tax benefits.
    • For tax purposes, factoring companies recognize: 1) revenue over the term of the structured settlement payment rights they purchase; and 2) operating expenses when they occur.
    • This timing difference generates potential tax deferrals which, for LLCs like the JGW affiliates, are passed through to individual members.
    • Various exchanges of membership interests among JGW affiliates increased the tax basis of certain assets and resulted in additional tax benefits for Wentworth Inc.
  • Implemented a TRA in conjunction with the sale of stock in Wentworth, Inc. to participants (including Plaintiffs) in a private offering.
    • TRAs are frequently used to monetize tax benefits in IPOs because public stockholders may not pay full value for a company's tax attributes.
    • TRAs allow pre-IPO equity owners to receive the value of a company's tax attributes as those tax attributes are utilized following an IPO.
• Under the TRA, Wentworth Inc. agreed to pay to Plaintiffs and other principals 85% of its tax benefit upon certain circumstance including a change in corporate control.
• Because Wentworth, Inc. (a holding company) had no assets of its own, Holdco (another holding company) agreed in its LLC Agreement to provide Wentworth, Inc. with the money needed to satisfy the TRA obligation.
• Following the 2008 financial crisis, Wentworth, Inc., Holdco and JGW LLC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy with a prepackaged plan of reorganization.
• The Bankruptcy Plan expressly stated that Plaintiffs' interests in the TRA and the debtors obligations to Plaintiffs remained "unimpaired" and Holdco, JGW LLC and Wentworth Inc. became jointly and severally liable for the TRA obligations.
• J.G. Wentworth and Peachtree Financial Solutions merged in 2011 leaving JGW LLC as the surviving entity with JGW Peachtree as a subsidiary.
• To avoid TRA payments to Plaintiffs, Wentworth Inc.'s controlling stockholder and Directors structured the JGW Peachtree entities so that Holdco would not be able to fund the TRA payments.
• Without making any TRA payments to Plaintiffs, JGW Peachtree distributed $459.6 million to its principals in 2013.
• Defendants have advised Plaintiffs that no TRA payments will be made because:
  • The TRA obligations were extinguished in bankruptcy.
  • The TRA obligation is limited to Wentworth Inc. which is insolvent.
  • Wentworth Inc. has not earned enough money to pay taxes and therefore cannot receive the tax benefits.
  • Loaning money to Wentworth Inc. is not feasible because Wentworth Inc. is insolvent.
• JGWPT Holdings, Inc.'s November 8, 2013 public offering of common stock (or alternatively the 2011 merger with Peachtree) constitutes a "change in control" triggering the TRA payments due plaintiffs under the TRA.

The Complaint additionally sets forth:

• Causes of action against the various Defendants including: Breach of Contract; Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty; and Unjust Enrichment.

• Prayer for relief seeking: to enforce the terms of the Wentworth Inc. TRA and the Holdco LLC Agreement; to award damages including interest, costs and expenses; and to impose a constructive trust or equitable lien of $35 million on the proceeds of the JGWPT Holdings, Inc. IPO.

For a copy of the Complaint, see the structured settlement wiki. For a recent J.G. Wentworth update, see this prior S2KM blog post.

Brief Filed in ELNY Contempt Order Appeal - 1

"People should know when they are conquered." - Quintus in "Gladiator"

"It ain't over till it's over." - Yogi Berra

Following 22 years of "Rehabilitation" supervised by various New York State Superintendents of Insurance and Financial Services, as Receivers, Executive Life Insurance Company of New York (ELNY) was officially liquidated August 8, 2013 pursuant to an Order of Liquidation signed by Nassau County New York State Supreme Court Judge John M. Galasso on April 16, 2012.

As part of his Liquidation Order, Judge Galasso also approved a Restructuring Agreement, as proposed by ELNY's Receiver and NOLHGA, whereby ELNY's remaining assets and ongoing liabilities have now been transferred to a successor company, Guaranty Associations Benefit Company (GABC), a not-for-profit Washington D.C.-based captive insurance company.

As a result of ELNY's liquidation and restructuring, approximately 1456 structured settlement payees will experience payment shortfalls totaling approximately $920 million (present value) following contributions from state life and health insurance guaranty associations and various life insurance companies.

ELNY Receivers' Responsibilities 

Significantly, ELNY's 1991 Rehabilitation Order did not result because of ELNY's insolvency. Instead, then New York Insurance Superintendent Salvatore Curiale's stated concern was a "run" on ELNY assets by policyholders.

Beginning with ELNY's 1991 Rehabilitation Order and continuing to ELNY's August 8, 2013 liquidation date, Superintendent Curiale and his successor New York Superintendents of Insurance and Financial Services managed ELNY's Rehabilitation (in their capacity as Receivers not regulators) with day-to-day management responsibilities assigned to their agent, the New York Liquidation Bureau (NYLB).

As ELNY's Receiver, these Superintendents undertook fiduciary responsibilities toward ELNY's policyholders and payees. Their duties, pursuant to Article 74 of New York's Insurance law, included: conducting ELNY's business, safeguarding ELNY's assets, and removing the causes and conditions that made ELNY's rehabilitation necessary.

Until December 17, 2010, however, when Judge Galasso issued an ex parte Order to Show Cause seeking an ELNY liquidation plan, ELNY's Receivers had not filed a single report with the court or made any efforts to inform policyholder or payees about ELNY's declining financial position. As of December 31, 2010, ELNY's audited financial statements show ELNY had assets of $905,945,200 compared with liabilities of $2,474,317,342, resulting in a negative surplus of $1,568,372,142.

During ELNY's March 2012 Liquidation Hearing, Judge Galasso ruled against ELNY shortfall payees' attempts to determine how and why ELNY had suffered such losses reasoning such issues were beyond the scope of the hearing. To further protect the Receiver, Judge Galasso's April 16, 2012 ELNY Liquidation Order contained immunity and injunction provisions proposed by ELNY's Receiver.

Although the Receiver represented these provisions did not immunize him from liability outside his Article 74 duties, structured settlement shortfall payees expressed concern the broad language of the immunity and injunction provisions could insulate the Receiver from liability beyond the scope of Article 74. They also believed, contrary to the Receiver's representations, that Article 74 prohibits not just bad faith conduct but also conduct without appropriate care and prudence.

ELNY Shortfall Payees' Options 

Faced with significant payment reductions resulting from ELNY's liquidation and restructuring agreement, ELNLY's structured settlement shortfall payees were left with three options:

1. Accept their payment reductions under the ELNY Restructuring Agreement and do nothing; or,
2. Appeal Judge Galasso's Order and ask the Appellate Court to send ELNY's Receiver back to drawing board; or,
3. Bring a separate legal action against the Receiver personally for bad faith conduct, breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment or waste.

The ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees chose options 2 and 3.

Option 2 failed. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department denied the ELNY shortfall payees' appeal of Judge Galasso's Order on February 6, 2013. New York State Court of Appeals denied a subsequent motion by ELNY shortfall payees for Leave to Appeal the Second Department decision on May 3, 2013.

Option 3 faces a significant judicial roadblock - a Contempt Order with the threat of fines plus imprisonment of legal counsel.

Prior to this Contempt Order, several ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees pursued Option 3 by filing a federal class action lawsuit November 8, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the ELNY Receiver (New York Superintendent of Financial Services Benjamin Lawsky) in his personal capacity. In response, the Receiver filed a motion December 7, 2012 asking the Liquidation Court (Judge Galasso) to find the shortfall payees in contempt for violating the injunction provision of the ELNY Liquidation Order.

