Beyond Structured Settlements

Global Insurance Capital Standard

The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), whose members constitute nearly all of the world's insurance supervisors including the United States Treasury's Federal Insurance Office (FIO) and the National Association of Insurance Commissioner (NAIC), has committed to develop and implement the first-ever risk based global insurance capital standard (ICS), according to Peter Braumüller, chairman of the IAIS Executive Committee.

This development was reported by the Duane Morris law firm in an October 11, 2013 Alert which also identified a 2016 target date for development of the ICS with full implementation expected in 2019 following two years of testing and refinement.

Established in 1994, IAIS is "the international standard setting body responsible for developing and assisting in the implementation of principles, standards and other supporting material for the supervision of the insurance sector", according to its website.

IAIS' mission is "to promote effective and globally consistent supervision of the insurance industry in order to develop and maintain fair, safe and stable insurance markets for the benefit and protection of policyholders and to contribute to global financial stability."

The Duane Morris Alert additionally reported conflicting reactions to the ICS from representatives of the FIO and the NAIC.

• FIO - Michael T. McRaith, director of the FIO and chairman of the IAIS Technical Committee, offered this assessment: "[f]rom the [2008] financial crisis, we learned that our global financial regulatory regime should be more robust and comprehensive in scope, and jurisdictions should share a commitment to global standards."
• NAIC - Ben Nelson, CEO of the NAIC, issued this response to the IAIS's announcement: "Although U.S. state insurance regulators continue to have serious concerns about the timing, necessity, and complexity of developing a global capital standard given regulatory differences around the globe, we intend to remain fully engaged in the process to ensure that any development augments the strong legal entity capital standards in the U.S. that have provided proven and tested security for U.S. policyholders and stable insurance markets for consumers and industry."

The United States structured settlement industry played an important historical role influencing the development of risk based capital requirements for insurance companies and will likely be impacted by related national and international developments.

Historical Background

• The United States insurance industry historically has been regulated almost exclusively by the states whose regulatory responsibility was reaffirmed in 1945 when Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
• Following the collapse of First Executive Corporation and its two Executive Life subsidiaries in 1991, which had invested heavily in "junk bonds" and had sold a substantial number of structured settlement annuities, the NAIC adopted several model reforms including risk based capital (RBC) requirements.
• RBC requires insurance companies with higher amounts of risk to retain higher amounts of capital and surplus.
• Prior to the Executive Life collapse, state insurance regulators had used fixed capital standards to monitor the financial solvency of insurance companies.
• Under fixed capital standards, depending upon the state and its line of business, insurance companies were required to maintain the same minimum amount of capital, regardless of the financial condition of the company.
• As a result of the 2008 global financial crisis and huge exposures to subprime real estate mortgages incurred by one its non-insurance subsidiaries, American International Group, Inc. (AIG), a significant structured settlement annuity provider, required a $182 billion government bailout to avoid collapse.
• The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), enacted in response to the 2008 global financial crisis, created changes in the United States financial regulatory system that impact all aspects of the financial services industry including insurance.
• Among many provisions, Dodd-Frank, according the U.S. Treasury website, "vested FIO with the authority to monitor all aspects of the insurance sector ... and to represent the United States on prudential aspects of international insurance matters, including at the International Association of Insurance Supervisors [IAIS]."
• The Financial Stability Board (FSB),an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system, published a list of nine insurers on July 18, 2013 that it identified as “global systemically important”.
• The FSB list includes three United States insurers, AIG, MetLife and Prudential - each of which currently sells structured settlement annuities in the U.S. market.
• Although these insurers insist they are nothing like banks in terms of insolvency risks, "regulators are more worried by non-insurance activities carried out by insurance groups than by their core activities", according to a July 27, 2013 article in The Economist titled "Global Systemic Insurers".
• "But it is not clear", The Economist article adds, "which activities the FSB considers core and which it thinks are too racy for insurers. Regulators (and others) worry about some annuities, savings-like products which offer guaranteed returns to customers."
• The Duane Morris Alert also reported the IAIS announcement "that by late 2014 it will have finalized and made ready for implementation 'straightforward, backstop capital requirements' for insurers that are designated as global systemically important insurers."

Reliance Structured Settlement Annuities

What happens, or should happen, to structured settlement payees when the owner of their structured settlement annuities becomes insolvent?

Reliance Insurance Company (Reliance), a liability insurer, is the most recent example where these issues are being adjudicated. Previous examples include Monarch Capital Corporation and First Executive Corporation, both non-insurance companies which, as "qualified assignees", owned structured settlement annuities issued by their subsidiary life insurance companies.

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania (Liquidation Court) declared Reliance insolvent and issued an Order of Liquidation which appointed the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner as Liquidator in 2001.

The Reliance Estate, however, remains open and its current assets include approximately 3,400 structured settlement annuity contracts which the Liquidator estimates have a present discounted value of $95.1 million. The Liquidator further estimates:

• Over 85 percent of the structured settlement annuity contracts owned by the Reliance Estate are “qualified assignment” contracts and the rest are “buy and hold” contracts.
• Over 95 percent of the qualified assignment contracts owned by the Reliance Estate involve annuity contracts issued by United Pacific Life Insurance Company, a former Reliance subsidiary which Reliance sold in 1993 and which is now known as Genworth Life Insurance Company.

As part of the Reliance liquidation process, current Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner Michael F. Consedine requested the Liquidation Court on September 10, 2012 to enter an Order approving transfer of ownership of these structured settlement annuity contracts to the annuity payees which, in many cases, now include factoring companies and investors who have purchased structured settlement payment rights from factoring companies.

On February 28, 2013, Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Judge Bonnie Brigance Leadbetter ordered the Liquidator’s Application for Approval to Transfer Ownership (Transfer Application) “be held in abeyance until further order of this Court.”