Judge Galasso issued a Contempt Order on January 25, 2013. He also imposed a $5000 fine and threatened additional fines plus imprisonment of legal counsel if the ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees did not dismiss their Federal action which they did (without prejudice) on February 7, 2013. 

Bottom line: so long as Judge Galasso's Contempt Order and continuing threat of additional fines and imprisonment of legal counsel remain in effect, ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees are effectively barred from pursuing Federal legal action against ELNY's Receiver for alleged mismanagement of ELNY's assets during ELNY's 22 year Rehabilitation. 

Appeal of Contempt Order

As a result, ELNY's shortfall payees are currently pursuing an appeal challenging "each and every part" of Judge Galasso's January 25, 2013 Contempt Order as a necessary step before re-filing their Federal action against the Receiver and his agents.

On August 9, 2013, Attorney Edward Stone filed a preliminary brief with the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department on behalf of ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees Jeanice Dolan, Keith Vincent, Daniel Malin and their attorneys.

The appellate brief filed on behalf of the ELNY shortfall payees addresses three legal issues:

• Did the ELNY Liquidation Court exceed it subject matter jurisdiction or otherwise err by interfering with shortfall payees' constitutional right to bring suit against the Receiver in Federal court?
• Did the ELNY Liquidation Court err in holding the shortfall payees in contempt for violating its injunctive Order when the order does not clearly and unequivocally bar personal capacity suits against the Receiver?
• Did the ELNY Liquidation Court err in holding that the shortfall payees conceded the Order barred personal capacity lawsuits by appealing the order and using this alleged concession as the basis to hold the shortfall payees in contempt?

S2KM will summarize the ELNY shortfall payees' arguments for each of these issues in a subsequent blog post. For S2KM's complete ELNY reporting, see the structured settlement wiki.

ASNP 2013 Annual Meeting

Although special needs (SN) planning encompasses non-personal injury clients, settlement planning, with and/or without structured settlements, represents an increasingly important component of both the SN market and the educational focus of its practitioners.

The Academy of Special Needs Planners (ASNP) hosted its seventh annual meeting in Austin, Texas March 21-23 which featured the following topics and speakers:

• Impact of the Affordable Care Act on SN Planning - Scott Solkoff
• Modifying Problem Trusts into Effective Special Needs Trusts (SNTs) - Renee Lovelace
• SNT Issues at the Social Security Administration - Eric Skidmore, Sean Balser, Kevin Urbatsch
• The Jimmo v. Sibelius Medicare Settlement - Margaret Murphy
• SSI Update and New Social Security Strategies - David Lillesand
• Medicaid Third-Party Liability Liens Post-Ahlborn - Floyd Faigle
• Settlement Planning Under Changing Conditions - Donna Meyer, Sharon Pope, Patrick Hindert, Jason Lazarus
• Drafting Special Needs Trusts - Nancy Chudacoff, Sheri Sudweeks, Vincent Russo
• Establishing the Financial Needs of the Special Needs Beneficiary - Jerry Hulick
• Administration of SNTs - Travis Finchum, Kathy Christofell, Jerry Hulick, Renee Lovelace
• Determining a Reasonable Attorney Fee - Mary Alice Jackson

Settlement Planning and Structured Settlement Highlights

Affordable Care Act

• ACA and Settlement Planning - The Affordable Care Act (ACA) changes settlement planning in fundamental ways which speaker Scott Solkoff highlighted in his comprehensive review:
  • Reduced personal injury verdicts and settlements.
  • A different calculus for determining future medical damages based upon health insurance costs.
  • Fewer first party special needs trusts (SNTs).
  • Reduced demand for Medicare and Medicaid for persons with disabilities under age 65.
  • New opportunities for special needs attorneys because of the complexity of the ACA.
• ACA, Verdicts and Settlements - S2KM will address the impact of the ACA on personal injury verdicts and settlements in future blog posts.
• ACA, SSA and SNTs - During an ASNP question and answer session moderated by Kevin Urbatsch and featuring representatives of the Social Security Administration (SSA Question and Answer session), the following exchange occurred:
  • Question: will the SSA allow early termination of SNTs to comply with ACA?
  • SSA Answer: right now, any early termination of a SNT will require payment of reversionary interest.

Settlement Planning and SN Attorneys

The ASNP settlement planning panel was one of several presentations which identified expanding opportunities for SN attorneys. Patrick Hindert, author of S2KM's blog, provided an analysis of the settlement planning market which emphasized changing structured settlement business and transactional models. Hindert highlighted the need for better standards and metrics as well as the importance of qualified settlement funds (QSFs) and the secondary structured settlement market. Sharon Pope discussed settlement planning practice issues and provided sample documents to help special needs attorneys expand their settlement planning practice. Jason Lazurus summarized new developments and cases impacting the use of Medicare set-aside arrangements in liability cases.

For SN attorneys to expand their settlement planning practice, ASNP's panel recommended more in-depth study of non-SNT settlement planning issues including the settlement planning market, the settlement planning team and the settlement plan itself. The panel's handout materials also identified a list of settlement planning documents organized among the following stages of the settlement planning process:

• Engagement
• Assessment
• Design
• Negotiation
• Implementation
• Monitoring

In addition to the settlement planning panel, multiple ASNP presenters discussed specific settlement planning issues. In addition to settlement topics and presenters mentioned elsewhere:

• Jimmo v. Sibelius - Margaret Murphy summarized this recent settlement which has important implications for anyone who needs skilled care as well as for skilled nursing facilities, home health and outpatient facilities. As a result of this settlement, Medicare claims should no longer be denied on a rule-of-thumb determination that a beneficiary's condition is not improving.
• WOS v. E.M.A. - Floyd Faiglie made a last minute addition to his Medicaid lien presentation to address this March 20, 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision. The decision expanded the Supreme Court's previous Alhborn decision; rejected arguments by North Carolina defending its third party recovery statute; and further limits when a state may demand recovery from a portion of a settlement allocated to non-medical damages.
• Modifying Problem Trusts into Effective SNTs - Renee Lovelace recommended a cost benefit analysis formula for analyzing whether and when to modify a problem trust. Her analysis was process-driven and included: identifying problems, possible benefits, options, and cost of changes; quantifying costs and benefits; and determining the extent of any modification.
• Determining a Reasonable Attorney Fee - Mary Alice Jackson reviewed the eight factors listed in ABA Model Rule 1.5 for determining the reasonableness of a fee and discussed those factors in the context of SNTs. Note (added 3/31/2013): In his SSI update (see below), David Lillesand addressed the issue of whether and when SN attorneys need SSA approval of their attorney fees to avoid penalties resulting from poor quality draftsmanship in the Social Security Act attorney fee regulations.
• Establishing Financial Needs of the Special Needs Beneficiary - Jerry Hulick's presentation addressed special care, the special care team, special care information needs, and special care documents outside of the settlement planning context.
• Drafting Special Needs Trusts - Nancy Chudacoff, Sheri Sudweeks, and Vincent Russo presented ASNP's new Model Third Party SNT. Third party SNTs typically are used outside of the settlement planning context.