As justification for the proposed transfer of structured settlement ownership, the Transfer Application provides in part:

• With the exception of several structured settlement annuities issued by Executive Life of California and Executive Life of New York (ELNY), all payments related to structured settlement annuities owned by the Reliance Estate have been paid by the annuity issuers.
• The structured settlement annuity payees will have the same right to receive payments from the annuity issuers assuming transfer of ownership to the payees.
• As owner of the annuity contracts, Reliance has the right to transfer ownership upon notice to the annuity issuers.
• The Liquidator has concluded that transferring ownership of the annuity contracts to current payees under those contracts, with the simultaneous discharge of Reliance’s related structured settlement payment obligations:
  • Would be in the “best interest” of the Reliance Estate and represents “the only viable option”; and
  • Would not create any federal income tax liability for Reliance.
• Recognizing that any asset transfer requires prior court approval, the Liquidator “explored several other options” including transfer of the annuity contracts to:
  • A newly-formed entity such as a subsidiary corporation; and/or
  • A trust owned by Reliance.
• The Liquidator, however, concluded that any and all such alternative options would fail to provide the Reliance Estate with finality and expense reduction.

The Liquidator’s Transfer Application provides the following additional comments about the Reliance structured settlement payees:

• Tax consequences – The Liquidator concluded “it is impossible and imprudent” for the Liquidator to make predictions or provide tax advice for the payees because each has unique circumstances. Accordingly, “payees may want to consult a tax advisor or accountant with respect to the [proposed] transfer.”
• Priority in liquidation – If any structured settlement annuity issuer fails to meet its structured settlement obligation (which the Transfer Application questionably refers to as “the primary obligation”), the Liquidator has determined a claim against the Reliance Estate under a “qualified assignment” contract “would warrant no higher than class (e) priority" under the Pennsylvania Insurance Company Act. The Liquidator, however, anticipates no Reliance creditors below class (b) priority will receive any distribution from the Reliance Estate.
• Notice – The Liquidator does not have a complete list of current names and addresses of Reliance structured settlement payees in part because Reliance did not retain copies of either the annuity contracts or other structured settlement documents issued by United Pacific Life Insurance Company when it sold the company in 1993. The Liquidator assumes Reliance structured settlement annuity issuers have the ability to furnish individual notice. In addition, the Liquidator plans to publish notice in multiple regional and national newspapers.

Additional Resources

• For additional documents related to the Reliance Liquidation, see the Reliance Documents website.
• For additional information about the resolution of Monarch Capital Corporation structured settlements, see Section 5.04[2][b][ii] of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J).
• For additional information about the resolution of First Executive Corporation structured settlements, see the structured settlement wiki and S2P2J Sections 3.05[11-13].
• For a discussion of alternative funding options ("qualified assignments" vs. "buy and hold") in the context of the ELNY liquidation, see "ELNY Qualified Assignments".

An ELNY Nightmare

While almost 1500 Executive Life of New York (ELNY) structured settlement shortfall payees await the outcome of continuing ELNY litigation, it is worth remembering how seriously Judge John Galasso's ELNY liquidation order and related restructuring agreement will impact some of these unfortunate individuals assuming his order and the restructuring agreement are ultimately upheld and implemented.

Glenn Arensdorf 

Glenn Arensdorf is one such individual. Glenn is a 49 year old Florida resident who is permanently and totally disabled. He cannot work in any capacity. Glenn's ELNY structured settlement payments are scheduled to be reduced by 58 percent which places him among the most drastically reduced of all the ELNY shortfall payees. 

Significantly, Glenn's structured settlement was funded in 1984 with two "buy and hold" annuities issued by ELNY and owned by Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, then known as Kemper Insurance Company, ("Lumbermens") one of the liability insurers in Glenn's personal injury case.

"Buy and hold" annuities, whereby an underlying insurer (in Glenn's case, Lumbermens) retained the liability for future periodic payments, and funded that liability through its ownership of qualified funding assets (in Glenn's case, two ELNY annuities), might appear advantageous compared with ELNY qualified assignments.

With qualified assignments, defendants and their liability insurers often seek to transfer their future liability for periodic payments to a qualified assignee which for ELNY annuities is First Executive Corporation. Unfortunately for ELNY qualified assignee payees, First Executive Corporation ceased to exist in 1991. 

Lumbermens, however, was ordered into rehabilitation July 2, 2012 so its financial and legal ability to fulfill its structured settlement obligations to Glenn are uncertain.

To add insult to injury: although Glenn has an application pending with the ELNY Hardship Fund, the fund specifically excludes applications for which the underlying insurer may still be responsible. To date, Glenn has not received any notification of an award or a rejection by the ELNY Hardship Fund.

Glenn, therefore, appears to face a "Catch 22" which he refers to as "my ELNY nightmare". Glenn's attorneys expect he will qualify under the Illinois Life and Health Guarantee Fund (Lumbermens' home state) where the combined coverage for both of Glenn's ELNY annuities appears to be $168,750.

Glenn's Personal Injuries

Three days after he began college in 1981, Glenn was a rear seat passenger in a one car accident in which a friend and driver lost control, hit a tree and died. Glenn was admitted to the hospital in an unconscious condition and was not expected to live. Although he survived, Glenn sustained traumatic brain injury, multiple fractures, and broken teeth among other injuries. He remained in a coma for five weeks. Glenn has no memory of either the accident or his first days in college.

Due to his brain injury, Glenn has subsequently developed permanent double vision and partial paralysis of facial muscles resulting in disfigurement. His left arm and hand are virtually useless. Glenn walks with a limp following 11 surgeries to his left leg. Both his left arm and left leg are noticeably smaller than his right as a result of muscle atrophy. Glenn also suffers psychological issues, neurological limitations, motor function impairment, cognitive limitations, impaired problem-solving skills, poor short-term memory, a short attention span and slow information processing speed - all as a result of his personal injuries.

Before his accident, Glenn played guitar and was a member of a rock 'n roll band - or, at least, that is what Glenn has been told. He cannot remember playing his guitar. After his accident, when Glenn finally returned home, he found a huge guitar amplifier and a Fender Stratocaster guitar. Having lost both his sense of rhythm and use of his left hand, Glenn became so depressed, he sold his amplifier and guitar "for pennies".

"Glenn's World"

With support and encouragement from his family, Glenn has learned to adapt to his handicapped status and has made progress toward living independently. Glenn lives in a gated community attached to a plaza with a grocery store, several restaurants, and various professional offices. He refers to his community as "Glenn's World" where he serves as an inspiration to other disabled persons who endeavor to live an independent life style.