Structured Settlements

• ACA - Scott Solkoff noted in his ACA presentation that, after the ACA takes full effect January 1, 2014, structured settlements will more likely fund future health insurance costs, which should be lower and more predictable, than future medical expenses.
• "Over-structuring" - The ASNP panel discussing SNT administration (Travis Finchum, Kathy Christofell, Jerry Hulick, Renee Lovelace) emphasized a common complaint among SN attorneys: plaintiff attorneys frequently contact SN attorneys to draft a SNT on short notice after an "over-structured" settlement has already been reached. This panel discussion followed Lovelace's earlier presentation ("Modifying Problem Trusts") during which she highlighted expanding litigation against fiduciaries. S2KM's suggested solutions for fiduciaries to address the problem of "over-structuring": promote QSFs; enforce product suitability standards; or, as a last resort, utilize the secondary market to obtain increased liquidity for the trust.
• Deficit Reduction Act - The ASNP's SNT administration panel did not discuss whether the annuity rules in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) are applicable to structured settlements. S2KM is not aware of any definitive authority addressing this issue. For S2KM's previous analysis of the DRA and structured settlements, summarizing a presentation by Sylvius von Saucken, see "Inconvenient Questions".
• Secondary Market - The SSA Question and Answer session did not address structured settlements. During a similar session at the ASNP 2012 Annual Meeting, Eric Skidmore, an SSA representative, confirmed an unpublished (and controversial) SSA position: the SSA believes the existence of the secondary market renders structured settlement annuities "available resources" that potentially disqualify special needs trusts beneficiaries from receiving Medicaid.

Congratulations to ASNP and conference Chairman David Lillesand for an outstanding 2013 educational program which also featured two special needs presentations by Lillesand: a supplemental "Back to Basics" program and a Supplemental Security Income (SSI) update.

For S2KM summaries of prior educational conferences of the ASNP, and other professional associations addressing settlement planning issues, see the structured settlement wiki.  For S2KM's listing of Spring 2013 educational conferences featuring settlement planning and structured settlement presentations, see this prior S2KM blog post.

ELNY Allegation Timeline

The Executive Life of New York (ELNY)  class action lawsuit , filed November 8, 2012 by attorney Edward Stone and representatives of the Christensen & Jensen law firm, on behalf of ELNY shortfall victims, against Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services of the State of New York, and his predecessor ELNY Rehabilitators (Superintendent and/or Rehabilitator), MetLife and Credit Suisse, substantially expands the historical allegations of post-1991 ELNY mismanagement and non-disclosure. 

What follows is S2KM's re-configuration of selected allegations from the class action complaint into an ELNY "allegation timeline".

For persons seeking more comprehensive understanding of alleged mismanagement of ELNY during its 21 year rehabilitation, S2KM recommends reading the ELNY class action complaint which is posted on the structured settlement wiki. The following S2KM blog posts provide additional critiques of the New York Liquidation Bureau's (NYLB) role in ELNY insolvency:

• Elephant in the ELNY Courtroom - S2KM's summary of Peter Bickford's article.
• NYLB Role in ELNY Disaster -  highlighting allegations in the National Underwriter article "The Complete ELNY Saga"

ELNY Class Action Allegation Timeline

April 16, 1991

• New York's Insurance Superintendent Salvatore Curiale states: "[ELNY] isn't insolvent and has ample cash on hand to pay life insurance death benefits and meet annuity payments."
• Curiale further states: "The company is currently neither in an insolvent or impaired condition. . . . I have not petitioned the Court to make a finding of insolvency. ELNY is a company well able to meet its current obligations."

April 23, 1991

• ELNY Rehabilitation Court enters an Order of Rehabilitation which prohibits "all" persons, including the Rehabilitator, from "doing or permitting to be done any act or thing which might waste the assets" of ELNY.
• Under ELNY's Order of Rehabilitation, no more than 30 percent of ELNY's assets can be invested in common stock at any given time. This 30 percent cap is 50 percent higher than the percentage allowed by active insurance companies.
• Consistent with normal practice, Superintendent Curiale, ELNY's Rehabilitator, delegates most of his ELNY rehabilitation duties to the New York Liquidation Bureau [NYLB], directed by a Special Deputy Superintendent who in 1991 is Kevin Foley.

May 17, 1991 - In a letter to ELNY policyholders, the Superintendent confirms the sole basis for ELNY's rehabilitation has been the risk of policy surrenders. The letter further states the Superintendent is "presently analyzing the assets and liabilities of ELNY[.]"

June 7, 1991 - NYLB files a petition, which the Rehabilitation Court approves to retain First Boston Corporation (First Boston) as ELNY's exclusive financial advisor.

• The court also approves an investment advisory and management agreement with a First Boston affiliate providing for the payment of multi-million dollar fees.
• First Boston (and its successor/purchaser Credit Suisse) subsequently invests ELNY's assets in violation of its contractual obligations, in violation of the court's order, in violation of its representations to the NYLB and the court, and in violation of its fiduciary duties to ELNY shortfall payees.
• Instead, First Boston and Credit Suisse engage in a pattern of risky investments that generate high management fees and place ELNY's assets at considerable risk.
• Note: Credit Suisse acquired First Boston Corporation in 1990 but did not phase out the First Boston name until 2006.

June 1991 - The Superintendent contacts the Life Insurance Guaranty Corporation of New York (LIGCNY) to discuss the disposition of ELNY. MetLife, the largest domiciled insurance company in New York, has a lead position in LIGCNY and receives information about ELNY that is not available to other insurers generally or to the public.

Between June and November 1991

• NYLB enters into discussions with MetLife. Deputy Superintendent Foley is the principal person representing NYLB in these discussions.
• Under an agreement ultimately approved by the Rehabilitation Court, MetLife receives more than $1.5 billion of ELNY's traditional whole life, term life and single premium deferred annuity books of business plus $1.5 billion of ELNY's highest-quality assets.
• NYLB takes several steps to prevent competitive bids from other insurers.
• The products transferred to MetLife include 52,748 single premium deferred annuities and 80,891 life insurance policies. This large book of business allows MetLife to increase its assets by more than $1 billion at essentially no risk.
• In addition to receiving cash, MetLife is allowed to pick and choose from among ELNY's bonds and to charge "substantially higher surrender charges" than allowed under the ELNY contracts.
• Part of the agreement with MetLife includes retention of MetLife to service ELNY's remaining SPIAs (including structured settlement annuities) with a monthly fee of $5.50 per payee if payments begin before the last day of any month and $2.50 per payee if payments have not begun.
• Under this arrangement, ELNY's true liabilities are ascertainable only by NYLB and MetLife, the only entities with access to the annuity contracts.

October 9, 1991 - In a letter to ELNY policyholders and annuitants, the Superintendent reiterates the original ELNY takeover was due to surrender requests and further states: "it remains our belief that ELNY policyholders, annuitants and contract holders will receive 100% of the amounts due them under any of the options chosen as part [of] the rehabilitation plan. ... Please be assured that your money is being well protected and conservatively invested by the Rehabilitator."

January 21, 1992 - In a letter to ELNY policyholders and annuitants, the Superintendent states he is proposing a transfer of assets to MetLife and that "[t]he contemplated exchange and reinsurance agreements [with MetLife] would place you in a substantially similar position as you were at the time of the entry of the Rehabilitation Order."

March 26, 1992 - To implement the agreements with First Boston and MetLife, NYLB submits a proposed ELNY Rehabilitation Plan which the court approves.