Every morning, Glenn rides his three-wheel bike to his favorite restaurant, Pete's Place, where he eats breakfast and socializes with the staff and regular customers "by telling them bad jokes". He visits a chiropractor three times each week for treatment of the scoliosis he developed from accident-related injuries. Everyday, Glenn also visits his other favorite restaurant in the plaza, Duffy's, where he helps the staff set up for a busy lunch hour by folding napkins and telling more bad jokes. Although he cannot cook, Glenn generally returns home in time to prepare a sandwich for lunch. 

During the afternoon, Glenn watches TV or reads his emails. Then he rides his bike back to the plaza for dinner at one of several restaurants. The staff of these restaurants have known Glenn for 20 years. When Glenn orders his dinners "chop chop", they help cut up his meals because he is unable to do so himself. Like other brain injured individuals, Glenn's life requires and benefits from similar daily and weekly routines. This includes Glenn's nighttime routine when, due to back pain, he always sleeps on his left side on the right side of his bed.

The ELNY Liquidation

Glenn's ability to sustain his life in "Glenn's World" depends upon his monthly ELNY annuity payments. His financial needs are extraordinary and his limitations profound. Glenn is completely reliant and dependent on others to do what he cannot do for himself. Besides his ELNY annuity payments, the only income Glenn receives is a monthly Social Security Disability payment in the amount of $720.

Glenn is presently being treated by a psychologist for the emotional stress and anxiety created by the ELNY liquidation. He suffers from depression and has difficulty sleeping at night. Glenn does not understand why the State of New York or other insurance companies did not bail out ELNY or why ELNY shortfall payees with catastrophic injuries will be forced to exist on budgets that do not meet their needs. Although Glenn would like to be part of an ELNY support group with other shortfall payees, Judge Galasso has ruled that Glenn and other shortfall payees cannot have access to each others names and contact information.

Some proponents claim that structured settlements are "the ultimate safeguards to guarantee the long term financial health of people harmed in accidents". For Glenn Arensdorf and similarly situated ELNY shortfall payees, however, the structured settlement system has failed them. To protect their rights, they have been forced to challenge the legality and unfairness of Judge Galasso's liquidation order and restructuring agreement against long odds and powerful opponents.

Additional Information

For profiles of five additional ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees, see "The Complete ELNY Saga - 21 Years of Mismanagement, Corruption, Broken Promises and Shattered Lives", the lead article in a comprehensive ELNY analysis published in 2012 by LifeHealthPro.

For S2KM's complete reporting about the ELNY liquidation, including related litigation and an Executive Life timeline, see the structured settlement wiki.

Structured Settlements in 2012 - 4

Executive Life of New York

At one time or another, each of us may have become acquainted with individuals who have overcome personal injuries and successfully transformed their disabilities and special needs into special lifetime accomplishments. Kyle Walsh, profiled in a 2012 S2KM blog post, is one such individual. The late Randy Snow, featured in a 2008 S2KM blog series, was another.

Structured settlements are supposed to provide economic security for people with serious injuries and disabilities - to help them rebuild their lives and, in many cases, to achieve special lifetime accomplishments. Instead of an all-cash personal injury settlement, structured settlement recipients accept a promise of future periodic payments.

What happens, if and when, that promise is broken? What happens when a structured settlement funding company, and the regulators and guaranty system responsible for protecting the structured settlement recipients, fail to make and/or insure full payment?

These questions are highlighted by the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) liquidation - the dominant structured settlement story of 2012 and one of the most important developments in the history of the United States structured settlement industry.

The story of ELNY, as well as its affiliate Executive Life of California (ELIC), and their parent company, First Capital Corporation (FEC), is long and complex. For background of events prior to ELNY's 1991 receivership, S2KM recommends Gary Schulte's 1992 book "The Fall of First Executive".

Significantly, neither the 1991 ELNY Rehabilitation Order nor the 1992 Order approving the ELNY Rehabilitation Plan declared ELNY to be insolvent. When then New York's Insurance Commissioner Salvatore Curiale seized control of ELNY on April 16, 1991 and placed it in receivership, he stated: "The company is currently neither in an insolvent or impaired condition. . . . I have not petitioned the Court to make a finding of insolvency. ELNY is a company well able to meet its current obligations."

Exactly twenty-one years later, on April 16, 2012, following 11 days of hearings at the Nassau County New York Supreme Court, presiding Judge John M. Galasso approved an Order of Liquidation and a Restructuring Agreement for ELNY as proposed by the Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (Superintendent), as ELNY's Receiver, and the National Organization of Life and Health Guaranty Funds (NOLHGA).

The result of the ELNY Liquidation Order and Restructuring Plan, even following contributions from state guaranty funds and voluntary life insurance company contributions, is a $900 million shortfall allocated entirely (and arguably inequitably) to more than 1400 ELNY payees out of a total of approximately 9700 current ELNY payees. The remaining ELNY payees expect to receive 100 percent of their promised future payments. The average individual shortfall is estimated to exceed $600,000 present value. Although an ELNY Hardship Fund has been created, it has not yet been funded.

An appeal was filed May 30, 2012, on behalf of 18 ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees, challenging the ELNY liquidation order and restructuring agreement on the basis of due process. The appeal also alleges that immunities and injunctions granted under the liquidation order are improper. Oral arguments occurred on November 15, 2012 in Brooklyn before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department. No decision has been announced.

Another legal challenge to the ELNY liquidation order occurred June 14, 2012 when attorneys for several liability insurers filed a Motion asking Judge John Gallasso to "clarify and/or correct" his April 16, 2012 ELNY Memorandum Decision. The motion indirectly raises the issue of whether qualified assignments extinguish the liability of defendants and/or liability insurers for shortfall payments resulting from the ELNY liquidation? Judge Galasso denied the Motion without further explanation. 

In a subsequent development, somewhat related to the liability insurers' motion, the ELNY website announced an ELNY Facilitation Plan to assist owners of ELNY structured settlement annuities (SSAs) make supplemental payments to ELNY SSA payees and to coordinate those payments with the ELNY benefit payments scheduled to be made by the Guaranty Association Benefits Company (GABC) under the ELNY Restructuring Plan approved by Judge Galasso on April 16, 2012 as part of the ELNY liquidation order.