• First Boston represents to the court the only possible course of action is to transfer virtually all of ELNY's investment grade assets to MetLife in exchange for MetLife assuming ELNY's obligations to only part of its policyholders.
• First Boston and NYLB represent that with First Boston's management of ELNY's assets, it is more than 90% certain the remaining ELNY assets will be sufficient to meet 100% of ELNY's obligations.
• Superintendent Curiale represents that, following "an extensive and detailed analysis ... Petitioner, as Rehabilitator, determined that the transaction proposed in the Plan would not impose any unwarranted or unreasonable risks on ELNY's SPIA holders, creditors or shareholders."
• Deputy Superintendent Foley states that, after the transfer, "we will make continued full payment" to annuitants, that he is "fully confident that these payments can and will be made," and that it is a "100 percent guarantee."
• NYLB represents that ELNY's remaining assets and liabilities will be approximately equal after the transfer of assets to MetLife. In fact, after the highest-value assets are transferred to MetLife, ELNY's remaining assets are less that its fixed liabilities by at least $300 million.
• From 1992 until 2010, the NYLB never files any reports with or otherwise updates the ELNY Rehabilitation Court with respect to ELNY's annuities.

April 13, 1992 - In a letter to ELNY policyholders and annuitants, the Superintendent states the proposed transfer of assets to MetLife "best protects all classes of ELNY policyholders and provides security, value, fairness, timeliness and practicality."

During 1992 - The Superintendent conducts "an extensive and detailed," "careful and exhaustive," "comprehensive" "full study" of ELNY's assets and liabilities and afterward reaffirms that ELNY is solvent.

• Following the transfer to MetLife, ELNY retains 23,666 annuity contracts in force and approximately $3.3 billion of assets.
• Foley acknowledges, under the deal, MetLife received "extremely high quality assets" and ELNY was left with lower-quality assets.
• Foley predicts the ELNY rehabilitation process will take "four or five years" or possibly less.
• NYLB asks Milliman & Robertson [M&R] to render actuarial opinions regarding the sufficiency of ELNY's remaining assets based upon certain assumptions and investment strategies.
• M&R does not audit or independently verify any of the information or assumptions provided to it.
• Based upon the assumptions provided by NYLB and First Boston, NYLB represents:
  • "[T]he investment strategy adopted by [the Superintendent] does not impose any unreasonable risks on ELNY's SPIA holders, creditors or shareholders."
  • "[I]n more than 90 percent of 500 randomly generated interest rate scenarios under ... base case assumptions, ELNY's SPIA obligations are satisfied in full."
  • "Under the M&R study, the projected cash flows from the remaining assets [are] sufficient to meet 95% of the SPIA obligations under approximately 99% of the scenerios tested using ... base case default, recovery, yield and rate of return assumptions."

1996 - NYLB for the first time refuses unrestricted access by the New York State Comptroller's office (Comptroller) to its records and personnel.

• The Comptroller reports: "During our work, Department and Bureau officials prevented auditors from examining relevant records related to the liquidation of one estate and employee personnel-related records. Our audit was precluded from interviewing agency managers and operating personnel without senior management present, thereby creating an environment where those individuals could not speak freely."
• Prior to its takeover of ELNY, NYLB had generally cooperated with audits requested by the Comptroller's office.
• For example, no limitations were placed on the Comptroller in 1976, 1984, or 1990.
• In 1994, the Comptroller performed a follow up audit limited to items that had not been reviewed in 1990.

1998 - Common stock comprises 38 percent of ELNY's portfolio exceeding the 30 percent limit set by the 1991 Order of Rehabilitation. 

1999

• A NYLB representative states it could take up to 100 years before ELNY is finally liquidated.
• Former Deputy Superintendent Foley begins employment with MetLife as its Vice President of External and Internal Communications.

2000

• Common stock comprises as much as 44 percent of ELNY's investment portfolio.
• ELNY's common stock portfolio loses hundreds of millions of dollars, nearly one-third of its value.

2001

• In a meeting with a potential ELNY investor representative, the then Deputy Superintendent states: "Why would we want to sell [ELNY] when we can sit here and clip coupons all day."
• ELNY's common stock portfolio drops another 13 percent.

2002 - ELNY's common stock portfolio drops another 19 percent.

2004 - The NYLB refuses a Comptroller request to perform a comprehensive audit to include a review of ELNY's assets and liabilities.

July 23, 2004 - The Comptroller issues subpoenas related to the proposed NYLB audit.

November 17, 2004 - The Superintendent files suit to quash the subpoenas.

June 30, 2005 - A New York Supreme Court quashes the subpoenas, and the Comptroller appeals.

Late 2005 or early 2006

• Then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer campaigns for Governor on an anti-corruption platform.
• NYLB officials approach NOLHGA and the two entities begin working on a plan to liquidate ELNY without informing the Rehabilitation Court or ELNY's policyholders and annuitants of ELNY's insolvency.
• Under this plan, more than 1400 ELNY annuitants would suffer reduced payments of up to 66 percent.

August 2006 - Then-Special Deputy Superintendent Jody Hall, who has responsibility for NYLB, is fired for suspected corruption. She later pleads guilty and is convicted.

November 2006 - Governor-elect Spitzer identifies an investigation of the NYLB as an important priority for his administration.

2007

• On at least three occasions prior to 2007, groups of potential investors advise the Superintendent of an interest in purchasing ELNY's assets and liabilities. On each occasion, the Superintendent directly interposes impediments to the performance of due diligence and other investment-related activities.
• NYLB personnel begin contacting insurance companies and others, such as purchasers of structured settlement payment rights, demanding they contribute money to shore up ELNY or face punitive actions by the New York Department of Insurance.

January 2007 - Governor Spitzer appoints Mark Peters as the new Superintendent.

March 6, 2007 - The New York Appellate Division rules the Comptroller can enforce its subpoenas against NYLB.

May 2007 - Superintendent Peters announces NYLB will be subjected to a "top to bottom" audit by an independent auditor for the first time in NYLB history. The auditors discover the NYLB's financial records are in complete disarray requiring the NYLB to "reconstruct" the financial records of all 60 estates under its supervision.

October 11, 2007 - In Dinallo v. DiNapoli , the New York Court of Appeals holds that, in his capacity as rehabilitator/liquidator of insurance companies, the Superintendent is not a state officer. Therefore, acting as the Superintendent's agent, the NYLB is not a state agency and is not subject to audit by the New York State Comptroller.

December 2007

• NYLB personnel inform Governor Spitzer that a deal has been reached with insurance companies and others assuring 100 percent payment to ELNY policyholders and/or annuitants.
• Unknown to Governor Spitzer, no deal has been reached. Instead, the NYLB is still working privately with NOLHGA on the plan to liquidate ELNY.
• Governor Spitzer announces an "agreement in principle" for ELNY, subject to approval by ELNY's Rehabilitation Court. The agreement is designed to:
  • Continue paying all ELNY annuitants 100% of their benefits;
  • Provide protection for approximately 11,000 ELNY annuity recipients including structured settlement recipients.
• The announced plan, whereby various insurers and guarantee associations apparently agree to pay $650 to $750 million to help fund $2 billion of future ELNY payments, never materializes.

October 2008 - Independent auditors discover NYLB has been understating ELNY's shortfall by more than $1 billion for years. Examining ELNY's estate as of December 31, 2006, the auditor concludes ELNY's liabilities exceed its assets by $1.26 billion.

March 18, 2009 - without notification to ELNY policyholders and annuitants, Judge Daniel Martin signs an Order allowing NYLB to:

• Replace Credit Suisse as ELNY's investment advisor with Wellington Management Company and Goldman Sachs Asset Management; and
• "[F]rom time to time amend the [Investment] Guidelines set by the Rehabilitator in consultation with his new financial advisors if the Rehabilitator deems it beneficial to ELNY."