The same attorneys who filed the ELNY appeal, Edward Stone and representatives of the Christensen & Jensen law firm, filed a class action lawsuit November 8, 2012, on behalf of ELNY shortfall victims, against Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services of the State of New York, and his predecessor ELNY Rehabilitators, as well as MetLife and Credit Suisse. The class action allegations provide a critical litany of mismanagment and non-disclosure during the 21 years ELNY's estate was being supervised by these defendants.

In response, attorneys representing Benjamin M. Lawsky, in his capacity as ELNY's Receiver, filed a Notice of a Motion with the Nassau County New York State Supreme Court requesting oral argument on January 4, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the parties may be heard:

• to enjoin three ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees and their legal counsel from proceeding with a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court Southern District of New York;
• to hold in contempt of court the shortfall payees' legal counsel; and
• to require their payment of the related costs and attorney's fees incurred by the Superintendent.

Although the ELNY liquidation has so far received limited coverage in the mainstream media, specialty insurance experts and analysts have not been silent. Examples:

• Peter Bickford - In his article titled "The Elephant in the Court Room" (summarized here by S2KM), Bickford argues New York’s receivership system has failed ELNY, its policyholders and beneficiaries, as well as the insurance industry and its customers due to a lack of basic accountability standards. Although the ELNY restructuring plan may solve the immediate ELNY problem (at the expense of the remaining ELNY shortfall victims), Bickford maintains it does not address the broader, underlying systemic defects inherent in the New York life insurance receivership system. Without an act of the New York legislature, according to Bickford, "there will be no life insurance guaranty fund coverage in New York" following ELNY. Bickford's article also provides succinct summaries of objections raised by ELNY shortfall victims and ELNY legal issues which he states "could linger in the courts for years"
• LifeHealthPro - In an article titled "The Complete ELNY Saga: 21 Years of Mismanagement, Corruption, Broken Promises and Shattered Lives", (summarized here by S2KM), the authors assign primary blame for ELNY insolvency to the NYLB which they describe as "a rogue agency known for its codes of secrecy and characterized by many who spoke for this story as ineffective and mismanaged at best, and a snake pit of corruption at worst". In a companion article (reviewed here by S2KM), writer Warren Hersch asks: "is the structured settlement process in need of reform"?  In a follow-up oped article titled "Governor Cuomo I'm Calling You Out", (summarized here by S2KM), Bill Coffin, LifeHealthPro's Group Editor, charges New York Governor Andrew Cuomo with personal responsibility to clean up the "ELNY debacle".

The final results of the ELNY liquidation will depend upon the outcome of the continuing litigation highlighted in this article. It also remains to be seen what reforms, if any, will result from the failed ELNY receivership process.

In conclusion, it should also be noted that ELIC-related litigation continued in 2012 (Garamendi v. Altus Finance S.A.) when a federal jury in Los Angeles rejected a claim by California's Insurance Commissioner that, but for a conspiracy by French investor group Artemis S.A.:

• ELIC's original conservator (then California insurance commissioner John Garamendi) would have accepted an alternative bid in 1991 by state insurance guaranty associations; and
• The alternative bid would have retained profits from ELIC's junk bond portfolio for the benefit of policyholders including ELIC structured settlement recipients.

For S2KM's complete and continuing reporting about the ELNY liquidation, see the structured settlement wiki.

This blog post completes S2KM's series "Structured Settlements in 2012":

• Part 1 - Primary market
• Part 2 - Settlement planning
• Part 3 - Secondary market
• Part 4 - Executive Life of New York

NYLB Role in ELNY Disaster

The comprehensive analysis of the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) liquidation published last week by the National Underwriter Life & Health magazine on its LifeHealth Pro website describes a "slow-motion disaster of gross mismanagement" the magazine claims will result in severe collateral damage not only to hundreds of ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims but also to the life insurance industry more generally.

In its lead article, titled "The Complete ELNY Saga - 21 Years of Mismanagement, Corruption, Broken Promises and Shattered Lives", the National Underwriter report intersperses profiles of five ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims with an historical summary of the 21 year ELNY rehabilitation and liquidation process.

The historical summary concludes:

• "[T]he ELNY rehabilitation, restructuring and liquidation have been nothing short of disastrous. Not only did regulators fail to protect a company from being dis-mantled by its insolvent parent, it failed to adequately manage the company from Day One. It failed its self-appointed fiduciary duty to serve ELNY’s payees. It failed to act with integrity, and it failed to uphold the social compact between insurers and their customers that if the money needs to be there, it will be there. Always. Without fail. Without exception."
• "At every single turn with ELNY, there was failure after failure to uphold the public’s trust. The state of New York, and especially the New York Liquidation Bureau, so badly disrupted the leap of faith between insurer and insured that the ripples will be felt for years to come, as every one of ELNY’s shortfall payees tells anyone who will listen that insurance and annuities are not worth it. That the money will not be there when it is needed, that the government will not protect the public." (emphasis added)
  

The National Underwriter article challenges the conventional explanation of ELNY's downfall which S2KM reported previously in "The Fall of First Executive".  Instead, it assigns primary blame to the New York Liquidation Bureau (NYLB), the non-government entity to which the New York Insurance Superintendent delegated ELNY management responsibilities beginning in 1991.

Describing the NYLB as "a rogue agency known for its codes of secrecy and characterized by many who spoke for this story as ineffective and mismanaged at best, and a snake pit of corruption at worst", the article highlights many examples of alleged mismanagement and lack of disclosure related to the ELNY liquidation:

• Failure to prepare and/or maintain any financial reports for ELNY for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992.
• The 1991 decision to sell almost all of ELNY's non-structured settlement business along with its non-junk bond investment portfolio to MetLife.
• Predicating the rehabilitation plan on unrealistic assumptions such as 30-year U.S. government treasuries maintaining an average interest rate of nine-and-a-half percent.
• Selling ELNY's high yield bond portfolio for a steep discount in 1991 at the bottom of the "junk bond" market.
• Reinvesting the proceeds in an unsafe percentage of common stocks vs. more conservative bonds.
• Increasing ELNY gross liabilities by $500 million between 1999 and 2000 based upon questionable assumptions and without due diligence.
• Reporting discrepancies and irregularities including incorrect numbers of policyholders and thousands of purported policyholder birth dates after ELNY entered rehabilitation.
• Excessive NYLB staffing with dozens of administrators for ELNY despite contracted services for ELNY's claims (MetLife), asset management (Credit Suisse) and accounting (Milliman & Robertson).
• Alleged corruption resulting in the dismissal of NYLB superintendent Jody Hall in 2006 at a time when Hall allegedly "was making persistent efforts to examine the elusive financial records on ELNY". Note: the National Underwriter provides additional related details in a companion article titled "The Aborted New York Liquidation Bureau Investigation".
• NYLB's alleged "culture of secrecy" exemplified by:
  • Disclaimers on ELNY financial reports stating that conclusions drawn by anyone except NYLB would be “materially misleading.”
  • Conditional bonuses, paid out of estates under NYLB management, requiring NYLB retirees to sign non-disclosure agreements prohibiting comments about non-public NYLB information.
• A damning description of the NYLB in its own 2007 annual report stating that the Bureau:
  • Had "little viable management structure or professional culture at the most senior level,” and
  • Needed "to address untimely payment of claims, poor employee evaluation methods, gross financial mismanagement in the case of ELNY, and a complete lack of auditing."

In the context of NYLB's alleged "gross mismanagement", the National Underwriter article finds it especially offensive that Judge John Galasso granted the NYLB complete judicial immunity as part of his ELNY liquidation order with support from the Superintendent of New York State Department of Financial Services and NOLHGA.

Attorney Edward Stone filed a Notice of Appeal May 30, 2012 on behalf of 18 ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims as objectors with the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department, challenging Judge Galasso's order. Oral arguments for the appeal are scheduled for November 15, 2012.

The National Underwriter article concludes: "the final chapter has not closed on ELNY, and there still is time to fix the problem without causing so much collateral damage." It urges the New York state government and/or the insurance industry to dedicate funds to fully restore ELNY and its shortfall victims.

For related S2KM reporting, see the structured settlement wiki and, more specifically:

• New York Liquidation Bureau
• ELNY Liquidation Order
• Elephant in the ELNY Court Room 
• ELNY Appeal - Objectors' Brief
• The ELNY Due Process Issue
• The ELNY Immunity Issue

Garamendi v. Altus Finance S.A.

As Executive Life of New York (ELNY) stakeholders and structured settlement industry participants await the outcome of the ELNY appeal , challenging the ELNY Order of Liquidation and Approval of the ELNY Restructuring Agreement, they may be surprised to learn the ultimate fate of Executive Life of California (ELIC), ELNY's sister company, likewise continues to be litigated.

The most recent ELIC-related development occurred October 29, 2012, in Garamendi v. Altus Finance S.A., when a federal jury in Los Angeles rejected a claim by California's Insurance Commissioner that, but for a conspiracy by French investor group Artemis S.A.:

• ELIC's original conservator (then California insurance commissioner John Garamendi) would have accepted an alternative bid in 1991 by state insurance guaranty associations; and
• The alternative bid would have retained profits from ELIC's junk bond portfolio for the benefit of policyholders including ELIC structured settlement recipients.

The actual 1991 ELIC sales agreement was a two-part sales agreement with New California Life Holdings, Inc. (NCLH) and Altus Finance (Altus), an affiliate of the French Bank Credit Lyonnais. That agreement was subsequently modified and approved by a California Superior Court on August 13, 1993 as part of the ELIC rehabilitation plan.

Under the 1991 agreement, Altus paid $3.25 billion and acquired ELIC's $6.4 billion junk bond portfolio. The Altus purchase price included $300 million of capital for a newly formed company, Aurora National Life Assurance Company, Inc. (Aurora) which assumed ELIC's remaining assets and liabilities including its structured settlement obligations. Also, as part of the actual sales agreement, the Artemis S.A. joint venture acquired a controlling interest in NCLH.

 A California Court of Appeals previously summarized these complex ownership relationships as follows: "Artemis S.A. is the parent of Aurora S.A. Aurora S.A. owns a controlling interest in NCLH. NCLH owns 100 percent of Aurora."

In retrospect, many critics claimed the 1991 agreement substantially undervalued ELIC's junk bond portfolio. Although the junk bond market was depressed and thinly traded in 1991, it was among the best performing investment markets in 1992 and 1993. Even in 1991, a substantial percentage of the junk bonds owned by First Executive Corporation (FEC) and its two Executive Life subsidiaries were current on interest payments and ultimately fulfilled their investment obligations.

ELIC-related legal developments between 1993 and the October 29, 2012 jury decision in Garamendi v. Altus Finance have also been complex. Relevant historical highlights:

• Subsequent to its NCLH purchase, Artemis learned of a conspiracy by Altus/MAAF Group, an investment group which previously controlled NCLH, to evade the prohibition under California law on foreign entities controlling California insurers. Rather than disclose this conspiracy to the California Insurance Commissioner, Artemis submitted multiple filings that contained false or misleading information.
• In 1999, the California Insurance Commissioner learned from a whistleblower about the Altus S.A./MAAF Group conspiracy and filed conspiracy lawsuits against multiple defendants including French bank Credit Lyonnais.
• In 2005, some of the defendants in the conspiracy lawsuits, including Credit Lyonnais, settled for $730,500,000, most of which was distributed to former ELIC policyholders and payees.
• The conspiracy lawsuit against the two remaining defendants, Artemis S.A. and Francois Pinault (Artemis' controlling shareholder), was conducted in Federal Court in 2005. The jurors found Artemis and Pinault liable for engaging in a conspiracy and awarded $0 in compensatory damages and $700 million in punitive damages. The trial court awarded an additional $241 million in equitable restitution.
• On August 25, 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the damage awards against Artemis and Pinault and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages.

For a more detailed background case summary, see S2KM's 2011 blog post "Aurora S.A. v. Poizner".

 In an article published October 30, 2012, Bloomberg Businessweek wrote that, following the most recent Garamendi v. Altus Finance SA verdict, U.S. District Judge Gary Klausner said "he was inclined to reinstate the restitution that the judge presiding over the 2005 trial had awarded the insurance commissioner" and "[Judge] Klausner ordered both sides to file briefs on the restitution including what amounts they thought were appropriate."