December 17, 2010 - State Supreme Court Judge Galasso orders the Superintendent to present the Court with a proposed order and plan of liquidation for ELNY on or before July 1, 2011 after the Superintendent confers with the New York Life Insurance Company Guaranty Corporation and other interested parties.

June 23, 2011 - The Superintendent files a motion to postpone the deadline for filing a proposed order and plan of liquidation for ELNY from July 1, 2011 to August 10, 2011 "in order to present a comprehensive and consensual proposed Plan of Liquidation that maximizes the potential benefits for ELNY's structured settlement and other annuitants."

August 8, 2011 - Counsel for the Superintendent advises the court the Superintendent 'is not in a position to submit a consensual proposed order and plan of liquidation on or before August 10, 2011" as previously promised. Instead, he anticipates the Superintendent doing so on or about August 26, 2011.

October 3, 2011 - Governor Andrew Cuomo creates the New York Department of Financial Services by consolidating the New York Insurance and Banking Departments. The Superintendent of Financial Services becomes the court appointed fiduciary and Receiver/Rehabilitator of ELNY as well as other impaired and insolvent insurance companies in New York.

December 2011 - NYLB:

• Files an ex parte motion stating its intent to liquidate ELNY.
• Notifies ELNY shortfall payees for the first time that their benefits will be cut.

March 2012 - Following a hearing, Judge Galasso determines ELNY is insolvent and approves the liquidation plan and restructuring agreement upon which NYLB and NOLHGA have been collaborating since 2006.

• Under the plan, ELNY shortfall payees face a potential loss of benefits exceeding $920 million.
• During the hearing, NYLB successfully prevents shortfall payees from exploring the causes of ELNY's insolvency.
• The order approving the ELNY liquidation plan and restructuring agreement is currently being appealed.

 

ELNY Appeal - Oral Arguments

Two Executive Life of New York (ELNY) legal actions are currently in process:

• ELNY Appeal - Oral arguments occurred on November 15, 2012 in Brooklyn before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department challenging the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) Order of Liquidation and Approval of the ELNY Restructuring Agreement signed by New York State Supreme Court Judge John M. Galasso on April 16, 2012.
• ELNY Class Action - Attorney Edward Stone and representatives of the Christensen & Jensen law firm filed a class action lawsuit November 8, 2012 on behalf of ELNY shortfall victims in the United States District Court Southern District of New York against defendants Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services of the State of New York, in his non-regulatory capacity as ELNY's Receiver, including predecessor ELNY Receivers (Superintendent/Rehabilitator), Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) and Credit Suisse Group, AG (Credit Suisse).

ELNY Appeal

The appeal, filed May 30, 2012 on behalf of 18 ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims as objectors:

• Alleges Judge Galasso "erroneously denied objectors' request to reject the proposed agreement of restructuring in connection with the [ELNY] liquidation";
• Further alleges  Judge Galasso's order:
  • "[I]mproperly grants and/or continues certain injunctions and immunities and discriminates against the objectors";
  • "[C]reates impermissible sub-classes of claimants"; and
  • "[R]eflects the courts erroneous denial of objectors' requests to adjourn the hearing ... due to a lack of proper notice of such hearing."
• Seeks to compel:
  • The Superintendent, as ELNY's Rehabilitator, "to provide certain discovery necessary to, among other things, allow objectors to demonstrate why the plan should not be approved and submit a viable competing restructuring plan";
  • Judge Galasso "to unseal certain documents submitted to the court by the rehabilitator"; and
• Further seeks to allow the objectors "to present evidence (in the form of live testimony by certain witnesses) rebutting the receiver's experts and otherwise showing that the proposed-liquidation plan should not have been approved."

Appellate Briefs

S2KM previously summarized:

• Objectors' appellate brief
• Arguments in the objectors' preliminary brief:
  • Due process
  • Immunity
  • Injunction
• Arguments in the Superintendent's brief and the objectors' reply brief:
  • Due process
  • Immunity
  • Injunction

Oral Arguments

S2KM did not attend the ELNY oral arguments in Brooklyn, N.Y. The following reporting notes were provided to S2KM by structured settlement shortfall payees, and their attorney Edward Stone, who did attend the oral arguments and includes their opinions and observations.

The four appellate judges who heard the oral arguments appeared to understand the complexity of the issues on appeal:

• Associate Justice Mark C. Dillon
• Associate Justice Sandra L. Sgroi
• Associate Justice Cheryl E. Chambers
• Associate Justice Robert J. Miller

Each briefing attorney summarized his/her arguments then responded to questions from the judges:

• Karra J. Porter - for the ELNY shortfall payees.
• Steven M. Bierman - for the Superintendent.
• Kevin P. Griffith - for NOLHGA.

At least a dozen attorneys supporting the ELNY liquidation plan approved by Judge Galasso attended the oral arguments, many at the expense of the ELNY victims.These attorneys included several each representing the Superintendent and NOLHGA.

Appearing on behalf of the ELNY shortfall payees, attorney Porter focused her comments on lower court proceedings that denied ELNY shortfall payees their basic due process rights including the right to verify information the Superintendent and NOLHGA relied upon in formulating their restructuring plan.

Porter also addressed the scope of immunity, if any, to be accorded the Superintendent under New York law. She asked the panel to hold the Superintendent's ELNY conduct to the same standard applicable to all private receivers: good faith and appropriate care and prudence. She argued there is no basis in either New York or common law for the immunity and injunctive relief Judge Galasso granted to the Superintendent and his agents.

Appearing on behalf of the Superintendent, attorney Bierman claimed the ELNY shortfall payees had been afforded a fair hearing and noted Judge Galasso had determined the ELNY liquidation and restructuring plan were appropriate under the circumstances. Bierman insisted the Superintendent represented all of the ELNY shortfall victims and acted in their best interest.

Bierman never referenced or attempted to refute evidence that the Superintendent and his agents mismanaged the ELNY estate. Instead, he characterized as "galling" that ELNY shortfall payees would challenge the results of the ELNY liquidation hearing and added "no good deed goes unpunished".

Understandably, the ELNY shortfall victims who attended the oral arguments strongly disagree with attorney Bierman as to what is "galling" about the ELNY rehabilitation, liquidation hearing and restructuring plan. What is "galling" to ELNY shortfall victims:

• The Superintendent's claim that he acted in their best interests.
• The Superintendent's gross mismanagement of the ELNY estate.
• Judge Galasso's denial of their basic due process rights.
• Judge Galasso's grant of immunity and injunction to:
  • Protect the Superintendent and his agents from lawsuits; and
  • Prevent meaningful verification of the Superintendent's assertions.

The judges seemed disinterested in the due process arguments presented by attorney Griffith on behalf of NOLHGA, according to the ELNY shortfall payees who attended the oral arguments. The only question asked: "Wasn't it always the obligation of NOLHGA's state guarantee association members to pay their coverage amounts to the ELNY shortfall payees?"

A decision in the ELNY appeal is expected by year end 2012.

For additional notes about the ELNY oral arguments, see attorney Edward Stone's website.

ELNY Appeal - Immunity 1

As earlier reported by S2KM, attorney Edward Stone filed a Notice of Appeal May 30, 2012 with the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department, on behalf of 18 Executive Life of New York (ELNY) structured settlement shortfall payees, as Objectors and Appellants, challenging the Order of Liquidation and Approval of the ELNY Restructuring Agreement approved by Judge John M. Galasso on April 16, 2012.

For a copy of the ELNY liquidation order, as well as an Executive Life timeline, see the structured settlement wiki.

The Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (Superintendent), as ELNY Receiver and Respondent, and attorney Stone, on behalf of Appellant/Objector ELNY shortfall payees, subsequently and jointly agreed to and requested calendar preference and an accelerated briefing schedule for this Appeal:

• Appellant/Objectors' brief and the record on appeal were served and filed on Friday, August 17, 2012. For S2KM's summary, see: ELNY Appeal - Objectors' Brief.
• The deadline for the Superintendent/Respondent's brief to be served and filed is Friday, September 7 ,2012.
• The deadline for the Appellant/Objectors' reply brief, if any, to be served and filed is Monday, September 14, 2012, with oral argument to be set by the Court as soon as practicable thereafter.

Conclusions of the Appellant/Objectors' Brief

• The expedited procedure of the ELNY liquidation hearing was so flawed, and the prejudice to the ELNY shortfall payees so great, as to violate constitutional principles of due process. Further, no statutory or common law basis existed for Judge Galasso's extraordinarily broad grant of immunity and injunctive relief to protect the Superintendent and his agents, including the New York Liquidation Bureau (NYLB).
• If the appellate court determines a violation of due process occurred, the ELNY shortfall payees have requested the appellate court to reverse Judge Galasso's Liquidation Order in its entirety. In the alternative, the ELNY shortfall payees have requested the appellate court to reverse specific paragraphs of the Liquidation Order granting the injunction and immunity.

 In prior blog posts, S2KM summarized the Appellant/Objectors' due process allegations (ELNY Appeal - Due Process 1) and provided additional related analysis (ELNY Due Process Issue). S2KM has also reported previously on the ELNY Immunity Issue featuring analysis by New York attorney Peter Bickford.

This blog post provides a more detailed summary of the allegations in the Appellant/Objectors appellate brief arguing that no statutory or common law basis existed for Judge Galasso's "extraordinarily broad grant of immunity" for the Superintendent and his agents. A copy of the Appellant/Objectors' brief is posted on the structured settlement wiki.

Judicial Immunity

The ELNY liquidation order signed by Judge Galasso on April 16, 2012 confirms the following grant of immunity:

"Judicial immunity is extended to the Receiver and his successors in office, the New York Liquidation Bureau, and their respective attorneys, agents and employees, and such immunity is extended to them for any cause of action of any nature against them, individually or jointly, for any action or omission by any one or more of them when acting in good faith, in accordance with this Order, or in the performance of their duties pursuant to Insurance Law Article 74 ..."

The objecting ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees allege: 1) Judge Galasso and the ELNY liquidation court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant judicial immunity to the Superintendent (along with his employees, agents and attorneys), acting as ELNY's Receiver, in their personal capacities; and 2) the scope of the judicial immunity provision is unsupported by and unprecedented under New York law. What follows is a summary of their arguments.

1. Subject matter jurisdiction

• Subject matter jurisdiction is “the authority of the courts to adjudicate classes of cases.”
• Subject matter jurisdiction may be limited by statute (e.g. Article 74 of the New York Insurance Law).
• A court cannot entertain actions in which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
• In this case, the New York Supreme Court had before it the ELNY estate – and only the ELNY estate.
• Under Article 74, subject matter jurisdiction in a liquidation proceeding is limited to the collection and disposition of the insurer’s assets.
• As a liquidation court, the New York Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to prospectively adjudicate claims or issue orders not involving the estate’s assets.
• During the ELNY liquidation hearing, the Superintendent incorrectly suggested that all claims against him and/or against his agents, regardless of capacity, constituted claims against the estate.
• Statutory immunity granted to the Superintendent as regulator, however, does not apply to his role as receiver where he stands in the shoes of management and should be subject to the same standard of care and responsibility.
• As evidence of its own private status, the NYLB, which managed ELNY's day to day operations as the Superintendent's agent during ELNY's 20 plus years of rehabilitation, has acknowledged in prior cases that it retains errors and omissions insurance.
• Claims against the Superintendent and/or his agents acting in their personal capacities as ELNY's Receiver, therefore, are not claims against the ELNY estate.
• The Superintendent also argued that similar immunity language was included in interim orders during the rehabilitation proceeding.
• However, the same rationale upon which the judicial immunity provision is void and unauthorized by law should also invalidate similar provisions in interlocutory orders.
• Because Judge Galasso's judicial grant of immunity to the Superintendent, as ELNY's Receiver, and to his agents, in their personal capacities extends beyond ELNY's assets in liquidation, it exceeds the New York Supreme Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and should be void.

2. New York legal authority

• Judge Galasso's grant of immunity for the Superintendent and his agents is not provided for by statute, and exceeds the proper scope of immunity for a private court-appointed receiver.
• Under common law, judges are immune from liability when acting within their judicial power and authority.
• Receivers are generally considered an arm of the court and are entitled to immunity for conduct related to their receivership duties.
• Unlike a judge, however, judicial immunity applies only when a receiver acts “in good faith and with appropriate care and prudence.”
• Prior to 1909, private individuals acting as court appointed receivers managed the liquidation of impaired insurance companies in New York.
• In 1909, the New York legislature assigned the role of receiver for impaired insurance companies to the Superintendent of Insurance.
• The 1909 legislation was not intended to change the common law with respect to the Superintendent’s role as receiver.
• In prior cases, the Superintendent has successfully argued that it is not a governmental agency when acting as receiver.
• Therefore, there is no legal basis for the Superintendent, as ELNY's Receiver, to claim greater immunity than any other private court-appointed receiver.
• During the Order to Show Cause hearing, the NYLB, as agent for the Superintendent, indicated that it was seeking the same “good faith” immunity normally afforded to receivers.
• However, the NYLB submitted, and Judge Galasso signed, far broader language "purporting to confer immunity for any action taken in conducting the business of the insurer, in both official and personal capacities, regardless of whether his actions were in good faith or with appropriate care and prudence, and even regardless of whether such actions were in violation of court orders."
• The ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees have no problem with immunity for acts taken “in good faith” and "with appropriate care and prudence” or for "acts specifically authorized by a court order".
• Judge Galasso's order, however, eliminated any limitations on immunity inherent in those clauses with the final disjunctive phrase, “or in the performance of their duties pursuant to Insurance Law Article 74.”
• As ELNY's Receiver, the Superintendent's Article 74 duties are broad and general and include, among other things, “conduct[ing] the business of the insurer.”
• Granting immunity to the Superintendent for performing duties permitted by Article 74 means that literally any act or omission related to the management of ELNY or its assets is immunized, whether or not undertaken in good faith, including acts that violate a court order.
• The 1992 ELNY Rehabilitation Order expressly prohibits the wasting of ELNY’s assets by anyone, including the Superintendent, as ELNY's Receiver.
• Under the immunity provision in the ELNY liquidation order, however, the Superintendent could claim immunity for the violation of that order, because any such waste would have occurred during the performance of the Receiver’s duties under Article 74.
• Judge Galasso's immunity order sanctions a wide range of potential breaches of the Superintendent/Receiver’s fiduciary duties to the ELNY shortfall payees.
• For example, the Superintendent could claim immunity for overcompensating himself and his agents, fraudulently concealing ELNY’s financial condition, managing ELNY assets for his benefit or that of vendors, and/or incompetently investing ELNY assets in risky ventures.
• Therefore, Judge Galasso erred because the ELNY liquidation order confers immunity for virtually every act or omission the Superintendent has ever undertaken while managing ELNY, whether in an official or personal capacity, or whether in bad faith or violation of a court order.