 For a background summary of ELIC, see S2KM's blog post "Executive Life of California" and, for greater detail, section 3.05[12] of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J).

For S2KM's complete and continuing Executive Life reporting, see the structured settlement wiki.

ELNY Periodic Payment Obligations

More than 1400 structured settlement annuity payees are expected to suffer payment shortfalls under the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) Liquidation Plan approved by New York State Supreme Court Judge John Galasso on April 16, 2012. The average individual shortfall is estimated to exceed $600,000 present value.

Under what circumstances, if any, will defendants/liability insurers have the legal responsibility to make up the difference in ELNY structured settlement shortfall payments?

Recent Motion

This issue was highlighted in a recent Motion by liability insurers asking Judge Galasso to "clarify and/or correct" his ELNY Memorandum Decision insofar as the Memorandum Decision "caused confusion or mistake" concerning responsibilities of those liability insurers to make up shortfalls on ELNY annuities. Judge Galasso denied the Motion on July 23, 2012.

The Motion attempted to distinguish two types of structured settlement funding alternatives ("buy and hold" vs. qualified assignments). "Buy and hold" annuities, according to the Motion, "are those whereby the underlying insurer retained, or held the liability for future payments, and funded that liability through its ownership of a qualified funding asset, or annuity."

In contrast, the Motion states, "where a structured settlement includes a qualified assignment, the defendant and its liability insurer are fully released from future liability - which liability is assumed by the assignee, here, First Executive Corporation." (emphasis added). Of course, one of the problems for all ELNY stakeholders is that First Executive Corporation ceased to exist in 1991.

As S2KM has previously written, those "suggestions" and/or "assumptions" are not necessarily or universally true. Legal rights and responsibilities resulting from attempts to create qualified assignments must be determined on a case by case basis.

Three Funding Choices

As more fully explained in Section 3.02 of "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J): with a structured settlement, each defendant and/or liability insurer has three choices regarding its obligation to fund future periodic payment obligations to the claimant (1) to have no obligation; (2) to assume or share the obligation; or (3) to assume and then transfer the obligation without recourse. In general:

• "No obligation" means either a claim is paid on a lump sum basis or a structured settlement occurs and all parties agree that the particular defendant or liability insurer shall have no duty to make any future periodic payments.
• “Assume the obligation” means that a particular defendant or liability insurer ("obligor") assumes a legal obligation to pay future periodic payments. This obligor may be solely, jointly, or jointly and severally liable for the payments and, by assuming the obligation, accepts certain risks. One such risk is the potential insolvency of the financing company (e.g. ELNY).
• "Transfer the obligation" means "novation" as defined in Section 280 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement): "A novation is a substituted contract that includes as a party one who was neither the obligor nor the obligee of the original duty." Comments to Section 280 further provide:
  • "Effect of novation. A novation discharges the original duty, just as any other substituted contract does, so that breach of the new duty gives no right of action on the old duty.
  • "Consideration. A novation is subject to the same requirements as any other contract, including that of consideration.... [C]onsideration to support the discharge of the original duty can usually be found in the promise to undertake a new duty….Assent of the obligee of the original duty and of the obligor of the new duty is always necessary."
  • "Substitution of obligor. ….[A] mere promise by a third party to assume the obligor’s duty, not offered in substitution for that duty, does not result in a novation, and the new duty that the third party may owe to the obligee as an intended beneficiary is in addition to and not in substitution for the obligor’s original duty."
  • Illustration: "A owes B $1000. B promises C that he will discharge the debt immediately if C will promise to pay him $1000. Intending to benefit A, C so promises. There is a novation under which B’s and C’s promises are consideration for each other, and A’s duty to pay B is discharged. A is the intended beneficiary of B’s promise …and can by disclaimer render the transaction, including the discharge, inoperative from the beginning."

Qualified Assignment

The most common method for transferring a structured settlement obligation is a "qualified assignment" as defined in IRC Section 130(c). For purposes of understanding "transfer of obligation" in the context of structured settlements, however, the Section 130 definition of "qualified assignment" presents two significant problems:

• IRC section 130 does not address whether the assignor's duty is discharged as a result of a qualified assignment.
• Section 130 incorrectly uses the term "assignment" when it should have utilized the term "delegation".

Restatement of Contracts

Comments to Section 316 of the Restatement explain both the difference and the significance of these two terms:

• "Assignment and delegation. In this Chapter rights are said to be 'assigned'; duties are said to be 'delegated' ….. 'Assignment' is the transfer of a right by the owner (the obligee or assignor) to another person (the assignee)."
• "Comparing delegation to assignment. A person subject to a duty (the obligor) does not ordinarily have such a power to substitute another in his place without the consent of the obligee; that is what is meant when it is said that duties cannot be assigned. 'Delegation' of performance may be effective to empower a substitute to perform on behalf of the obligor, but the obligor remains subject to the duty until it has been discharged by performance or otherwise."

Comments to Section 318 of the Restatement further differentiate "delegation" and "novation" as follows: "An obligor is discharged by the substitution of a new obligor only if the contract so provides or if the obligee makes a binding manifestation of assent, forming a novation….Otherwise the obligee retains his original right against the obligor, even though the obligor manifests an intention to substitute another obligor in his place and the other purports to assume the duty. The obligee may, however, have rights against the other as an intended beneficiary of the promise to assume the duty."

NSSTA Model Agreements

After ELNY entered rehabilitation in 1991, the National Structured Settlement Trade Association (NSSTA) published Model Qualified Assignment Agreements (with and without a Release) which documents were updated following the enactment of IRC 5891 in 2001. Both versions of NSSTA's current Model Qualified Assignment Agreements reference IRC section 130 and utilize "assignment" to describe what the Restatement more properly characterizes as a "delegation".

Here is the relevant comparative language from current paragraphs 1 of the NSSTA Model Agreements:

• With Release - "Assignment and Assumption; Release of Assignor. Assignor hereby assigns to Assignee, and Assignee hereby accepts and assumes, all of Assignor’s liability to make the Periodic Payments. Each Claimant hereby accepts and consents to such assignment by Assignor and assumption by Assignee. Effective on the Effective Date, each Claimant hereby releases and discharges Assignor from all liability to make the Periodic Payments."
• Without Release - "Assignment and Assumption. Assignor hereby assigns to Assignee, and Assignee hereby accepts and assumes, all of Assignor’s liability to make the Periodic Payments."

Impact for Defendants and ELNY Victims

How does this discussion impact whether defendants/liability insurers have the legal responsibility to make up the difference in ELNY structured settlement shortfall payments?

• NSSTA's Model Qualified Assignment Agreements did not exist during the time period (1985-1990) when ELNY was selling structured settlement annuities.
• Legal rights and responsibilities resulting from attempts to create qualified assignments must be determined on a case by case basis.
• Whatever language parties used to describe and/or label their transactions (e.g. annuity financing; buy and hold; qualified assignment; novation; transfer; etc.) is not by itself determinative of the rights and responsibilities set forth in the actual language of the settlement documentation.
• Some common industry practices, at least during the 1985-1990 time period, could create problems for defendant/liability insurers.
• For example, in the paper he delivered at the Society of Settlement Planners (SSP) 2012 Annual Meeting, attorney David Higgins pointed out how some defendants and liability insurers have attempted "to collapse the creation of the liability with the assignment of the liability to the assignee."
• Higgins, who drafted the text of the 1982 structured settlement law introduced in the House and the Senate, warned that "such a collapse is to be avoided if the definition [of a qualified assignment] is to be met."
• Under U.S. common law, whether a novation has occurred is a question of fact, and the burden of proving it is generally upon the party asserting it.
• The Restatement identifies potential defenses for ELNY structured settlement shortfall victims who attempt to void a novation including misrepresentation (Sections 159-162) and disclaimer (Section 306).
• All ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees, as well as defendants and/or liability insurers who purchased the related ELNY structured settlement annuities, should retain qualified legal counsel to review their settlement documentation.

For S2KM's complete reporting about the ELNY liquidation, see the structured settlement wiki.

ELNY Qualified Assignments

Do qualified assignments extinguish the liability of defendants and/or liability insurers for shortfall payments resulting from the liquidation of Executive Life of New York (ELNY)?

That issue is highlighted by a Motion filed June 14, 2012 on behalf of several liability insurers ("Motion") asking Judge John Gallasso to "clarify and/or correct" his April 16, 2012 ELNY Memorandum Decision. For additional background, see S2KM's blog post "ELNY Shortfall Payments".

Judge Galasso's ELNY Memorandum Decision states in relevant part: "certain insurance companies such as Travelers, the Fireman's Fund Companies and Hartford have assured the Court that they will make up the difference to those identified shortfall payees for any settlement obligation where they purchased an ELNY annuity on behalf of an injured party."

The Motion attempts to distinguish two types of structured settlement funding alternatives ("buy and hold" vs. qualified assignments). "Buy and hold" annuities, according to the Motion, "are those whereby the underlying insurer retained, or held the liability for future payments, and funded that liability through its ownership of a qualified funding asset, or annuity."

In contrast, the Motion states, "where a structured settlement includes a qualified assignment, the defendant and its liability insurer are fully released from future liability - which liability is assumed by the assignee, here, First Executive Corporation." (emphasis added). Of course, one of the problems for all ELNY stakeholders is that First Executive Corporation ceased to exist in 1991.

Regardless of whether Judge Galasso grants the liability insurers' motion, the legal rights and responsibilities of ELNY qualified assignments represents a critical issue that may subsequently be litigated. The Motion suggests that all qualified assignments release all defendants and liability insurers from future liability for promised periodic payments and that annuity ownership determines liability.

Those "suggestions" and/or "assumptions" are not necessarily or universally true. Legal rights and responsibilities resulting from attempts to create qualified assignments must be determined on a case by case basis for multiple reasons:

• IRC section 130, which defines a "qualified assignment", does not address whether the assignor's duty is discharged as a result of a qualified assignment.
• IRC section 130 does include requirements which must be met to successfully create a qualified assignment.
• The Monarch Capital case demonstrates some judges apply "creative" legal analysis to protect structured settlement payees following the bankruptcy of a qualified structured settlement assignee.

See "Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment Judgments" (S2P2J) Section 3.05[9] for information about life insurance insolvencies including ELNY; Section 3.06 for information about qualified assignments; and Section 5.04 which addresses the risk of non-payment to a structured settlement payee.

See the structured settlement wiki for S2KM's complete and continuing reporting about Executive Life of New York,

ELNY Shortfall Payments

Who has responsibility to make up the difference in annuity shortfall payments under the Executive Life of New York (ELNY) Liquidation Plan approved by New York State Supreme Court Judge John Galasso on April 16, 2012?

Attorneys representing several liability insurers who previously purchased ELNY structured settlement annuities have filed a Motion asking Judge Galasso to "clarify and/or correct" his ELNY Memorandum Decision insofar as the Memorandum Decision "caused confusion or mistake" concerning responsibilities of those liability insurers to make up shortfalls on ELNY annuities.

The ELNY Memorandum Decision states in relevant part: "certain insurance companies such as Travelers, the Fireman's Fund Companies and Hartford have assured the Court that they will make up the difference to those identified shortfall payees for any settlement obligation where they purchased an ELNY annuity on behalf of an injured party."

In their June 14, 2012 Motion, attorneys Seiger Gfeller Laurie, representing those liability insurers, as well as Jefferson Insurance Company, Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company dba Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty North America, John Hancock Property and Casualty Insurance Company and John Hancock Indemnity Company, ask the Court to "amend its decision to omit what the Court likely intended as an aside, or background, which is not material to the Court's approval" of the ELNY Liquidation Plan.

The Motion attempts to distinguish two types of structured settlement funding alternatives: "buy and hold" vs. qualified assignments. The Motion maintains that "at no time" did the liability insurers "undertake liability following qualified assignments - liability was extinguished pursuant to the qualified assignment arrangements."

The Motion further attempts to clarify statements made during the ELNY Liquidation hearings by Fireman's Fund attorney Peter Vodola. According to the Motion, Vodola's promise on behalf of Fireman's Fund that structured settlement shortfall payees "will receive a hundred percent of their benefits regardless of what happens here" was specifically limited to ELNY annuitants "who are entitled to payments under annuities owned by Fireman's Fund."