For S2KM's complete ELNY reporting, see the structured settlement wiki.

SSP 2012 Annual Meeting - 2

Charles Schell, incoming President of the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP), concluded the SSP 2012 Annual Meeting by communicating his thoughts for improving the settlement planning market and expanding its core structured settlement annuity product. In his remarks, Schell addressed alternative business models and challenged participants in both models to collaborate to improve business standards and practices.

What follows is a summary of Schell's SSP comments.

Alternative business models

"Structure brokers under the traditional Claims Management model have the advantage of access to claims adjusters. However, their single-product sale is frequently dismissed by injury victims and their families for many reasons including low interest rates, lack of liquidity and the defense brokers' ties to the defendant. As a result, many injury victims and their families make uninformed decisions or resent the limited financial options presented at the time of settlement.

"In contrast, injury victims and their families generally welcome Settlement Planners into their homes as trusted advisers because they are recommended by plaintiffs' attorneys. By introducing a menu of insurance and financial products and providers, Settlement Planners promote education and information sharing. They encourage the injury victim and his/her family to actively participate in the planning process. From my personal experience, more information equals more structured settlement annuities because the product is generally right in every case at some level of participation as one asset class.

"The Claims Management model benefits the settlement planning industry and Settlement Planners should acknowledge the benefits which include product marketing and continued protection of IRC sections 104(a)(2) and 130. Concurrently, defense brokers should recognize the benefits of collaborating, rather than competing, with Settlement Planners. These benefits include access to and trust of the customer, an awareness of financial needs and family issues plus multi-product financial solutions that feature structured settlements and enhance their sale.

Business standards and practices

"To grow the structured settlement market, both Settlement Planners and traditional Claim Management structured settlement practitioners must improve their business standards and practices. To do so, we must understand, embrace and promote full disclosure, product suitability standards and written, informed consent. Our disclosure practices should include compensation and conflicts of interest. Our product suitability standards should satisfy a fiduciary and/or "best interest" test. We should insist that our customers understand, and acknowledge their understanding of, our proposed products and settlement plans by signing a written informed consent form.

"Rather than complain about secondary market business practices, primary market stakeholders should take direct actions to improve the secondary market. First, by adopting our own "best interest" or fiduciary suitability standards, the primary structured settlement market can improve settlement planning. The result will be fewer cases that are "over-structured" and subsequently require structured settlement recipients to sell payment rights to obtain needed liquidity.

"Second, we can improve the secondary market by promoting one simple, best practice from the primary market - multiple quotes. Unfortunately, single quote transfers remain a common practice within the structured settlement secondary market resulting in unnecessarily high discount rates. By educating and encouraging judges to require multiple quotes as a necessary condition for meeting the "best interest" test, the primary market can help produce an important and immediate secondary market improvement.

"To summarize: my proposed strategy to improve and grow both the structured settlement and settlement planning markets:

• "Study and improve our business standards and practices.
• "Develop "customer centric" solutions that help injury victims.
• "Build collaborative business models by focusing on shared interests."

Acknowledgement: In addition to serving as SSP's President, Charles Schell is a founding partner of Forge Consulting. Forge is also an owner of The Settlement Service Group (TSSG) for which Patrick Hindert, S2KM's blog author, serves as Managing Director.

For additional S2KM reporting about the Society of Settlement Planners, see the structured settlement wiki.

The ELNY Immunity Issue

Assuming presiding Judge John M. Galasso approves the Order of Liquidation and Approval of a Restructuring Agreement for Executive Life of New York (ELNY) as proposed by the Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (Superintendent), as ELNY's Receiver, will the Liquidation Order grant legal immunity to the Superintendent, as ELNY Receiver, and his agents, including the New York Liquidation Bureau (NYLB or Bureau), for their acts and omissions in managing ELNY's Rehabilitation since 1991?

Objection

At least some of the ELNY policyholders and shortfall payees who filed objections took issue with the following proposed paragraph in the Superintendent's proposed Order:

“Judicial immunity is extended to the Superintendent in his capacity as Receiver and his successors in office, the New York Liquidation Bureau, and their respective attorneys, agents, and employees, and such immunity is extended to them for any cause of action of any nature against them, individually or jointly, for any action or omission by any one or more of them when active in good faith, in accordance with this order, or in the performance of their duties pursuant to Insurance law Article 74; . . .”

Superintendent's Reply

On March 1, 2012, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General for the State of New York and Attorney for the Superintendent, filed an "Omnibus Reply Memorandum of Law in Response to the Objections to the Proposed Liquidation of ELNY and Distribution of ELNY's Assets Pursuant to the Restructuring Agreement" (Reply Memorandum). Addressing the proposed judicial grant of immunity, the Reply Memorandum argues:

• The Superintendent, as regulator of the insurance industry in the State of New York, is immune for his decision to seek liquidation and the timing of such decision.
• The Superintendent, as Receiver for ELNY, has no liability for actions performed within the scope of his authority pursuant to the Rehabilitation Order, the Rehabilitation Plan Order, and subsequent orders of this Court.
• Any claim against the Superintendent would deplete estate assets without any benefit to ELNY Contract policyholders or payees.
• If the Court does not grant immunity, the Superintendent will be forced to reserve assets in the ELNY estate to pay the costs of defending these meritless claims, which could significantly delay the liquidation of ELNY and the closing of the Restructuring Agreement.
• The injunctions contained in the 1992 ELNY Rehabilitation Order restraining all persons from commencing any action against the Superintendent, as Receiver, should be continued.
• No objector has met its burden of proof to vacate or modify the injunctions granted by the Court.

Peter Bickford Analysis

In a 2009 article consolidating a series of blog posts about "The Insurance Receivership Process in New York", attorney Peter Bickford provides an alternative perspective on the immunity issue:

"... [T]he Bureau acts as the agent for the superintendent of insurance in his separate and private role as liquidator or rehabilitator, marshalling assets, paying claims and, in the case of rehabilitation, managing the business and acting to remove the causes of insolvency to restore the company to the marketplace. The courts have held that the liquidator or rehabilitator “stands in the shoes” of management so that, in theory at least, the Bureau and its employees are subject to the same standards of care and responsibility as any manager of any insurance entity.

"Of course, given the circumstances of taking over an insolvent company, the law provides for certain protections for the estate, such as providing the courts with the authority to issue injunctions or orders 'necessary to prevent interference with the superintendent or the proceeding, or waste of the assets of the insurer, or the commencement or prosecution of any actions, the obtaining of preferences, judgments, attachments or other liens, or the making of any levy against the insurer, its assets or any part thereof.'” (Insurance Law § 7419; Bickford's emphasis)

"These powers are clearly intended for the protection of the estate and its assets, and to allow for an orderly administration of an estate. They are not intended, and have not in the past been used overtly for the personal protection of the rehabilitator or liquidator and his agents – until now."

Bickford continues:

"By adding this [immunity] paragraph to the form of court order of liquidation or rehabilitation, the Bureau seeks to obtain immunity without any basis in the law, and for which there is no precedent in any of the hundreds of liquidation and rehabilitation petitions filed in the past. This immunity, by the way, is no garden-variety immunity from mere negligence. It bestows absolute immunity – including for gross negligence or intentional acts committed while acting as liquidator or rehabilitator of an estate.