At least one ELNY shortfall victim has already requested that Fireman's Fund make up the difference on a structured settlement funded with a qualified assignment.  The Motion highlights as an Exhibit an April 25, 2012 letter written by attorney Edward Stone to Fireman's Fund's Chief Counsel on behalf of ELNY shortfall victim Jeanice Dolan.

Stone's letter states that Dolan anticipates a 47 percent payment reduction under the ELNY Liquidation Plan resulting in a present value loss of $815,162.62. After quoting the Memorandum Decision language the Motion seeks to "clarify and/or correct", Stone's letter requests Fireman's Fund to compensate Dolan for her ELNY shortfall.

Stone has indicated to S2KM he plans to file opposition papers and a cross motion.

A copy of the Motion to Clarify and/or Correct the Court's Memorandum Decision is posted on the structured settlement wiki.

The ELNY Due Process Issue

Assuming presiding Judge John M. Galasso signs the Order of Liquidation and Approval of a Restructuring Agreement for Executive Life of New York (ELNY) as proposed by the Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (Superintendent), as ELNY's Receiver, a critical issue arises:

Will the ELNY structured settlement shortfall payees have been afforded "due process" before being deprived of a percentage of their payment rights?

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution provide in part:

• Fifth Amendment - "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;"
• Fourteenth Amendment Section 1 - "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

The United States Supreme Court has interpreted these clauses as creating two doctrines: substantive due process and procedural due process.

Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process addresses whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty or property. The most obvious, and presumably adequate, reason why the ELNY liquidation hearing could result in some persons (shortfall payees) being deprived of property (percentage of their annuity payments) is that ELNY is insolvent.

ELNY does not have sufficient assets to meet all of its future payment liabilities. Because of variations in state guaranty association laws (primarily coverage caps) as well as individual ELNY contracts (size of annuities), approximately 15 percent of ELNY's annuity payees (mostly structured settlement payees) anticipate shortfalls while the other 85 percent expect to receive 100 percent of their promised future payments from ELNY's successor company, Guaranty Association Benefits Company (GABC).

Alternative Legal Recourse

Some of the structured settlement shortfall payees should have recourse against defendants and/or liability insurers who funded their structured settlement using a "buy and hold" methodology. Other structured settlement payees, whose structured settlements were funded with qualified assignments, likely would not have similar secondary payment options because First Executive Corporation (FEC), the purchaser and owner of their annuities, declared bankruptcy in 1991 and no longer exists. For an explanation of the difference between "buy and hold" funding and qualified assignments, see this prior S2KM blog post.

Although ELNY shortfall victims (including both policyholders and payees) might have a legal claim against the Superintendent, as Receiver, and his agents, including the New York Liquidation Bureau (NYLB), the Superientent's proposed Liquidation Order includes an immunity clause intended to protect the Superintendent and his agents from any legal claims that they mismanaged the ELNY Rehabilitation and are responsible for ELNY's insolvency. For additional information about the ELNY immunity issue, see this prior S2KM blog post.

Procedural Due Process

Procedural due process addresses whether the government has followed adequate procedures in taking away a person's life, liberty or property. A denial of procedural due process occurs only when there is a denial of life, liberty or property without adequate procedures. For many ELNY structured settlement payees, the probable result of the ELNY Liquidation Order and Restructuring Agreement will be to deny them of a portion of their future structured settlement payment rights. The key question for purposes of procedural due process is whether the procedures that could result in this loss of property have been "adequate".

Structured settlement payees who anticipate shortfalls and their attorneys have argued "no" - the procedures have not been adequate and therefore they anticipate suffering an unconstitutional taking of their property because of:

• Inadequate notice - ELNY's financial records indicate ELNY became insolvent as early as 2002. Former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer held a press conference in 2007 announcing "an agreement in principle" that all future ELNY payments would be paid in full and on time. The NYLB mailed letters to individual ELNY annuity payees on December 7, 2011: 1)  notifying them about the proposed ELNY Liquidation and Restructuring Agreement; and 2) alerting them of anticipated shortfalls for specific ELNY annuity contracts and a January 16, 2012 deadline for filing written objections. Responding to objections of inadequate notice, the Superintendent has argued the ELNY notice and briefing schedule balanced the need for a prompt resolution of ELNY’s deepening insolvency against the ability of affected parties to review and object to the proposed liquidation and Restructuring Agreement.
• Denial of information - ELNY shortfall victims and their attorneys claim they have received inadequate information to properly evaluate the proposed Restructuring Agreement in order to propose possible improvements and/or alternatives. The Superintendent's response: this objection does not constitute grounds for rejecting the Restructuring Agreement because the information sought has been provided or is premature and unnecessary for the Court’s consideration and approval of the Restructuring Agreement. The Superintendent further points out the objectors have not offered a competing plan. During the ELNY hearing, Judge John Galasso denied a motion by attorneys for the structured settlement shortfall victims to gain access to source materials utilized by Jack Gibson, the Superintendent's expert, who testified: 1) GABC is "financially viable"; 2) the Superintendent's proposed plan was "the best plan"; and 3) all ELNY shortfall victims will be better off under the proposed Restructuring Agreement than under a straight liquidation.
• Denial of witnesses - Judge Galasso refused to allow attorneys for ELNY shortfall payees to introduce several expert witnesses stating "they wouldn't help". Among the witnesses not permitted to testify:
  • A former Chief Executive Officer of ELNY.
  • Two expert actuaries.
  • Two forensic accountants one of whom is also an insurance fraud investigator.

In an article published in the Touro Law Review (Vol 16 page 871), titled "Procedural Due Process Claims", constitutional legal expert Erwin Chemerinsky highlights the following three-part balancing test the United States Supreme Court articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) to determine whether an individual has been denied procedural due process:

• The more important the interest to the individual, the more procedural protections the reviewing court is going to require.
• The reviewing court must balance the ability of additional procedures to increase the accuracy of the fact finding; how likely is it that the additional procedures will reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation?
• Whether the government's interest in administrative efficiency is such that the more expensive the procedures would be, the less likely it would be that the reviewing court would require them.

For S2KM's complete reporting about the ELNY Liquidation Hearing, see the structured settlement wiki.