"Once again the current administration of the Liquidation Bureau has acted counter to its own pronouncements of openness and accountability. The Bureau repeatedly states that it is protecting the interests of policyholders and claimants of insolvent estates, and has publicly invoked its “fiduciary” role more than a few times. In the law, of course, fiduciaries are held to a higher standard of care than mere managers. Not only is the Bureau not prepared to assume even the most basic standard of care for its actions or inactions, the Bureau seeks to escape any and all responsibility.

"Add this unprecedented immunity to the lack of existing institutional oversight or regulation, and you have the perfect setting for unbridled and undiscoverable abuse."

Bickford concludes:

"The regulatory oversight of a licensed company should not end with the entering of an order of liquidation or rehabilitation. It makes no sense that when an insurance entity is placed in receivership the commissioner ceases to be the regulator and becomes the manager of an unregulated insurance business. Why shouldn’t the superintendent as receiver be held to the same standards that he imposes on the rest of the industry as its regulator? Why shouldn’t he apply his own rules to himself?"

The ELNY Liquidation Hearing concluded March 29, 2012 and awaits Judge Galasso's decision.

For additional Peter Bickford commentary and analysis, see "The Trouble with ELNY" , S2KM's review of a recent Bickford article. For S2KM's complete reporting about the ELNY Liquidation, see the structured settlement wiki.

Product Suitability Standards - 4

With declining annuity premium and historically low interest rates, structured settlement stakeholders should be discussing how to improve and grow their business. To help promote this discussion, S2KM's current blog series about "product suitability standards" highlights two fundamental issues rarely addressed during industry educational conferences:

• When is a structured settlement annuity appropriate for a specific physical personal injury claimant?
• What standards exist to help judges, guardians, trustees, mediators, attorneys, settlement planners, structured settlement consultants and other structured settlement stakeholders make this determination?

Potential sources for structured settlement product suitability standards discussed in prior S2KM blog posts:

• Part 1 - NSSTA's Code of Ethics; SSP's Standards of Professional Conduct; and the NAIC's Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation.
• Part 2 - State minors' statutes and state structured settlement protection statutes.
• Part 3 - The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)

Fiduciary Standard

Among other findings, S2KM's prior review points out a general legislative trend to protect investors and consumers with a more uniform fiduciary, and/or "best interest", standard of care. In general, a fiduciary standard is viewed as the highest legal standard of customer care requiring both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. A fiduciary is required to act in the best interest of the investor and/or customer and to fully disclose all material facts plus any conflicts of interest. Trustees and investment advisers currently are held to a fiduciary standard which may soon also apply to financial planners and broker dealers. Many state minors' statutes and all state structured settlement protection statutes incorporate "best interest" standards.

Model Annuity Regulations

For some but not all annuity products, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has created a "Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation". Significantly, the NAIC Model Suitability Regulation exempts structured settlements and provides less consumer protection than the fiduciary, and/or "best interest" standard. The NAIC has also promulgated an "Annuity Disclosure Model Regulation" "to provide standards for the disclosure of certain minimum information about annuity contracts to protect consumers and foster consumer education." It also exempts structured settlements. The legislative history of the NAIC Model Disclosure Regulation indicates that "[i]nterested parties spoke in favor of an exemption for sophisticated transactions such as ..... structured settlements."

A Hall Pass?

Do these NAIC exemptions mean that structured settlements have been given a "hall pass" for purposes of product suitability requirements? No. If structured structured stakeholders want to improve and grow their business, there are many reasons why they should: 1) understand the meaning and requirements of all three standards (fiduciary duty, best interest, and suitability); and 2) adopt better business practices that address and incorporate one or more of these product standards. Reasons include:

• Blended products - Structured settlement annuities increasingly are paid into trusts (UPIA standard) that also include financial products (Dodd-Frank standard).
• Multiple licenses - In addition to structured settlement annuities, settlement planners increasingly sell securities as well as multiple life insurance and annuity products.
• Competition - To successfully compete in today's economic and legal environment, structured settlement sales persons must adjust upward to match the higher product suitability standards and best business practices of their competitors.
• Clients and Stakeholders - As a matter of self-protection as well as consumer protection, many structured settlement clients (defendants; plaintiff attorneys) and stakeholders ( judges; mediators) will increasingly demand higher product and sales standards for injury victims.
• Lawsuits - In this era of accountability and compliance, all structured settlement participants are likely to be held to higher legal standards.

Three-Card Monte

Why do product suitability standards create issues for the structured settlement industry? At their worst, especially from the perspective of an unrepresented injury victim, some traditional structured settlement business practices not only fall far short of the fiduciary standard - they can resemble a game of "Three-card Monte" .

Misrepresentations or omission of material facts

• Cost or Value - From a claimant's perspective, a core strategy for traditional structured settlements often appears "to make a little money look like a lot of money". The Spencer v. Hartford class action allegations outline one "sophisticated" variation of this strategy which often depends on hiding or misrepresenting annuity "cost" and/or settlement "value".
• Guaranteed payments - Many structured settlement sales brochures continue to promise "guaranteed payments" without specifying who guarantees what if and when an annuity provider like Executive Life of New York (ELNY) becomes insolvent.
• Managed account - Many structured settlement recipients do not understand important product details when their case is settled including how structured settlements differ from managed accounts and why they cannot access funds without court approval pursuant to state structured settlement protection acts.
• Structured settlement myths- historically used to promote sales such as:
  • Studies show that nine out of 10 lump sum recipients squander the entire amount within five years.
  • Structured settlements enable injury victims to live free of reliance on government assistance.

Conflicts of interest - without written, informed client and/or customer consent

• Single product - The danger of single product structured settlement sales persons is not limited to whether his or her product is "suitable" or in the "best interest" of a particular claimant/customer. The danger is also that single product sales persons are inherently conflicted in recommending how much of any settlement should be allocated to their product.
• Multiple roles - A structured settlement sales person introduced into a case by a defendant or liability insurer frequently plays four separate roles each of which potentially conflicts with the other roles: agent for the annuity provider; broker for the defendant; broker for the plaintiff; and agent for the defendant in helping to negotiate and settle the case.
• Compensation sharing - Unless all parties to a settlement are informed about whether and how structured settlement annuity commissions are shared, a structured settlement creates a variety of potential conflicts of interest.
• Funding alternatives - Based upon traditional structured settlement business and compensation models, the potential availability and applicability of 468B qualified settlement funds for "appropriate cases" creates inherent conflicts of interest between defendants and their structured settlement brokers.

Recommendations

• Education - Both the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA) and the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) should devote more educational resources to understanding product suitability standards applicable directly and indirectly to structured settlements including standards applicable to their clients and competitors.
• Business standards - SSP's "Standards of Professional Conduct for Settlement Planners" represents an important industry document that has received less attention among structured settlement stakeholders than it deserves. As a result of Dodd-Frank, SSP should review and re-consider the product suitability standards proposed in its current Standards of Conduct.
• Business model - Without violating anti-trust laws, both NSSTA and SSP should encourage their members to continue studying and discussing how transitional settlement planning business models impact traditional structured settlement broker roles, compensation models and business standards.
• Documentation - In the context of transitional business models and standards, structured settlement stakeholders should review and improve core case documents including client requests for proposals, sales materials, settlement agreements, broker of record letters, and commission sharing agreements.

For additional S2KM reporting and commentary about structured settlement business standards and practices, see the structured settlement wiki.